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Chapter	  1:	  Introduction	  
Introduction	  
Crises	  at	  Sea	  On	   6th	   September	   2014,	   a	   boat	   departed	   from	   the	   port	   of	   Damietta,	   on	   Egypt’s	   North	   Coast,	  carrying	  more	   than	  500	  migrants	   from	  Syria,	   Palestine,	   Sudan	   and	  Egypt.	   The	  boat,	   headed	   for	  Malta,	   never	   reached	   its	   destination.	   A	   dispute	   broke	   out	   between	   the	   passengers	   and	   the	  smugglers,	  and	  ultimately	  the	  smugglers	  rammed	  the	  migrants’	  boat,	  causing	  it	  to	  sink.	  Of	  all	  the	  passengers	   on	   board,	   only	   eleven	   reportedly	   survived.	   One	   of	   the	   Palestinian	   passengers	   who	  lived	  to	  tell	  the	  tale,	  clung	  to	  a	  life	  buoy	  for	  a	  day	  and	  a	  half	  before	  being	  rescued	  by	  a	  container	  ship	   that	  was	   already	   carrying	   386	   rescued	  migrants	   from	   another	   sunken	   vessel.	   In	   the	   days	  after	   the	   sinking,	   tragic	  personal	   stories	   emerged	   in	   the	  media	   -­‐	   the	  Egyptian	   teenager	   seeking	  money	  for	  his	  father’s	  medical	  treatment	  who	  clung	  to	  the	  buoy	  for	  hours	  before	  succumbing	  to	  fatigue	  and	  drifting	  into	  the	  ocean;	  the	  man	  who,	  in	  a	  final	  act	  of	  desperation,	  hung	  himself	  on	  the	  boat	  as	  the	  conflict	  with	  the	  smugglers	  escalated;	  and	  the	  watery	  misspelled	  love	  letter	  carried	  by	  a	  young	  Egyptian	  who	  drowned.	  	  The	  news	  emerged	  on	  the	  same	  day	  as	  yet	  another	  boat	  bound	  for	  Europe	  capsized	  off	  the	  coast	  of	   Libya,	  with	   as	  many	   as	   two	   hundred	  more	  migrants	   feared	   dead.	   Spokesperson	   for	   UNHCR,	  Carlotta	   Sami,	   described	   it	   as	   “without	   any	   doubt	   the	   deadliest	   weekend	   ever	   in	   the	  Mediterranean”.	  A	  Libyan	  navy	  spokesperson	  said:	  “There	  are	  so	  many	  dead	  bodies	  floating	  in	  the	  sea”.	  And	   indeed	  he	   is	   right	   -­‐	   the	  number	  of	   lives	   lost	  at	   sea	  has	  peaked	   in	  2014,	  with	   the	   IOM	  estimating	  that	  up	  to	  3,072	  migrants	  have	  died	  in	  the	  Mediterranean	  from	  January	  through	  to	  the	  end	   of	   September	   alone.1	   The	   actual	   number	   of	   fatalities	   is	   likely	   to	   be	  much	   higher,	   as	  many	  deaths	  go	  unrecorded.	  In	  some	  cases,	  entire	  boats	  and	  all	  their	  passengers	  disappear	  at	  sea	  and	  no	  deaths	  are	  ever	  recorded.	  Crossing	  to	  Europe	  from	  the	  Middle	  East	  and	  North	  Africa	  appears	  to	  be	  the	  most	  deadly	  site	  globally	  for	  migrants,	  with	  over	  22,000	  lives	  lost	  since	  2000.	  	  	  In	  the	  same	  month	  as	  these	  Mediterranean	  tragedies,	  on	  the	  other	  side	  of	  the	  world	  the	  Australian	  Immigration	   Minister	   Scott	   Morrison	   was	   claiming	   victory	   in	   his	   battle	   to	   ‘stop	   the	   boats’	  attempting	  to	  arrive	  on	  Australian	  shores.	  Morrison	  was	  pictured	  giving	  a	  triumphant	  thumbs-­‐up	  from	   behind	   an	   Operation	   Sovereign	   Borders	   podium,	   while	   Australian	   newspaper	   headlines	  celebrated	   a	   ‘mission	   accomplished’,	   ‘victory	   at	   sea’,	   boasting	   that	   in	   the	   last	   year	   the	   new	  government	  had	  been	  able	  to	  turn	  back	  12	  boats,	  prevent	  45	  boats	  from	  ever	  leaving	  their	  port,	  and	   send	   1,673	   asylum	   seekers	   ‘back	   to	   where	   they	   came	   from’.	   Despite	   the	   relatively	   small	  
                                                
1 “IOM Releases New Data on Migrant Fatalities Worldwide: Almost 40,000 Since 2000 - International 
Organization for Migration,” 11, accessed September 30, 2014, 
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numbers	   of	   attempted	   sea	   crossings	   to	  Australia,	   a	   huge	   amount	   of	   government	   resources	   and	  public	  sentiment	  are	  invested	  in	  the	  issue	  of	  border	  control.	  The	  Border	  Crossing	  Observatory	  of	  Monash	   University	   in	   Australia	   suggests	   that	   around	   1,500	  migrants	   have	   died	   at	   sea	   in	   their	  journey	  to	  Australia	  between	  2000	  and	  2014.	  	  While	  in	  Australia	  the	  scale	  of	  irregular	  migration	  crossings	   by	   boat	   is	   far	   smaller	   numerically	   and	   even	   proportionately	   compared	   to	   the	  Mediterranean,	   the	   issue	   is	  writ	   large	   in	   the	   national	   imagination	   and	   Australia	   is	   known	   as	   a	  global	  trailblazer	  in	  hard-­‐line	  approaches	  to	  border	  security.	  	  	  Faced	   with	   a	   steady	   flow	   of	   boats,	   Western	   states	   and	   their	   general	   publics	   have	   become	  increasingly	   fixated	   on	   those	  who	   attempt	   to	   undertake	   irregular	   journeys	   by	   sea.	   Despite	   the	  supposed	   legal	   parity	   of	   those	   arriving	   by	   sea	   with	   those	   arriving	   by	   land	   or	   air,	   migrants	  undertaking	   irregular	   maritime	   journeys	   occupy	   a	   particularly	   potent	   form	   of	   threat,	   which	  manifests	   in	   policy	   and	   discursive	   realms	   of	   “Fortress	   Europe”	   and	   Australia.	   As	   migration	  management	   takes	   on	   evermore-­‐draconian	   dimensions,	   the	   border	   has	   become	   an	   irrefutably	  violent	  and	  deadly	  site,	  and	   this	   is	  nowhere	  more	  apparent	   than	   in	   the	  dangerous	  sea	   journeys	  undertaken	  in	  the	  hope	  of	  reaching	  Europe	  or	  Australia.	  Tragic	  events	  like	  those	  described	  above	  are	  no	  longer	  isolated	  incidents;	  stories	  abound	  of	  leaky	  boats,	  drownings,	  shipwrecks,	  standoffs,	  smugglers,	   rescue	   attempts,	   floating	   bodies,	   sodden	   personal	   artefacts,	   and	   long	   lists	   of	   the	  missing.	  	  	  	  	  In	  both	  Europe	  and	  Australia,	  the	  fierce	  political	  debates	  and	  media	  frenzy	  surrounding	  irregular	  maritime	  arrivals	  of	  asylum	  seekers	  are	  permeated	  by	   the	  enduring	  construction	  of	   crisis.2	  The	  crisis	   is	   fed	  by	  the	  ever	  present	  “threat”	  that	  unauthorised	  arrivals	  pose	  to	  national	  security.	  To	  respond	   to	   this	   crisis,	   states	   deploy	   ever	   more	   complex	   and	   punitive	   practices	   to	   ensure	   that	  unauthorised	  migrants,	  as	  far	  as	  possible,	  never	  arrive.	  In	  doing	  so,	  the	  reach	  of	  the	  state	  extends	  offshore,	   extending	   its	   sovereign	   power	   far	   beyond	   the	   margins	   of	   territory.	   A	   host	   of	   new	  technologies	   to	   deter	   ‘unauthorized	   arrivals’	   have	   been	   deployed,	   which	   at	   once	   disrupt	  traditional	   notions	   of	   territoriality,	   while	   simultaneously	   enhancing	   and	   protecting	   territorial	  boundaries.	  These	  strategies	   include	  extraterritorial	  policing	  and	  pre-­‐emptive	   interceptions,	   the	  excision	   of	   territories,	   the	   establishment	   of	   offshore	   detention	   centres,	   and	   a	   host	   of	   “third	  country”	   agreements.	   Border	   enforcement	   prevents	   migrant	   bodies	   from	   seeking	   asylum	   by	  deterring,	   and	   otherwise	   excluding	   them	   from	   jurisdictions	  where	   they	   could	  make	   an	   asylum	  claim.3	  	  
                                                                                                                                                     
http://www.iom.int/cms/render/live/en/sites/iom/home/news-and-views/news-releases/news-listing/iom-releases-
new-data-on-migrant.html. 
2 Michael Grewcock, Border Crimes: Australia’s War on Illicit Migrants (Sydney, N.S.W: Federation Pr, 2010). 
3 Sharon Pickering, “Floating Carceral Spaces: Border Enforcement and Gender on the High Seas,” Punishment 
and Society 16, no. 2 (2014): 187. 
5 
Given	   the	   heated	   political	   debates	   globally	   on	   the	   issue	   of	   irregular	   border-­‐crossings,	   and	   the	  growing	  list	  of	  drowned	  asylum	  seekers	  -­‐	  named	  and	  unnamed	  –	  questions	  arise	  about	  the	  forced	  and	   voluntary	   movement	   of	   bodies	   through	   these	   offshore	   geographies.	   What	   terrains	   of	  sovereignty,	   citizenship	   and	   death	   do	   such	   mobile	   bodies	   move	   within?	   And	   what	   is	   so	  threatening	  about	  a	  particular	  form	  of	  agency	  (manifest	  as	  mobility)	  that	  such	  violent	  and	  absurd	  measures	   are	   required	   to	   capture,	   neutralise	   or	   otherwise	   annihilate	   this	   very	   basic	   form	   of	  human	   freedom?	   	   Is	   there	   something	   particular	   about	   the	   sea	   and	   our	   relationship	   to	   slippery	  offshore	   geographies	   more	   broadly	   that	   invites	   a	   particular	   type	   of	   spatial	   assertion	   of	  sovereignty?	  	  	  
Fluid	  Sovereignties	  	  The	  sea	  is	  full	  of	  possibility	  and	  danger	  -­‐	  at	  once	  the	  site	  of	  potential	  death,	  rescue,	  or	  deliverance.	  It	  has	  emerged	  as	  the	  main	  stage	  where	  various	  spectacular	  encounters	  are	  played	  out	  between	  migrants	   and	   a	   growing	   assemblage	   of	   state,	   non-­‐state	   and	   private	   actors	   entangled	   in	   the	  governance	  of	  migration.	  At	  sea,	  the	  imperatives	  of	  security	  and	  border	  patrol	  are	  entwined	  with	  humanitarianism,	   foreign	   aid,	   peacekeeping	   missions,	   and	   private	   contracts.4	   These	   multiple	  actors	   are	   continually	   reshaping	   the	   contested	   geopolitical	   space	   of	   the	   border,	   against	   the	  backdrop	  of	  colonial	  histories,	  the	  inequities	  of	  globalisation,	  and	  the	  discourses	  and	  technologies	  of	  securitisation.	  	  Increasingly,	  humanitarian	  and	  security	  imperatives	  intersect,	  with	  military	  and	  police	   institutions	  appropriating	  human	  rights	  discourses,	  while	  humanitarian	  agencies	  become	  evermore	   implicated	   in	   the	   enforcement	  of	   securitisation	   agendas.5	  Attempts	   to	   control	   human	  movement	   are	   promoted	   as	   the	   sole	   prerogative	   of	   the	   territorially	   defined	   nation	   state.6	  	  Nonetheless,	  migrant	  bodies	  -­‐	  living	  and	  dead	  -­‐	  continue	  to	  defy	  these	  lines	  drawn	  in	  the	  sea	  and	  manage	  to	  test	  the	  limits	  of	  inclusion	  and	  exclusion.	  	  	  Spatially	  and	  ontologically	  separated	  from	  the	  mainland,	  the	  sea	  and	  its	  island	  territories	  operate	  at	   the	   level	   of	   the	   symbolic	   as	  well	   as	   the	   geopolitical.	   The	   sea,	   in	   all	   its	   fluidity,	   poses	   spatial-­‐political	  challenges	  to	  the	  nation	  state	  and	  territorialised	  conceptions	  of	  sovereignty.	  The	  sea,	  the	  ship,	  the	  island,	  the	  seashore	  are	  all	  ambiguous	  problem-­‐spaces	  for	  Western	  legal	  jurisdiction	  in	  comparison	  to	  the	  territorialised	  space	  of	  the	  state.	  Not	  coincidentally,	  the	  pirate,	  as	  the	  ‘ultimate	  territorial	   transgressor’	   -­‐	   not	   bound	   by	   any	   national	   identification	   and	   harboured	   by	   the	  sovereign-­‐less	  seas	  -­‐	  was	  the	  precursor	  to	  the	  terrorist:	  the	  original	  ‘enemy	  of	  all’.7	  Outside	  of	  the	  
                                                
4 Suvendrini Perera, Australia and the Insular Imagination: Beaches, Borders, Boats, and Bodies (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 5. 
5 Paul Amar, The Security Archipelago: Human-Security States, Sexuality Politics, and the End of Neoliberalism 
(Durham: Duke University Press Books, 2013). 
6 Nicholas De Genova, “The Deportation Regime: Sovereignty, Space and the Freedom of Movement,” in The 
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Peutz (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2010), 34. 
7 Daniel Heller-Roazen, The Enemy of All: Piracy and the Law of Nations (New York  : Cambridge, Mass: Zone 
Books, 2009). 
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law,	   these	   enemies	   and	   their	   outlaw	   territorialities	   challenge	   the	   state	   preoccupation	   with	  territorial	   fixity,	  while	   at	   the	   same	   time	   these	   zones	   of	   illegibility	   and	   ambiguity	   can	   be	   highly	  productive	   for	  state	  power.	   	  Taking	   the	  sea	  as	  a	  site	  of	  analysis,	   it	   is	  clear	   that	   the	  security	  and	  humanitarian	   imperatives	   of	   migration	   management	   play	   out	   according	   to	   particular	   spatial	  imaginaries.	  	  The	   tragic	   dramas	   of	   boats,	   bodies	   and	   borders	   that	   play	   out	   offshore	   reveal	   much	   about	   the	  contemporary	   exercise	   of	   sovereignty.	   Perera	   has	   suggested	   that	   beaches,	   oceans,	   islands	   and	  offshore	  territories	  are	  the	  sites	  where	  sovereignty	  and	  territoriality	  are	  exercised	  in	  distinctive	  ways	  through	  ‘inclusion	  and	  exclusion,	  extension	  and	  contraction,	  where	  the	  limits	  of	  the	  national	  are	   performed	   and	   tested’.8	   From	   pre-­‐emptive	   patrolling	   to	   detention	   in	   remote	   territories,	  struggles	  over	  migration,	   asylum	  and	  exclusion	  play	  out	   along	   the	  margins	  of	   the	  nation-­‐state.9	  These	  edges	  and	  extremities	  of	  the	  geopolitical	  body	  of	  the	  nation	  state	  serve	  to	  remind	  us	  of	  the	  existence	   of	   the	   border	   itself.	   At	   these	   sites,	  where	   the	   finite	   territoriality	   of	   the	   nation	   is	   laid	  bare,	   anxieties	   accrue,	   as	   do	   the	   ‘myths	   and	   fantasies	   that	   assuage	   and	   contain	   the	   anxieties	  generated’.10	  	  There	  are	  broad	  spatial	  and	  conceptual	  patterns	  at	  work	  on	  a	  global	  scale,	  and	  offshore	  locations	  are	  now	  critical	  to	  migration	  governance.	  These	  various	  geographies	  -­‐	  of	  inclusion	  and	  exclusion,	  of	  the	  sublime	  and	  the	  spectacle,	  the	  citizen	  and	  the	  terrorist,	  the	  abject	  and	  the	  spectator	  -­‐	  create	  a	  necropolitical	  terrain	  where	  death,	  or	  being	   ‘let	  die’,	   is	   increasingly	  the	  norm.	  These	  offshores	  sites	  are	  the	  spaces	  between-­‐nations,	  where	  asylum	  seekers	  wait	  -­‐	  often	  for	  lengthy	  durations	  -­‐	  in	  legal	  limbo.	  This	  suspension	  of	  time	  maps	  onto	  the	  corresponding	  spatial	  ambiguity	  of	  these	  sites,	  often	   theorized	   as	   ‘liminality,	   zones	   of	   exception	  or	   thresholds	   between	   states’.11	   These	   liminal	  sites	  signal	  both	  ‘movement	  and	  stagnation,	  transgression	  and	  disruption,	  and	  ambiguous	  forms	  of	  belonging	  that	  map	  onto	  partial	  forms	  of	  citizenship	  and	  statelessness’.12	  	  	  
Spectacular	  Visualities	  The	   regulation	   of	   migration	   within	   a	   crisis/securitisation	   discourse	   would	   not	   be	   possible	  without	   heavy	   investment	   in	   the	   discursive	   and	   representational	   realms.	   Securitisation	   and	  humanitarianism	  rely	  upon	  the	  production	  of	  a	  particular	  kind	  of	  spectacle.	  Over	  the	  last	  decade,	  such	  affective	  spectacles	  have	  proliferated	  -­‐	   from	  those	  of	  militarised	  border	  policing13,	   through	  
                                                
8 Perera, Australia and the Insular Imagination, 4. 
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11 Alison Mountz, “Where Asylum-Seekers Wait: Feminist Counter-Topographies of Sites between States,” 
Gender, Place & Culture: A Journal of Feminist Geography 18, no. 3 (2011): 381-2 
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to	   the	   spectacle	   of	   the	   shipwreck,	   described	   by	   Perera	   as	   a	   ‘theatre	   of	   sublime	   trauma’.14	   The	  visuality	   of	   such	   spectacles	   plays	   a	   key	   role	   in	   the	   reproduction	   of	   securitisation	   and	  humanitarian	   discourses	   of	  migration.	   In	   his	   book	   on	   the	   emergence	   of	   human-­‐security	   states,	  Paul	  Amar	  has	  argued	  that	  hypervisibilisation	  (the	  ‘spotlighting	  of	  certain	  identities	  and	  bodies	  as	  sources	  of	  radical	  insecurity	  and	  moral	  panic	  in	  ways	  that	  actually	  render	  invisible	  the	  real	  nature	  of	   power	   and	   social	   control’)	   and	   securitisation	   (the	   ‘reconfiguration	   of	   political	   debates	   and	  claims	   around	   social	   justice,	   political	   participation,	   or	   resource	   distribution	   into	   technical	  assessments	   of	   danger,	   operations	   of	   enforcement	   and	   targeting	   of	   risk	   populations’)	   are	   key	  tenets	  in	  human-­‐security	  modes	  of	  governance.15	  	  The	   tacit	   public	   approval	   of	   the	   state’s	   punitive	   treatment	   of	   asylum	   seekers	   relies	   upon	   a	  particular	  aesthetic	  and	  discursive	  treatment	  of	  asylum	  seekers.	  The	  spectacle	  attached	  to	  asylum	  seeking	   -­‐	   a	   spectacle	   of	   shipwrecks,	   drownings,	   rescues	   on	   the	   high	   seas,	   and	   remote	   island	  detention	   centres	   –	   is	   critical.	   This	   spectacle	   not	   only	   contributes	   to	   the	   discourse	   around	  migration	  by	  fuelling	  the	  fire	  of	  crisis,	  but	  also	  serves	  to	  manufacture	  a	  certain	  brand	  of	  horror.	  The	  spectacle	  and	  the	  horror	  themselves	  circulate,	  attaching	  to	  the	  abject	  figure	  of	  the	  migrant	  in	  the	  public	  imagination.	  Equally	  critical	  are	  those	  spaces	  that	  remain	  unseen	  -­‐	  the	  remote	  offshore	  territories	   that	   have	  become	   the	   cornerstone	  of	  migration	  detention	  policies,	   for	   the	  most	  part	  kept	   out	   of	   view	   of	   the	  mainland,	  with	  media	   access	   granted	   in	   limited	  ways	   according	   to	   the	  state’s	   wishes.	   The	   island	   territory	   and	   the	   deep	   sea	   are	   paradoxically	   both	   out	   of	   sight	   and	  spectacularly	   illuminated,	   but	   all	   the	   while	   under	   intense	   surveillance	   using	   highly	   visual	  technologies.	  	  	  Technologies	  of	  extra-­‐territorial	  and	  offshore	  border	  policing	  rely	  on	   increasingly	  sophisticated	  ‘statist	   regimes	   of	   visuality’.16	   These	   include	   biometric	   technologies,	   human	   detection	   sensors,	  surveillance	  drones	  and	  satellite	   tracking	   systems.17	   In	  order	   to	   justify	   these	  draconian	  border-­‐policing	   measures,	   the	   state	   maintains	   an	   ongoing	   project	   of	   legitimation	   that	   relies	   upon	   the	  visible	  production	  and	  reproduction	  of	  particular	  -­‐	  and	  spectacular	  -­‐	  images	  of	  crisis,	  terror	  and	  horror	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  threat	  posed	  by	  irregular	  migrants.	  The	  distant	  geographies	  of	  offshore	  sites	  -­‐	  the	  high	  seas,	  remote	  island	  detention	  centres	  and	  other	  offshore	  territories	  -­‐	  ensure	  that	  irregular	  migrants	  are	  largely	  out	  of	  sight,	  with	  the	  exception	  of	  the	  strategic	  production	  of	  visual	  spectacles	  of	  trauma	  and	  horror.	  The	  violent	  measures	  used	  by	  states	  and	  private	  border	  security	  contractors	   often	   take	   place	   far	   from	   the	   public	   eye.	   Despite	   the	   distances,	   technology	   allows	  visual	  messages	   to	  cross	  borders	   in	  multiple	  directions	   -­‐	  going	   to	  and	   from	  the	  offshore	  spaces	  where	  migrants	  are	  detained.	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  Migrants	   held	   in	   detention	   attempt	   to	   make	   themselves	   visible	   to	   the	   public	   through	   creating	  their	  own	  spectacles	  (such	  as	  violent	  acts	  of	  self	  harm)	  or	  through	  publishing	  photos,	  testimonies	  and	   letters	   online	   through	   activists	   and	   other	   advocacy	   networks.	   The	   state,	   for	   its	   part,	   also	  relies	   on	   sending	   visual	  messages	   to	   asylum	   seekers	   and	  potential	   asylum	   seekers.	   These	  have	  included	  multilingual	   billboards,	   graphic	   novels,	  websites,	   booklets	   and	   video	  messages.	   Visual	  processes	  are	  thereby	  used	  by	  states,	  irregular	  migrants,	  the	  media,	  NGOs,	  activist	  and	  advocacy	  groups,	   to	   achieve	   certain	   types	   of	   visibility	   and	   invisibility.	   The	   spatiality	   of	   offshore	   sites	   is	  critical	   to	   the	   functioning	   of	   these	   visual	   strategies.	   These	   processes	   manipulate	   distance	   and	  proximity,	  and	  serve	  to	  criminalise	  irregular	  migrants	  in	  both	  discursive	  and	  material	  ways.18	  	  
Research	  Questions	  In	   light	   of	   these	   recent	   trends,	   this	   thesis	   seeks	   to	   broadly	   examine	   the	   relationship	   between	  migration,	   securitisation	   and	   crises	   of	   sovereignty	   within	   the	   contemporary	   transnational	  governance	   of	   human	   mobility.	   Its	   focus	   is	   on	   the	   ways	   in	   which	   offshore	   geographies	   and	  visualities	  combine	  to	  produce	  a	  form	  of	  spectacular	  horror	  that	  becomes	  attached	  to	  the	  migrant	  body.	  It	  will	  examine	  the	  functioning	  of	  visibility	  and	  invisibility	  in	  liminal	  spaces,	  particularly	  in	  those	   offshore	   sites	   where	   acts	   of	   border	   policing	   take	   place.	   I	   will	   attempt	   to	   connect	   those	  events	  happening	  at	  the	  sites	  between	  nation-­‐states	  with	  those	  events	  taking	  place	  domestically	  within	   sovereign	   territories:	   exclusion,	   the	   politics	   of	   terror,	  media	   depictions,	   state	   visualities	  and	  counter-­‐visualities.19	  	  	  My	   geographical	   focus	   is	   on	   the	   edge-­‐of-­‐territory	   and	   beyond	   -­‐	   that	   is,	   the	   beaches,	   islands,	  offshore	  territories	  and	  the	  deep	  sea	  -­‐	  where	  these	  maritime	  spectacles	  take	  place,	  particularly	  in	  crossing	  the	  Mediterranean	  Sea	  from	  North	  Africa	  to	  Europe,	  and	  in	  the	  waters	  north	  of	  Australia.	  These	  spaces	  at	   territory’s	  edge	  and	  beyond	  need	   to	  be	  contextualised	  and	   located	  within	   their	  particular	  histories	  of	  imperialism,	  colonialism	  and	  militarisation.	  To	  do	  so	  serves	  to	  differentiate	  these	  sites	  from	  one	  another,	  according	  to	  their	  historical	  and	  material	  specificities.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	   attending	   to	   the	   patterns	   of	   power	   and	   space	   operating	   in	   offshore	   sites	   can	   help	   us	   to	  connect	   spatially	   distant	   and	   historically	   unique	   sites	   within	   a	   broader	   regime	   of	   mobility	  control.20	  	  	  	  Taking	  the	  sea	  and	  offshore	  geographies	  as	  my	  site,	  I	  wish	  to	  explore	  this	  distinctly	  contemporary	  form	   of	   migration	   governance	   which	   combines	   the	   discourses	   of	   securitisation	   and	  humanitarianism	  with	  visual	  registers	  of	  exposure,	  erasure	  and	  the	  spectacle.	  The	  functioning	  of	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19 cf. Ibid., 383. and Cindi Katz, “On the Grounds of Globalization: A Topography for Feminist Political 
Engagement,” Signs, Globalization and Gender, 26, no. 4 (2001): 1213–34. 
20 cf. Ibid. 
9 
these	  technologies	  is	  far	  from	  purely	  discursive	  or	  symbolic;	  as	  I	  will	  demonstrate,	  these	  offshore	  geographies	   and	   visualities	   are	   a	   form	   of	   sovereign	   power	   that	   has	   devastating	   material	  consequences	  for	  migrants.	  In	  order	  to	  animate	  this	  discussion,	  I	  will	  examine	  a	  set	  of	  examples	  from	  my	   two	   sites	   -­‐	   the	  Mediterranean	   and	   Australia’s	   offshore	   -­‐	   and	   bring	   them	   into	   the	   one	  analytical	   frame.	   Through	   an	   analysis	   of	   these	   examples,	   the	   role	   of	   visuality,	   the	   sublime	  spectacle,	  and	  the	  manufacture	  of	  horror	  are	  laid	  bare.	  I	  wish	  to	  explore	  the	  global	  fixation	  with	  those	   who	   travel	   by	   sea,	   and	   the	   role	   of	   visuality	   and	   horror	   in	   justifying	   the	   increasingly	  securitised	  and	  militarised	  response	  to	  maritime	  migrations.	  	  	  My	   thesis	   seeks	   to	   consider	   three	   primary	   questions	   through	   the	   examination	   of	   a	   number	   of	  examples.	   Firstly,	   what	   historical	   and	   geographical	   patterns	   emerge	   in	   the	   increasing	   use	   of	  offshore	  and	  marginal	  sites,	  by	  Australia	  and	  the	  EU,	   in	  the	  ongoing	  securitisation	  of	  migration?	  Second,	   in	   moments	   of	   crises,	   how	   does	   securitisation	   come	   to	   deploy	   both	   carceral	   and	  humanitarian	   technologies	   simultaneously?	  And	   finally,	   how	  do	  visual	   regimes	  across	  maritime	  spaces	   and	   the	   edges	   of	   territory	   serve	   to	   both	   expose	   and	   erase	   migrants,	   while	   producing	  spectacles	  of	  trauma?	  	  	  These	  three	  questions	  will	  be	  addressed	  across	  four	  chapters,	  followed	  by	  a	  conclusion.	  Chapter	  
One:	   “Introduction”	   introduces	   the	   research,	   its	   methodology,	   and	   reviews	   the	   relevant	  literature	  in	  order	  to	  locate	  this	  work	  within	  a	  particular	  genealogy	  of	  thinking	  and	  writing	  about	  sovereignty,	  space,	  migration,	  humanitarianism	  and	  securitisation.	  	  	  
Chapter	  Two	  “Spatial	  Practices	  of	  Bordering:	  Islands	  and	  Other	  Offshore	  Strategies”	  focuses	  on	   the	   emerging	   spatial	   practises	   used	   by	   states,	   particularly	   the	   geographical	   articulation	   of	  sovereignty	  upon	  islands	  and	  peripheral	  spaces	  during	  times	  of	  crisis.	  I	  will	  look	  at	  the	  decoupling	  of	  sovereignty	  and	  territory,	  the	  role	  of	  islands	  in	  the	  Western	  imaginary,	  and	  outline	  the	  specific	  histories	   and	   geographies	   of	   four	   sites	   -­‐	   Lampedusa	   and	   Melilla	   in	   the	   Mediterranean,	   and	  Christmas	   Island	   and	   Nauru	   to	   the	   north	   of	   Australia.	   I	   will	   argue	   in	   this	   chapter	   that	   across	  distant	  geographies	  there	  are	  horizontal	  contours	  of	  connection	  and	  similarity	  across	  these	  sites.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  on	  a	  temporal	  axis,	  the	  current	  use	  of	  these	  sites	  cannot	  be	  separated	  from	  their	  respective	  histories	  of	  indigeneity,	  militarism,	  colonialism,	  and	  economic	  exploitation.	  	  	  	  	  	  In	  Chapter	  Three	  “Human	  Security?	  Risky	  Bodies	  in	  Times	  of	  Crisis”	  I	  examine	  contemporary	  securitisation	  discourses.	   I	   focus	  on	   the	  ways	   in	  which	   the	  perception	  and	  production	  of	   crises	  trigger	   state	   security	   responses,	   which	   combine	   the	   punitive	   measure	   of	   detention	   with	  humanitarian	   imperatives.	   I	   will	   focus	   on	   the	   intersection	   of	   security	   and	   humanitarian	  imperatives	  in	  relation	  to	  Syrian	  refugees	  in	  Egypt.	  I	  will	  look	  at	  the	  causal	  factors	  that	  led	  to	  the	  mass	  exodus	  by	  sea,	  which	  can	  be	  attributed	  to	  security	  concerns,	  of	  both	  the	  state	  and	  refugees	  themselves.	   I	   will	   consider	   the	   speech	   acts	   of	   political	   elites	   that	   contribute	   to	   securitisation	  
10 
responses	   and	   the	   reshaping	   of	   the	   Self/Other	   relationship.	   I	   will	   highlight	   the	   ways	   in	   which	  securitisation	   and	   humanitarian	   imperatives	   converge	   upon	   the	   refugee	   body	   in	   moments	   of	  national	  crisis.	  	  	  
Chapter	   Four,	   “Visual	   Regimes:	   Surveillance,	   Shipwrecks	   and	   the	   Spectacle	   of	   Suffering”	  attends	  to	  the	  role	  of	  visuality	  and	  the	  spectacle	  in	  the	  production	  and	  management	  of	  maritime	  migrations.	  Firstly	   I	  will	   consider	   the	   statist	  visuality	   regimes	  used	   in	   the	   surveillance	  of	  water	  bodies	  and	  refugee	  bodies,	  and	   the	  potentiality	   for	   this	  visual	  data	   to	  be	  re-­‐appropriated	   to	   tell	  counter-­‐stories.	  Following	  this	  I	  will	  focus	  on	  the	  concept	  of	  the	  spectacle	  of	  suffering	  and	  trauma,	  looking	  at	  both	  shipwrecks	  and	  offshore	  migrant	  detention.	  I	  will	  argue	  that	  refugees	  undertaking	  maritime	   migrations	   or	   being	   held	   in	   offshore	   detention	   centres	   are	   represented	   along	   visual	  registers	   which	   serve	   to	   both	   expose	   and	   erase.	   One	   aspect	   of	   this	   exposure	   -­‐	   which	   also	  constitutes	   an	   erasure	   -­‐	   is	   the	   production	   of	   spectacle,	   particularly	   the	   shipwreck,	   but	   also	   the	  incarcerated	   refugee,	   or	   the	   self-­‐harming	   protesting	   refugee.	   I	   will	   examine	   the	   conditions	   of	  carceral	   horror	   produced	   in	   Australia’s	   Manus	   Island	   detention	   facility	   and	   the	   way	   these	  conditions	  are	  visually	  mobilised	  by	  the	  Australian	  government	  as	  a	  lesson	  in	  deterrence.	  	  	  The	   final	   section	   is	   the	   Conclusion	   in	   which	   I	   will	   bring	   together	   the	   three	   aspects	   of	  contemporary	   migration	   management	   that	   I	   have	   considered	   -­‐	   its	   offshore	   geographical	  articulations,	   the	   securitisation-­‐humanitarian	  nexus,	   and	   regimes	   of	   spectacular	   visuality.	   I	  will	  consider	   what	   these	   patterns	   reveal	   to	   us	   about	   contemporary	   management	   of	   migration	   and	  manifestations	  of	  sovereignty	  in	  moments	  of	  crisis.	  	  	  	  
Methodology	  This	   thesis	   is	   essentially	   a	   series	   of	   theoretical	   and	   empirical	   enquiries	   into	   the	   interrelated	  categories	  of	  migration,	  security	  and	  humanitarianism.	  It	  seeks	  to	  examine	  topographies	  of	  power	  operating	  transnationally	  across	  a	  range	  of	  sites	  located	  offshore	  or	  at	  territory’s	  edge,	  inhabited	  by	  asylum	  seekers.	  The	  methodology	  seeks	  to	  connect	  distant	  nodes	  that	  give	  shape	  to	  an	  overall	  constellation	  that	  reveals	  something	  of	  the	  form	  of	  contemporary	  migration	  governance.	  It	  does	  not	  seek	  to	  undertake	  comparative	  work,	  but	  rather	  to	  highlight	  particular	  nodes,	  events,	  images	  and	  speech	  acts	  which	  reveal	  the	  working	  of	  power	  at	  a	  local	  level,	  connected	  to	  the	  transnational.	  	  	  In	  this	  sense,	  I	  am	  influenced	  methodologically	  by	  geographers	  Alison	  Mountz	  and	  Cindi	  Katz	  in	  their	  topographical	  approach.21	  While	  topography	  is	  traditionally	  seen	  as	  made	  up	  of	  landscapes	  and	   their	   description	   or	   representation,	   Katz	   uses	   topography	   as	   a	   research	  method.	   For	   Katz,	  topography-­‐as-­‐method	   enables	   a	   ‘situated,	   but	   at	   the	   same	   time	   scale-­‐jumping	   and	   geography-­‐
                                                
21 Mountz, “Where Asylum Seekers Wait.” and Katz, “On the Grounds of Globalization.” 
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crossing’	   response.22	   She	   argues	   that	   while	   topography	   is	   ‘resolutely	   material’,	   there	   are	  ‘productive	   metaphorical	   entailments	   of	   the	   idea	   as	   well’.	   A	   multi-­‐sited	   topography	   enables	  relationships	   and	  movements	   across	   spaces	   and	   between	   places	   to	   be	   examined,	   including	   the	  movement	   of	   people,	   labour,	   capital	   and	   cultural	   products.	   Contour	   lines	   -­‐	   as	   used	   on	   a	  topographical	  map	  -­‐	  connect	  places	  that	  share	  an	  altitude	  in	  order	  to	  reveal	  the	  three-­‐dimensional	  shape	   of	   the	   terrain.23	   In	   applying	   contour	   lines	   to	   analysis	   of	   multiple	   sites,	   places	   can	   be	  connected	  analytically	  to	  other	  places	  at	  the	  same	  “elevation”	   in	  relation	  to	  a	  particular	  process	  (e.g.	   global	   management	   of	   migration),	   while	   maintaining	   their	   own	   distinctness.24	   Such	   an	  approach	   seeks	   to	  map	   the	   neo-­‐colonial	   power	   relations	   that	   shape	  migration	   governance	   and	  reveal	   the	   material	   and	   affective	   disparities	   at	   work.	   In	   this	   way,	   a	   topographical	   approach	  enables	  analysis	  grounded	  in	  a	  politics	  of	  location,	  while	  linking	  global	  and	  local	  scales.25	  While	  a	  thorough	   topography	   of	   my	   sites,	   including	   historical	   and	   geographical	   analysis	   of	   social	   and	  material	  practices,	  is	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  thesis,	  I	  have	  attempted	  to	  provide	  at	  least	  a	  brief	  topographical	  analysis	  of	  my	  offshore	  sites.	  	  	  To	  draw	  upon	  another	  spatial	  metaphor	  pertaining	  to	  methodology,	  I	  have	  also	  been	  influenced	  by	   Paul	   Amar’s	   “archipelago	   method”.26	   Amar	   uses	   a	   range	   of	   interpretive	   methods	   to	   bring	  together	  transnational	  events,	  practices	  and	  discourses	  in	  Cairo	  and	  Rio	  de	  Janeiro.	  He	  examines	  a	  range	   of	   examples	   from	   the	   two	   sites	   and	   interprets	   them	   in	   a	  way	   that	   advances	   his	   broader	  argument	  -­‐	  that	  human	  security	  discourses27	  are	  replacing	  neoliberalism	  as	  the	  dominant	  form	  of	  governance	  in	  the	  global	  south.	  	  The	   thesis	   methodology	   draws	   upon	   a	   combination	   of	   fieldwork	   and	   theoretical	   and	   textual	  analysis.	   The	   empirical	   fieldwork	  has	   been	  undertaken	  within	  Egypt	   and	   consists	   of	   a	   range	   of	  formal	  and	  informal	  research	  methods	  undertaken	  over	  the	  last	  three	  and	  a	  half	  years	  of	  living	  in	  Cairo.	  Semi-­‐structured	  interviews	  were	  carried	  out	  with	  refugee	  service	  providers	  ranging	  from	  UNHCR	   to	   international	   NGOs,	   through	   to	   local	   NGOs,	   faith-­‐based	   organisations	   and	   Syrian	  community	  organisations,	  as	  well	  innumerable	  conversations	  with	  African	  and	  Syrian	  refugees	  in	  Egypt.	   The	   research	   also	   draws	   upon	   knowledge	   gained	   while	   teaching	   English	   to	   refugees	   at	  Saint	   Andrew’s	   Refugee	   Services.	   In	   my	   role	   as	   a	   freelance	   consultant,	   I	   have	   undertaken	  
                                                
22 Ibid., 1216. 
23 Ibid., 1229. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Mountz, “Where Asylum Seekers Wait,” 383. 
26 Amar, The Security Archipelago. 
27 The paradigm of “human security” rose to prominence in the mid 1990s as a challenge the traditional notion of 
national security, which shifted the emphasis onto individual human security. While proffered as an alternative 
paradigm, Paul Amar is highly critical of the notion. This will be discussed further later in the thesis but it is 
important to note here that Amar is critical of the term for propagating an alignment of humanitarian and police 
and military concerns under a broader rubric of human security. My use of the term follows Amar’s here, rather 
than the institutionalized notion of the term patronised by UN agencies and NGOs.  
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observation	  and	  participant-­‐observation	  methods	  while	  working	  as	  a	  researcher	  for	  UNHCR	  and	  Plan	  International	  undertaking	  research	  projects	  and	  assessments	  regarding	  Syrians	  in	  Egypt.	  	  As	  well	  as	  my	  involvement	  with	  NGOs,	  I	  have	  also	  been	  in	  contact	  with,	  and	  at	  times	  participated	  in,	   Egyptian	   refugee	   solidarity	   campaigns	   such	   as	   Refugee	   Solidarity	   Movement	   (RSM)	   and	   in	  Australia	  with	   the	  Refugee	  Action	  Collective	  (RAC).	  Data	  pertaining	   to	  refugees	   in	  Egypt,	  with	  a	  focus	  on	  Syrians,	  has	  been	  drawn	   from	  UNHCR	  assessments,	   INGO	  assessments,	  documentation	  work	  carried	  out	  by	  the	  RSM	  on	  detentions	  and	  deportations,	  and	  from	  research	  I	  have	  conducted	  myself.	   The	   textual	   analysis	   components	   are	   informed	   by	   following	   mainstream	   media,	   social	  media,	  and	  alternative	  media	  campaigns	  in	  order	  to	  identify	  the	  circulation	  of	  popular	  texts	  and	  images	  in	  both	  Australia	  and	  Egypt	  or	  the	  greater	  Mediterranean	  space.	  In	  Australia,	  government	  documents	  are	  far	  easier	  to	  obtain	  as	  these	  are	  clearly	  articulated,	  published,	  produced	  in	  English,	  and	   available	   online.	   In	   the	   EU	   countries,	   government	   documents	   are	   often	   available	   online,	  although	  not	  as	  readily	  as	  in	  Australia	  and	  not	  all	  of	  them	  in	  English.	  In	  Egypt,	  such	  government	  documents	   pertaining	   to	   refugees	   are	   far	   harder	   to	   obtain.	   To	   this	   end,	   I	   have	   relied	   upon	  documentation	   of	   experiences	   as	   reported	   by	   refugees	   themselves	   and	   service	   providing	  organisations	  working	  with	  refugees.	  I	  have	  worked	  with	  a	  research	  assistant/translator	  at	  some	  points	   during	   the	   research	   in	   order	   to	   identify	   and	   translate	  Arabic	  media	   circulating	   in	   Egypt	  pertaining	   to	   refugees,	   particularly	   Syrians	   and	   the	   significant	   discursive	   shift	   that	   occurred	   in	  relation	  to	  their	  position	  in	  Egypt.	  I	  rely	  extensively	  upon	  my	  relationships	  in	  Egypt	  and	  informal	  ways	   of	   knowing,	   and	   have	   privileged	   this	   over	  more	   formal	  methodologies.	   This	   thesis	   is	   the	  result	  of	  many	   innumerable	  hours	  of	  conversation,	  of	  anecdotes,	  of	  questions	  and	  answers,	  and	  observations.	  	  
Literature	  Review	  The	  contemporary	  moment	  is	  an	  era	  in	  which	  all	  aspects	  of	  human	  mobility	  have	  been	  subject	  to	  an	   expansion	   of	   securitisation	   and	   militarisation.	   The	   punitive	   approach	   to	   migration	  management	   is	  executed	  across	   inequitable	   terrain,	  such	  that	  some	  mobile	  bodies	  are	  rendered	  abject	   to	   the	   extent	   that	   they	   can	  be	  killed,	   or	   at	   least	   “let	   die”.28	   In	   studying	   the	   securitisation	  discourses	   surrounding	   human	   trafficking,	   Claudia	   Aradau	   has	   argued	   that	   security	   entails	   the	  promise	  of	  ontological	  and	  epistemological	   certainty.29	  For	  Aradau,	   this	  promise	   rests	  upon	   the	  ‘exclusion	  and	  abjectification	  of	  another,	  who	  is	  repudiated	  as	  dangerous	  or	  risky,	  turned	  into	  life	  which	  is	  not	  life	  and	  ‘materiality’	  which	  does	  not	  matter’.30	  She	  goes	  on	  to	  say	  that	  such	  spaces	  of	  abjection	  are	  created	  through	  ‘symbolic	  practices	  (institutional	  and	  non-­‐institutional,	  mobilizing	  technologies,	  knowledge	  and	  language)	  and	  an	  imaginary	  of	  security	  as	  desirable	  stasis’.	  	  	  
                                                
28 Achille Mbembe, “Necropolitics,” Public Culture 15, no. 1 (2003): 11–40. 
29 Claudia Aradau, Rethinking Trafficking in Women: Politics out of Security (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2008), 63. 
30 Maijer and Prins (1998:281) in Ibid. 
13 
Taking	  Aradau’s	  formulation	  as	  my	  point	  of	  departure,	  I	  would	  like	  to	  take	  a	  few	  steps	  backwards	  and	   begin	  with	   the	   notions	   of	   exclusion,	   abjectification	   and	   the	   figure	   of	   a	   dangerous	   or	   risky	  enemy,	  whose	  life	  does	  not	  count	  as	  life	  as	  such.	  Many	  theorists	  have	  drawn	  upon	  Foucault,	  and	  more	   recently	   Agamben,	   to	   engage	   and	   challenge	   their	   respective	   formulations	   of	   biopower’s	  relationship	   to	   sovereignty,	   exclusion	   and	   the	  migrant.	   I	  will	   consider	   Agamben’s	   theorising	   of	  “bare	   life”	   and	   the	   “state	   of	   exception”,	   and	   the	   ways	   in	   which	   other	   scholars	   have	   critically	  engaged	   these	   notions.	   Political	   and	   feminist	   geographers,	   political	   scientists,	   sociologists	   and	  anthropologists	   have	   all	   variously	   attended	   to	   the	   emerging	   spatialities	   and	   temporalities	   of	  human	   mobility	   and	   examined	   how	   these	   relate	   to	   power,	   labour,	   detention	   and	   deportation	  regimes,	  and	  to	  death	  itself.	  In	  this	  sense,	  the	  literature	  review	  aims	  to	  set	  the	  broader	  theoretical	  stage	  around	  migration,	  sovereignty,	  territoriality,	  space	  and	  exclusion.	  I	  have	  therefore	  focused	  the	  literature	  review	  on	  the	  debates	  around	  the	  key	  concepts	  of	  sovereignty	  and	  its	  relationship	  to	  territory	  and	  matters	  of	  life	  and	  death.	  	  The	  following	  chapters	  will	  build	  upon	  these	  notions	  to	  explore	   the	   geographical	   articulations,	   security	   imaginaries,	   and	   the	   practices	   of	   spectacular	  abjection	  that	  characterise	  contemporary	  migration	  management.	  	  	  	  Within	   the	   literature	   on	  migration,	   notions	   of	   citizenship,	   territories	   and	   the	   nation-­‐state	   have	  come	  under	  critical	  scrutiny.	  While	  considerations	  of	  space	  and	  place	  now	  operate	  on	  a	  scale	  far	  beyond	   that	   of	   the	   nation-­‐state,	   there	   remains	   an	   ongoing	   contestation	   around	   the	   role	   of	   the	  state	  and	  questions	  of	  sovereignty.	  The	  ongoing	  relevance	  of	  the	  nation	  state	  is	  usually	  framed	  in	  terms	  of	  sovereignty,	  which	   is	  seen	  as	   the	  state’s	  distinguishing	   feature,	   the	  erosion	  of	  which	   is	  viewed	  as	  a	  measure	  of	  ‘impaired	  state	  capacity’31.	  	  The	  sovereign	  power	  to	  regulate	  and	  restrict	  human	  movement	   though	  space	  has	   in	  recent	  decades	  become	  simultaneously	  more	  militarised	  and	   more	   bureaucratic.	   While	   there	   has	   been	   a	   flourishing	   of	   administrative	   process	   in	   an	  attempt	  to	  further	  regulate	  and	  restrict	  human	  movement,	  De	  Genova	  cautions	  us	  against	  reading	  migration	   management	   as	   a	   matter	   of	   “administration”.	   He	   reminds	   us	   that	   limiting	   human	  movement	   is	   an	   imposition	   of	   a	   power	   over	   life	   itself.32	   There	   is	   therefore	   a	   fundamental	  relationship	   between	   migration,	   state	   sovereignty,	   citizenship,	   national	   identity	   and	   the	   social	  production	  of	  nation	  state	  spaces.33	  	  	  While	  traditional	  IR	  definitions	  of	  sovereignty	  have	  located	  sovereignty	  within	  the	  borders	  of	  the	  nation	   state,	   critical	   scholars	   in	   recent	   decades	   have	   followed	   Foucault’s	   formulation	   that	  sovereignty	   ultimately	   resides	   in	   the	   power	   to	   dictate	   who	   may	   live	   and	   who	   may	   die.34	   One	  
                                                
31 Catherine Dauvergne, Making People Illegal: What Globalization Means for Migration and Law, Law in 
Context (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 32. 
32 De Genova, “The Deportation Regime,” 13. 
33 Ibid., 28. 
34 Specifically, Foucault detailed a 19th Century shift from the old sovereign prerogative to ‘take life or let live’ 
was complemented (but not replaced) by a new right - to ‘make live and let die’. Michel Foucault, “Society Must 
Be Defended”: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1975-1976, trans. David Macey, Reprint edition (New York: 
Picador, 2003), 241. 
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extension	   of	   Foucault’s	   theorisation	   that	   has	   rose	   to	   prominence	   within	   critical	   scholarly	  discourse	  on	  migration	  is	  Italian	  philosopher	  Giorgio	  Agamben’s	  formulation	  of	  “bare	  life”	  and	  the	  “state	   of	   exception”.35	   Agamben’s	   work	   has	   been	   credited	   with	   providing	   ‘fertile	   territory	   for	  critical	  work	  on	  the	  meanings	  of	  torture,	  the	  accrual	  of	  emergency	  powers	  to	  the	  executive,	  and	  the	  camp’.36	  Given	  the	  increasing	  application	  of	  exceptional	  measures,	  emergency	  powers	  and	  the	  global	   rise	   in	  migrant	   detention	   “camps”,	   Agamben’s	  work	  has	   enjoyed	  wide	   circulation	  within	  critical	   literature	   on	   the	   war	   against	   terror,	   the	   deployment	   of	   emergency	   powers,	   and	   the	  relegation	  of	  the	  refugee	  body	  to	  a	  state	  of	  abjection	  -­‐	  what	  Agamben	  calls	  ‘bare	  life’.37	  	  	  Agamben	   draws	   upon	   Foucault’s	   conception	   of	   biopolitics	   to	   extend	   Carl	   Schmitt’s	   (avowedly	  fascist)	   conceptualisation	   of	   political	   power.	   For	   Schmitt,	   the	   essence	   of	   sovereignty	   is	   the	  decision	   over	   what	   constitutes	   the	   exception	   and	   what	   measures	   to	   take	   to	   deal	   with	   the	  exception.	   The	   rationale	   for	   introducing	   the	   state	   of	   exception,	   according	   to	   Schmitt,	   is	   to	  preserve	   the	  normal.	  He	  writes,	   ‘The	  state	  suspends	   the	   law	   in	   the	  exception	  on	   the	  basis	  of	   its	  right	   of	   self-­‐preservation’.38	   In	   other	   words,	   the	   law	   is	   “temporarily”	   suspended	   in	   order	   to	  preserve	  the	  legal	  order	  and	  the	  state	  itself.	  	  Schmitt’s	  political	  theory	  focuses	  on	  the	  functioning	  of	  the	  law	  and	  the	  state	  in	  a	  context	  of	  an	  ever-­‐present	  threat	  of	  conflict	  and	  crisis,	  and	  views	  the	  law	  and	  its	  institutions	  as	  essential	  to	  the	  maintenance	  of	  order.39	  It	  is	  the	  sovereign	  power	  that	  determines	  definitively	  what	  constitutes	  public	  order	  and	  security,	  and	  determines	  when	  they	  are	  disturbed.40	   In	   Schmitt’s	   view,	   it	   is	   the	   role	   of	   the	   sovereign	   state	   to	   ensure	   that	   violence	   and	  conflict	  is	  bracketed	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  protects	  the	  legal	  order.	  Non-­‐sanctioned	  violence	  poses	  an	  existential	  threat	  to	  the	  legal	  order,	  not	  so	  much	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  evil	  outcomes	  such	  violence	  might	  result	  in,	  but	  rather	  that	  through	  flouting	  the	  law,	  this	  kind	  of	  violence	  undermines	  the	  legal	  order	  and	  therefore	  the	  state	   itself.	  Schmitt	  has	  suggested	  that	  the	  essence	  of	  sovereignty	   is	  therefore	  located	  in	  the	  state’s	  decision	  on	  the	  existence	  of	  the	  enemy	  and	  the	  imminent,	  existential	  danger	  that	   this	   enemy	   poses.41	   Mbembe	   has	   argued	   that	   power	   continuously	   appeals	   to	   this	   state	   of	  ‘exception,	   emergency	   and	   a	   fictionalised	   notion	   of	   the	   enemy’	  while	   labouring	   to	   continue	   ‘to	  produce	  that	  same	  exception,	  emergency	  and	  enemy’.42	  	  	  In	  ‘State	  of	  Exception’,	  Agamben	  draws	  almost	  entirely	  on	  Schmitt,	  extending	  his	  theory	  to	  argue	  that	   in	  modern	   forms	   of	   government,	   the	   state	   of	   exception	   is	   predicated	   on	   the	   indistinction	  
                                                
35 Giorgio Agamben, State of Exception (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005). 
36 Mark B. Salter, “We Are All Exiles: Implications of the Border as a State of Exception,” in Contemporary 
Insecurities and the Politics of Exception (presented at the Standing Group on International Relations Conference 
2007, Turin, Italy, 2007), 1–15. 
37 Agamben, State of Exception. 
38 Carl Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty, trans. George Schwab 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 12. 
39 George Schwab, “Introduction,” in Political Theology, by Carl Schmitt (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1985), xvi. 
40 Schmitt, Political Theology. 
41 Roxanne Lynn Doty, “States of Exception on the Mexico-U.S. Border: Security, ‘Decisions’, and Civilian 
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15 
between	   legality	   and	   illegality,	   war	   and	   peace,	   public	   and	   private,	   law	   and	   violence,	   and	   the	  exception	   and	   the	   norm.43	   In	   this	   way,	   he	   argues,	   the	   state	   of	   exception	   is	   neither	   inside	   nor	  outside	  of	   the	   juridical	  order,	  but	  belongs	   to	  a	  blurred	   ‘zone	  of	   indifference’	  between	  the	   two.44	  Agamben	   suggests	   that	   the	   state	   of	   exception	   as	   indistinction	   has	   increasingly	   become	   the	  principal	  paradigm	  of	  modern	  government.	  He	  writes:	  	   Indeed,	   the	   state	   of	   exception	   has	   today	   reached	   its	   maximum	   worldwide	   development.	   The	  normative	  aspect	  of	  law	  can	  thus	  be	  obliterated	  and	  contradicted	  with	  impunity	  by	  a	  governmental	  violence	   that—while	   ignoring	   international	   law	   externally	   and	   producing	   a	   permanent	   state	   of	  exception	  internally—	  nevertheless	  still	  claims	  to	  be	  applying	  the	  law.45	  	  Drawing	   extensively	   upon	   Hannah	   Arendt	   and	   Foucault’s	   notion	   of	   biopolitics,	   Agamben	  describes	  the	  human	  victim	  captured	  in	  the	  sovereign	  sphere	  as	  ‘bare	  life’.46	  “Bare”	  or	  “naked”	  life	  maybe	  understood	  as	  ‘what	  remains	  when	  human	  existence,	  while	  yet	  alive,	  is	  stripped	  of	  all	  the	  encumbrances	   of	   social	   location,	   and	   thus	   bereft	   of	   all	   the	   qualifications	   for	   proper	   political	  inclusion	  and	  belonging’.47	  Bare	  life	  is	  captured	  by	  the	  political	  twice-­‐over:	  firstly,	  in	  the	  form	  of	  exclusion	  -­‐	  bare	  life	  is	  included	  in	  the	  political	  only	  as	  an	  object	  of	  exclusion;	  and	  secondly,	  in	  the	  form	  of	  unlimited	  exposure	  to	  violation,	  which	  does	  not	  count	  as	  a	  crime.48	  For	  Agamben,	  bare	  life	  is	  not	  just	  captured	  by	  sovereign	  power;	  it	  is	  actually	  produced	  by	  it.	  The	  production	  of	  bare	  life,	  he	   claims,	   is	   the	   ‘originary	   activity	   of	   sovereignty’.49	   Agamben	   uses	   Foucault’s	   concept	   of	  biopower	  to	  articulate	  the	  relationship	  between	  sovereign	  power	  and	  bare	  life.	  For	  Foucault,	  the	  pre-­‐modern	   form	  of	  monarchical	   sovereign	  power	   entailed	   a	   prerogative	   to	   kill	  with	   impunity.	  This	  form	  of	  sovereign	  authoritarian	  power	  came	  to	  be	  transcended	  by	  another	  form	  of	  political	  power	   that	   ‘had	   assigned	   itself	   the	   task	   of	   administering	   life’	   and	  whose	   ‘highest	   function	  was	  perhaps	   no	   longer	   to	   kill,	   but	   to	   invest	   in	   life	   through	   and	   through’.50	   Foucault	   describes	   the	  emergence	  of	  technologies	  of	  power	  from	  the	  17th	  and	  18th	  centuries	  onwards	  which	  were	  ‘used	  to	   ensure	   the	   spatial	   distribution	   of	   individual	   bodies	   (their	   separation,	   their	   alignment,	   their	  serialization,	   and	   their	   surveillance)	   and	   the	  organization,	   around	   those	   individuals,	   of	   a	  whole	  field	  of	  visibility’.51	  	  	  Agamben	   credits	   Foucault’s	   conceptualisation	   of	   biopolitics	   with	   having	   restored	   the	   bare	   or	  naked	  life	  of	  human	  beings	  to	  the	  centre	  of	  politics.	  He	  argues	  that	  in	  the	  shift	  from	  pre-­‐modern	  
                                                                                                                                                     
42 Mbembe, “Necropolitics,” 16. 
43 Agamben, State of Exception. 
44 Ibid. 
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sovereign	   power	   to	   modern	   forms	   of	   biopower,	   bare	   life	   ceases	   to	   be	   excluded	   outside	   the	  political,	  but	  ‘gradually	  begins	  to	  coincide	  with	  the	  political	  realm’.52	  However,	  De	  Genova	  argues	  that	  in	  doing	  so,	  Agamben	  joins	  a	  cast	  of	  recent	  scholarship	  that	  mostly	  ‘serves	  to	  recapitulate	  the	  reification	  of	  power	  as	  synonymous	  with	  domination	  and	  sovereignty	  as	  an	  exclusive	  preserve	  of	  the	   state53’.	   He	   argues	   that	   such	   discourses	   serve	   to	   reify	   and	   fetishise	   power-­‐as-­‐dominance,	  which	  he	   identifies	   as	   an	  original	   limitation	  of	   Foucauldian	   conceptions	  of	   power.54	  Along	  with	  this	  fetishisation	  of	  state	  power,	  Agamben	  has	  been	  critiqued	  for	  offering	  little	  optimism	  for	  the	  possibility	   of	   resistance.	   Under	   the	   condition	   of	   abjection	   that	   bare	   life	   is	   consigned	   to	   in	  Agamben’s	   formulation,	   Didier	   Bigo	   argues	   there	   can	   be	   no	   possible	   resistance.55	   Ziarek	   too,	  following	   Ernesto	   Laclau’s	   critiques,	   suggests	   that	   Agamben’s	   work	   lacks	   ‘emancipatory	  possibilities’.56	   Through	   his	   notion	   of	   “bare	   life”,	   Agamben’s	   sovereign	   power	   ties	   bare	   life	  inextricably	  to	  death,	  ‘leaving	  no	  opportunity	  for	  agency,	  resistance	  or	  escape’.57	  	  	  Agamben’s	  theories	  are	  also	  wildly	  universalising	  and	  undifferentiated;	  the	  body	  of	  bare	  life	  lacks	  attention	  to	  race,	  gender	  or	  nationality.58	  Ziarek	  argues	  that	  any	  critical	  feminist	  engagement	  with	  Agamben’s	  work	  needs	   to	   attend	   to	   the	  ways	   in	  which	   bare	   life	   is	   implicated	   in	   the	   ‘gendered,	  sexist,	  colonial,	  and	  racist	  configurations	  of	   the	  political,	  and	  because	  of	   this	   implication,	  how	  it	  suffers	  different	   forms	  of	  violence’.59	  Crucially,	  Agamben	   is	   critiqued	   for	  his	   lack	  of	  attention	   to	  contextualisation	   -­‐	   to	   the	  specificities	  of	   location,	  historicisation	  and	  geographical	  context.60	  His	  theories	   of	   sovereign	   power	   as	   exceptional	   are	   applied	   in	   a	   universal	   sense,	   without	  differentiation	  to	  context	  or	  to	  the	  raced	  and	  gendered	  body	  of	  she	  who	  is	  excluded.	  	  	  Philosopher	   and	   political	   scientist	   Archille	   Mbembe	   in	   his	   influential	   article	   ‘Necropolitics’,61	  follows	  Foucault	  and	  Agamben	  in	  their	  shared	  assumption	  that	  sovereignty	  resides	  in	  the	  power	  to	   dictate	   who	   may	   live	   and	   who	   must	   die.62	   However,	   Mbembe	   argues	   that	   the	   notion	   of	  biopower	  -­‐	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  sovereign	  power	  of	  modernity	  is	  organised	  around	  the	  ‘management	  of	   life	  rather	   than	  the	  menace	  of	  death’63	   -­‐	   is	   ‘insufficient	   to	  account	   for	  contemporary	   forms	  of	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subjugation	   of	   life	   to	   the	   power	   of	   death’.64	   He	   asks	   what	   does	   the	   implementation	   of	   the	  sovereign	  right	  to	  kill	  tell	  us	  about	  ‘the	  person	  who	  is	  thus	  put	  to	  death	  and	  about	  the	  relation	  of	  enmity	  that	  sets	  that	  person	  against	  his	  or	  her	  murderer?	  …What	  place	  is	  given	  to	  life,	  death,	  and	  the	  human	  body	  (in	  particular	  the	  wounded	  or	  slain	  body)?	  How	  are	  they	  inscribed	  in	  the	  order	  of	  power?65’	  Mbembe’s	  interest	  lies	  not	  in	  figures	  of	  sovereignty	  struggling	  for	  autonomy,	  but	  in	  the	  ‘generalised	   instrumentalisation	   of	   human	   existence	   and	   the	   material	   destruction	   of	   human	  bodies	  and	  populations’.66	  To	  this	  end,	  he	  proposes	  an	  alternative	  reading	  of	  politics,	  sovereignty	  and	  the	  subject,	  which	  would	  be	  based	  around	  the	  ‘tactile	  categories’	  of	  life	  and	  death.67	  Mbembe	  revises	  a	   range	  of	   theorists’	   varied	  conceptions	  of	   the	   relationship	  between	  death,	   the	  political,	  the	   subject	   and	   sovereignty.	   	   Among	   them,	   is	   Georges	   Bataille,	   who	   wrote	   that	   ultimately	  sovereignty	   is	   the	   ‘refusal	   to	   accept	   the	   limits	   that	   the	   fear	   of	   death	   would	   have	   the	   subject	  respect’,	  and	  that	  the	  sovereign	  ‘is	  he	  who	  is,	  as	  if	  death	  were	  not…	  he	  is	  the	  transgression	  of	  all	  such	   limits’.68	   Sovereignty	   requires	   the	   strength	   to	   ‘violate	   the	   prohibition	   against	   killing’	   and	  ‘[sovereignty]	  calls	  for	  the	  risk	  of	  death’.69	  	  	  Let	  us	  consider	  for	  a	  moment	  this	  conceptualisation	  of	  sovereignty	  -­‐	  as	  the	  refusal	  to	  be	  limited	  by	  a	   fear	   of	   death	   -­‐	   in	   relation	   to	   both	   the	   sovereign	   power	   of	   the	   state,	   and	   also	   the	   individual	  subject.	   The	   subject	   of	   sovereign	  power	   should	   respect	   a	   fear	   of	   death,	   and	  be	   limited	  by	   it,	   in	  ways	   that	   the	   sovereign	   power	   is	   not.	   For	   a	   subject	   to	   refuse	   to	   respect	   the	   fear	   of	   death	  constitutes	   an	   autonomous	   and	   defiant	   action	   against	   the	   sovereign	   power.	   De	   Genova	   has	  suggested	  that	  it	  is	  the	  sheer	  autonomy	  of	  migration,	  particularly	  of	  unauthorised	  migrants,	  that	  is	  taken	  as	  such	  an	  affront	  to	  state	  sovereignty.70	   	  If	  this	  act	  of	  migration	  entails	  a	  preparedness	  to	  risk	  death,	  it	  can	  be	  apprehended	  that	  unauthorised	  migration	  challenges	  the	  power	  of	  the	  state	  not	  only	  to	  control	  its	  sovereign	  space,	  but	  also	  constitutes	  a	  transgression	  of	  the	  limits	  that	  a	  fear	  of	  death	  should	   impose	  upon	  subjects.	  And	   therein	   lies	   its	  power.	   In	  Mbembe’s	  words,	  death	   is	  ‘that	  space	  where	  freedom	  and	  negation	  operate’.71	  Just	  as	  in	  Schmitt’s	  thinking	  on	  the	  power	  of	  non-­‐sanctioned	  violence,	  it	  is	  not	  so	  much	  the	  outcomes	  of	  unauthorised	  migration,	  but	  rather	  the	  flagrant	  flouting	  of	  the	  legal	  order	  that	  poses	  such	  an	  existential	  threat	  to	  the	  sovereign	  state.	  	  	  Wendy	   Brown,	   in	   her	   study	   of	   territoriality,	   state	   violence	   and	   sovereignty	   argues	   that	   the	  increased	   investment	   in	   enforcing	  boundaries	   suggests	   a	   deep	   crisis	   of	   state	   sovereignty.72	   She	  argues	   that	   nation	   states	   have	   become	   severely	   compromised	   over	   the	   last	   century	   by	  transnational	   flows	   and	   neoliberal	   rationality,	   resulting	   in	   an	   anxiety	   over	   the	   sovereign	  
                                                
64 Mbembe, “Necropolitics,” 39–40. 
65 Ibid. 12. 
66 Ibid., 14. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Bataille in Ibid., 16. 
69 Bataille in Ibid. 
70 De Genova, “The Deportation Regime,” 39. 
71 Mbembe, “Necropolitics,” 39. 
18 
impotence	  of	  the	  nation-­‐state.73	  She	  argues	  that	  the	  recent	  investments	  in	  walling	  and	  bordering	  suggest	  the	  weakening	  of	  the	  nation-­‐state,	  or	  more	  precisely,	  the	  detachment	  of	  sovereignty	  from	  the	  nation-­‐state.74	  	  ‘Rather	  than	  iterations	  of	  nation-­‐state	  sovereignty,	  the	  new	  nation-­‐state	  walls	  are	  part	  of	  an	  ad	  hoc	  global	  landscape	  of	  flows	  and	  barriers,	  both	  inside	  nation-­‐states	  and	  in	  the	  surrounding	  post-­‐national	  constellations,	  flows	  and	  barriers	  that	  divide	  richer	  from	  poorer	  parts	  of	   the	   globe’.75	   For	  Brown,	   the	   investment	   in	  walls,	   as	   a	   form	  of	   exclusionary	   architecture,	   is	   a	  hyperbolic	  expression	  of	  sovereignty,	  which	  reveals	  a	  ‘tremulousness,	  vulnerability,	  dubiousness,	  or	   instability	   at	   the	   core	   of	   what	   they	   aim	   to	   express’.76	   She	   attends	   to	   the	   performative	   and	  theatrical	  quality	  of	   the	  exclusionary	  architectures	  of	  nation-­‐state	  bordering,	   and	   the	   staging	  of	  ‘sovereign	  powers	  of	  protection’.77	  	  De	  Genova,	   in	  his	  work	  on	   the	  deportation	   regime,	   has	   emphasised	   that	   through	   its	   prominent	  circulation,	   Agamben’s	   concept	   of	   bare	   life	   has	   been	   somewhat	   inflated	   and	   devalued	   in	   its	  deployment.78	  All	  too	  often,	  ‘bare	  life’	  has	  been	  reduced	  to	  a	  figure	  of	  mere	  exclusion.	  De	  Genova	  feels	   this	   is	   a	   flattening	   of	   Agamben’s	   more	   subtle	   formulation,	   which	   revolves	   around	   the	  
indistinction	  between	  ‘“inside	  and	  outside,	  exclusion	  and	  inclusion”,	  whereby	  bare	  life	  is	  produced	  by	   sovereign	   (state)	   power’.79	   De	   Genova	   argues	   that	   the	   “illegalised”	   (cheap)	   workforce	   of	  migrant	   labour	  -­‐	  vulnerable	   to	  both	  exploitation	  and	  deportation	   -­‐	   is	  constitutive	  of	  exactly	   this	  contradiction.	  It	  is	  precisely	  their	  legal	  vulnerability	  and	  official	  exclusion,	  which	  renders	  them	  as	  a	  highly	  desirable	  workforce,	  thereby	  ensuring	  their	  subordinate	  inclusion.80	  In	  this	  way,	  migrant	  bodies	   are	   ‘captured’	   by	   immobility,	   disciplined	   into	   productive	   bodies	   and	   their	   potential	  channelled	   into	   the	   labour	   force.81	   The	   sovereign	   power	   thereby	   relies	   upon	   sedentarism	   and	  immobility	   in	   so	   far	   as	   immobilised	   bodies	   become	   subjects	   of	   that	   specific	   territory,	   of	   that	  sovereign	  power.82	  	  As	  De	  Genova	  points	  out,	  bare	  life	  in	  Agamben’s	  formulation,	  is	  not	  something	  that	  precedes	  the	  sovereign	  power,	  as	  if	  in	  a	  state	  of	  nature,	  but	  “bare	  life”	  is	  a	  product	  of	  the	  biopolitical	  machine.	  It	  is	   therefore	   a	   ‘debasement	   of	   the	   human	   specificity	   of	   human	   life’.83	   De	   Genova	   suggests	   that	  while	   Foucault	   maintains	   that	   “(bio)power”	   and	   “life”	   are	   in	   opposition,	   Agamben	   ‘invokes	   a	  notion	  (not	  unlike	  Marx)	  of	  a	  restitution	  of	  human	  life	   to	   its	  own	  intrinsic	  power	  (the	  originary	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power	  that	  Marx	  describes	  as	  “sovereign”)’.84	  In	  this	  sense,	  De	  Genova	  sees	  Agamben’s	  conception	  of	   a	   “life	   of	   power”	   as	   similar	   to	   Marx’s	   notion	   of	   “human	   emancipation”	   as	   a	   radical	   type	   of	  freedom	  disarticulated	   from	  all	   notions	   of	   citizenship,	   rights,	   the	   state,	   and	   even	  politics.85	   The	  “life	  of	  power”	  that	  Agamben	  refers	  to	  is	  predicated	  upon	  ‘emancipation	  from	  the	  very	  division	  of	  sovereign	   (state)	   power	   and	   naked	   (biological)	   life	   and	   an	   “irrevocable	   exodus	   from	   any	  sovereignty”’.86	  	  	  This	   leads	  us	   to	  questions	  of	  power	  and	  agency,	  and	  where	   these	  are	   located	   in	   the	  struggle	   to	  contain	   human	   movement.	   For	   Lauren	   Berlant,	   the	   concept	   of	   sovereignty	   is	   inadequate	   for	  talking	   about	   agency,	   outside	   of	   an	   authoritarian	   decree,	   and	   she	   argues	   that	   ‘sovereignty	   is	   a	  distorting	   description	   of	   the	   political,	   affective,	   and	   psychological	   conditions	   in	   which	   the	  ordinary	  subjects	  of	  democratic/capitalist	  power	  take	  up	  positions	  as	  agents’.87	  She	  critiques	  the	  lineage	  of	  Schmitt,	  Agamben,	  Bataille	  and	  Mbembe,	  for	  conceptualising	  sovereignty	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	   puts	   the	   emphasis	   back	  onto	  events	   of	   decision-­‐making.	  Berlant	   argues	   that	   to	   conceive	  of	  sovereignty	   in	   this	   way	   maintains	   a	   distinction	   between	   the	   productive	   procedures	   of	  governmentality	  and	  the	  violence	  of	  the	  state.88	  For	  her,	  sovereignty	  is	  an	  inadequate	  concept	  -­‐	  a	  ‘fantasy	  misrecognized	  as	  an	  objective	  state:	  an	  aspiration	  position	  of	  personal	  and	  institutional	  self-­‐legitimating	  performativity	  and	  an	  affective	  sense	  of	  control	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  fantasy	  of	  that	  position’s	   offer	   of	   security	   and	   efficacy’.89	   Similarly,	   Didier	   Fassin,	   in	   his	   work	   on	   the	  governmentality	  of	  immigration,	  has	  suggested	  that	  sovereignty	  is	  a	  limited	  concept	  for	  thinking	  through	  notions	  of	  power	  and	  forms	  of	  control.	  He	  claims	  that	  thinking	  through	  governmentality	  allows	  us	  to	  exceed	  ‘the	  issue	  of	  sovereignty	  and	  complicates	  the	  question	  of	  control’	  in	  relation	  to	  how	   human	   mobility	   is	   regulated.	   He	   suggests	   that	   applying	   notions	   of	   governmentality	   to	  immigration	  has	   ‘enriched	  our	  understanding	   of	   the	   subtle	   and	   complex	   games	   involved	   in	   the	  ‘biopolitics	  of	  otherness’:	  a	  politics	  of	  borders	  and	  boundaries,	   temporality	  and	  spatiality,	  states	  and	  bureaucracies,	  detention	  and	  deportation,	  asylum	  and	  humanitarianism’.90	  	  	  In	   “Escape	   Routes”	   Papadopoulos	   et	   al	   urge	   us	   to	   consider	   the	   ways	   in	   which	   the	   migration	  regime	   has	   itself	   been	   challenged	   by	   ‘fluid,	   streamlined,	   clandestine,	   multidirectional,	  multipositional,	  and	  context-­‐dependent	   forms	  of	  mobility’.91	  They	  argue	   that	   transformations	  of	  sovereignty	  can	  be	  apprehended	  as	  the	  result	  of	  global	  migrant	  practices	  that	  tend	  to	  ‘undermine	  the	   basis	   upon	  which	   sovereignty	   has	   hitherto	   functioned’.92	   Indeed	   state	   sovereignty	   is	   being	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transformed	  through	  the	  plethora	  of	  creative	  challenges	  ‘from	  below’	  posed	  by	  migrants,	  and	  also	  through	   the	   growing	   bureaucratic	   web	   of	   state	   and	   non-­‐state	   actors	   and	   private	   contractors	  involved	   in	   the	   response.	   Today’s	   borders	   are	   ‘less	   about	   “control”	   and	   more	   about	  “management”,	   combining	   heterogenous	   domains	   of	   personnel,	   goods,	   people,	   data,	   audit	  capability,	  international	  cooperation	  and	  partnerships	  with	  carriers	  and	  industry’.93	  Not	  only	  the	  proliferation	  of	  networks	  and	  actors	   involved	  in	  migration,	  but	  also	  the	  proliferation	  of	  borders	  themselves	  has	  brought	  about	   changes	   to	   the	  notion	  of	   territorial	   sovereignty.	   In	   classical	   legal	  theory,	  territorial	  sovereignty	  has	  rested	  upon	  the	  indivisible	  nature	  of	  sovereignty	  and	  law,	  and	  both	   being	   territorially	   bounded.	   The	   notion	   of	   the	   state	   and	   its	   territory	   were	   seen	   as	  coterminous,	  and	  the	  social	  production	  of	  territory	  has	  been	  a	  defining	  preoccupation	  of	  modern	  states.94	  This	  alignment	  has	  been	  ruptured;	  borders,	  sovereignty,	  governance,	  security	  and	  labour	  no	  longer	  map	  onto	  the	  space	  of	  the	  sovereign	  state.95	  	  	  Feminist	   geographers	   of	   migration	   have	   also	   contributed	   to	   the	   reconceptualisation	   of	   the	  relationship	  between	  mobility	   and	   the	  production	  of	   space.	   In	  particular,	   feminists	  have	  drawn	  attention	   to	   the	   politics	   of	   scale,	   transnational	   mobility	   as	   a	   political	   process,96	   questions	   of	  subjectivity	  and	  identity,97	  interstitial	  spaces,98	  and	  critical	  theorisations	  around	  space,	  place,	  and	  temporality.99	   Feminist	   scholarship	   on	   migration	   has	   focused	   on	   in-­‐between	   sites,	   gendered	  embodiment	   and	   gendered	   migration	   policies,	   as	   well	   as	   developing	   methods	   that	   challenge	  dominant,	   masculinist,	   positivist	   discourses	   framing	   migration.100	   The	   feminist	   scholarly	  attention	  given	   to	   the	  body	  has	  also	  entered	   the	   field	  of	  geography	  and	  migration	  studies,	  with	  feminist	  geographers	  theorising	  the	  political	  connections	  between	  the	  body,	  power	  and	  spaces.101	  In	   this	   sense,	   the	   contribution	   of	   feminist	   geographers,	   rather	   than	   offering	   a	   singular	   feminist	  perspective	  on	  the	  literature,	  has	  been	  to	  respatialise	  multiple	  forms	  of	  the	  political.102	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The	   normative	   IR	   position	   that	   sovereignty	   resides	  within	   the	   borders	   of	   the	   nation	   state,	   has	  effectively	  been	  challenged	  by	  those	  who	  argue	  that	  space	  and	  territory	  are	  being	  reconfigured	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  sovereignty	  is	  no	  longer	  spatially	  delineated.103	  It	  is	  necessary	  therefore	  to	  think	  beyond	   state-­‐centric	   models	   and	   instead	   consider	   spaces	   of	   shared	   or	   overlapping	  sovereignties.104	  Given	  that	  my	  site	  of	  analysis	  here	  is	  the	  sea,	  thinking	  through	  interstitial	  spaces	  and	   borderscapes	   as	   zones	   of	   shared,	   overlapping,	   or	   even	   “fluid”	   sovereignties	   makes	   sense.	  Andrijasevic	   critiques	   state-­‐centric	   models	   of	   sovereignty,	   such	   as	   Agamben’s,	   from	   a	   spatio-­‐political	  perspective,	  arguing	  that	  the	  notion	  of	  a	  sovereign	  “state	  of	  exception”	  is	  inadequate	  for	  accounting	   for	   the	   technologies	   of	   migration	   detention	   in	   contemporary	   Europe.	   While	   for	  Agamben	   the	   camp	   (or	   detention	   centre)	   stands	   as	   a	   ‘material	   spatial	   manifestation	   of	   the	  abstract	   juridical	   dimension	   that	   is	   the	   state	   of	   exception’,105	   Andrijasevic	   urges	   us	   to	   consider	  more	   transnational	   modes	   of	   governance,	   which	   rely	   on	   continuity	   rather	   than	   separation,	  creating	   spaces	   of	   ‘shared	   sovereignty’.106	   In	   this	   sense,	   she	   cautions	   against	   readings	   of	   the	  “externalisation”	  of	  the	  European	  border,	  and	  instead	  suggests	  challenging	  the	  dialectics	  of	  inside	  and	  outside	  through	  an	  examination	  of	  the	  continuities	  and	  complex	  assemblages	  of	  postnational	  configurations	   governing	  migratory	  movements	   and	   transforming	   the	   boundaries	   of	   European	  citizenship.107	  Similarly,	  Anne	  McNevin	  argues,	  the	  field	  of	  interaction	  that	  constitutes	  the	  border	  today	   defies	   ‘conventional	   cartographies	   and	   simplistic	   scalar	   registers	   running	   from	   local	   to	  national	  and	  global’.108	  While	  conventional	  ‘territorial	  frames	  do	  not	  help	  to	  illuminate	  the	  spatial	  complexity	   at	   hand’,	   neither	   do	   exaggerated	   claims	   of	   a	   post-­‐national	   deterritorialised	   world,	  when	   ‘territorial	   identities	   continue	   to	   figure	   so	   prominently	   in	   the	   lives	   and	   death	   of	   asylum	  seekers	  and	  other	  irregular	  migrants	  everywhere’.109	  	  Thinking	  about	   the	  spatialisation	  of	   the	  state	   is	  not	   just	  a	  matter	  of	   symbolic	  practice.	  Through	  specific	  metaphors	  states	  represent	  themselves	  as	  entities	  with	  particular	  spatial	  properties,	  and	  in	   doing	   so	   ‘secure	   their	   legitimacy,	   naturalise	   their	   authority,	   and	   represent	   themselves	   as	  superior	  to,	  and	  encompassing	  of,	  other	  institutions	  and	  centres	  of	  power’.110	  Ferguson	  and	  Gupta	  identify	   two	   images	   in	  popular	  and	  academic	  discourses	  of	   the	  state	   that	  produce	  a	   spatial	  and	  scalar	  imaginary	  of	  the	  state.	  These	  are	  verticality	  -­‐	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  state	  is	  somehow	  above	  civil	  society	  and	  community;	  and	  encompassment	  -­‐	   the	  state	   is	   located	   in	  an	  ever	  widening	  series	  of	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circles	  that	  begins	  with	  family	  and	  local	  community	  and	  ends	  with	  nation-­‐states.111	  These	  spatial	  metaphors	   are	   animated	   and	   naturalised	   by	   a	   range	   of	   routinised	   practices	   of	   state	  bureaucracies,112	   including	   those	   of	   migration	   management.	   These	   spatial	   metaphors	   of	  verticality	   and	   encompassment	   have	   been	   stretched	   to	   incorporate	   the	   range	   of	   non-­‐state	   and	  transnational	   entities	   that	   constitute	   nodes	   in	   networks	   of	   transnational	   governmentality.113	  Ferguson	   and	   Gupta	   call	   for	   discussions	   of	   transnational	   governmentality	   to	   not	   only	   consider	  technologies	  of	  discipline	  and	  regulation	  like	  the	  WTO	  and	  IMF,	  but	  also	  to	  consider	  transnational	  activist	  networks,	  INGOs	  and	  NGOs.114	  They	  argue	  that	  these	  organisations	  should	  not	  be	  read	  as	  ‘challengers	  to	  the	  state	  from	  below,	  but	  as	  horizontal	  contemporaries	  of	  the	  organs	  of	  the	  state	  -­‐	  sometimes	  rivals;	  sometimes	  servants;	  sometimes	  watchdogs;	  sometimes	  parasites;	  but	  in	  every	  case	  operating	  on	  the	  same	  level,	   in	  the	  same	  global	  space’.115	   	  Paul	  Amar	  has	  argued	  that	  these	  parastatal	   forms	   -­‐	   of	   transnational	   public-­‐private	   partnership	   and	   of	   NGO	   proliferation	   -­‐	   are	  characteristic	  of	  emerging	  forms	  of	  ‘human	  security	  governance’.116	  	  Recent	   scholarship	   has	   attended	   to	   the	   relationship	   between	   spatiality	   and	   temporality	   as	   it	  pertains	  to	  the	  regulation	  of	  migration.	  Increasingly,	  time	  is	  being	  seen	  as	  occupying	  a	  key	  role	  in	  the	  regulation	  of	  migration.117	  If	  the	  functioning	  of	  sovereign	  power	  also	  relies	  upon	  sedentarism	  and	  immobility,	  then	  this	  immobility	  has	  not	  only	  a	  spatial	  dimension,	  but	  also	  a	  temporal	  one.118	  In	   “Escape	   Routes”	   Papadopoulos	   et	   al	   propose	   to	   rethink	   the	   linearity	   with	   which	   migrant	  journeys	  are	  usually	  portrayed.	  They	  suggest	  that	  rather	  than	  linear	  journeys	  from	  A	  to	  B	  (which	  may	   fail	   or	  may	   succeed)	  we	   should	   consider	   the	   temporal	   dimensions	   of	   irregular	  migration,	  with	   all	   its	   ‘interruptions	   and	   discontinuities,	   such	   as	   waiting,	   hiding,	   unexpected	   diversions,	  settlements,	   stopovers,	   escapes	   and	   returns’.119	   They	   argue	   that	   camps,	   or	   migrant	   detention	  centres,	   are	   spatialised	  attempts	   to	   temporarily	   control	  mobility.120	  They	  challenge	   the	  political	  disciplinary	   connotations	  of	   the	   camp	  as	  a	   technology	  of	   exclusion,	   and	   instead	   to	   consider	   the	  camp	   as	   an	   attempt	   to	   regulate	   the	   speed	   of	   migrant	   circulation	   and	   to	   decelerate	   it.121	  ‘Decelerated	  circulation’	   is	   therefore	  a	  way	   to	   regulate	  mobility	  not	   through	  space,	  but	   through	  time.122	   What	   takes	   place	   then	   within	   the	   space	   of	   the	   migrant	   detention	   centre	   is	   the	  ‘transformation	   of	   undocumented	   labour	   migration	   into	   controllable	   migrational	   flows’.123	  Andrijasevic	  has	  found	  Papadopoulos	  and	  co’s	  work	  to	  be	  extremely	  useful	  in	  accounting	  for	  the	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ambiguities	  of	  migration	  control	  in	  Europe.124	  She	  cites	  an	  example	  regarding	  irregular	  migrants	  in	   Italy	   -­‐	  where	  most	  migrants	  held	  on	  the	   island	  of	  Lampedusa	  are	   transferred	  to	  other	   Italian	  detention	   centres.	   A	   2004	   report	   shows	   that	   of	   the	   12,000	   migrants	   held	   in	   Italian	   detention	  centres,	  less	  than	  half	  were	  deported.	  Most	  of	  them	  were	  released	  after	  the	  maximum	  detention	  period	  had	  expired,	  and	  the	  rest	  escaped.125	  	  	  	  In	  the	  following	  chapters	  I	  will	  attend	  to	  these	  concepts	  -­‐	  of	  sovereignty	  and	  territory,	  spatiality	  and	   temporality,	   abjectification	   and	   exclusion,	   biopolitics	   and	   necropolitics	   -­‐	   in	   relation	   to	   a	  number	   of	   examples	   in	   order	   to	   articulate	   contemporary	   global	   patterns	   of	   migration	  management.	  I	  will	  use	  these	  conceptual	  framings	  as	  a	  way	  to	  connect	  distinct	  yet	  interconnected	  sites	  and	  events	  located	  at	  the	  edge	  of	  territory	  and	  beyond,	  in	  order	  to	  reveal	  the	  functioning	  of	  power	  through	  spatialisation,	  securitisation	  and	  visual	  regimes.	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Chapter	  2:	  Spatial	  Practices	  of	  Bordering:	  Islands	  and	  Other	  Offshore	  
Strategies	  
	  Contemporary	  forms	  of	  border	  policing	  and	  migration	  management	  rely	  upon	  mobilising	  spatial	  frames	  in	  novel	  ways	  to	  produce	  shifting	  geographical	  articulations	  of	  sovereignty.	  Patterns	  can	  be	  traced	  on	  a	  global	  scale	  to	  suggest	  that	  beaches,	  oceans,	  islands	  and	  offshore	  territories	  are	  the	  key	   sites	   where	   sovereignty	   is	   exercised	   and	   challenged	   in	   the	   struggle	   to	   contain	   human	  mobility.	   It	   is	   particularly	   evident	   that	   during	   times	   of	   crisis,	  when	   the	   sovereign	  power	   of	   the	  nation	   state	   is	   tested,	   these	   maritime	   contestations	   are	   heightened.	   These	   moments	   of	   crisis	  maybe	  at	   the	  domestic	   level	   of	   the	   sovereign	   state	   in	   a	  moment	  of	   contesting	  power	   (as	   in	   the	  case	  of	  Egypt	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  3),	  or	  the	  more	  prevailing	  global	  sense	  of	  crisis.	  Recent	  years	  have	   been	   characterised	   by	   the	   global	   ‘crumbling	   legitimacy	   of	   neoliberalism’s	   policies	   and	  financial	   infrastructure’,	   as	  well	   as	  by	   the	  backlash	  against	   the	  neoconservatives’	  war	  on	   terror	  and	  broader	  disregard	  for	  human	  rights	  and	  social	  justice.126	  As	  neoliberal	  market	  states	  struggle	  to	   survive	   the	  era	  of	   financial	   crisis	   and	  geopolitical	   realignment,	   governments	   try	   to	  articulate	  new	   discourses	   to	   legitimise	   and	   ‘reorganise	   intensified	   intervention	   and	   regulatory	  governance’.127	  	  In	  this	  section	  I	  will	  briefly	  trace	  the	  decoupling	  of	  sovereignty	  and	  territory	  in	  recent	  migration	  management	  policies	  of	  Australia	  and	  the	  EU,	  and	  the	  emerging	  spatial	  practise	  of	  “offshoring”.	  I	  will	  consider	   the	  role	  of	   islands	   in	   the	  Western	   imaginary	  and	  outline	   the	  specific	  histories	  and	  geographies	  of	  four	  sites	  -­‐	  Lampedusa	  and	  Melilla	  in	  the	  Mediterranean,	  and	  Christmas	  Island	  and	  Nauru	  to	  the	  north	  of	  Australia.	  In	  this	  sense,	  I	  attempt	  to	  respond	  to	  geographer	  Alison	  Mountz’s	  call	  for	  more	  attention	  to	  be	  paid	  to	  the	  specificities	  of	  the	  spaces	  between	  states.	  She	  points	  out	  the	   state-­‐centric	   nature	   of	   migration	   studies,	   which	   tends	   to	   ‘document	   the	   experiences	   of	  particular	  categories	  of	  people	  moving	  from	  or	  to	  particular	  countries’,	  examining	  source	  country,	  nationality,	  ethnicity,	  legal	  status,	  religion	  or	  occupation	  in	  the	  ‘host’	  country.128	  As	  migration	  by	  definition	   crosses	   the	   spaces	   between	   states,	   Mountz	   calls	   for	   a	   greater	   engagement	   with	   the	  ‘peripheral	   zones	   of	   sovereign	   territory’	   to	   develop	   more	   sophisticated	   conceptualisations	   of	  these	  sites.	  She	  argues	  that	  new	  research	  must	  historicise	  islands	  in	  their	   ‘colonial,	  postcolonial,	  and	   militarised	   landscapes’,	   in	   order	   to	   understand	   their	   role	   in	   the	   intersecting	   processes	   of	  migrant	   displacement	   and	   relocation.129	   While	   there	   has	   been	   a	   recent	   trend	   towards	  geographical	  articulations	  of	  sovereignty	  upon	  islands	  and	  peripheral	   territorial	  sites	   in	  various	  contestations	  around	  migration,	   these	   sites	  have	   long	  been	  utilised	   for	  militaristic,	   colonial	  and	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economic	   exploits.	   The	   contemporary	   uses	   of	   these	   sites	   are	   therefore	   not	   novel,	   but	   can	   be	  historicised	  within	  a	  trajectory	  of	  exploitative	  geographies.	  	  	  
Mobile	  Borders	  and	  Deterritorialisation	  Parallel	  developments	  have	  occurred	  in	  migration	  management	  among	  the	  wealthy	  nations	  of	  the	  world,	   as	   they	   seek	   to	   address	   irregular	   migration	   as	   a	   security	   threat.130	   As	   Peter	   Chambers	  reminds	   us,	   those	   nation	   states	   on	   the	   ‘wealthy’	   side	   of	   global	   inequality	   seek	   to	   secure	  themselves	   against	   migrant	   flows	   produced,	   in	   no	   small	   part,	   by	   their	   own	   interventions	  elsewhere:	   whether	   through	   ‘military	   misadventure,	   resource	   extraction,	   currency	  destabilisation,	  or	   food	  price	  spikes’.131	  As	   the	   flows	  of	  human	  migration	   intensified	   throughout	  the	   1990s	   and	   into	   the	   2000s,	   states	   undertook	   new	   creative	   modes	   of	   border	   management,	  contracting	  and	  expanding	   their	  borders	   to	  create	  spatio-­‐legal	  ambiguities.	  Border	  enforcement	  has	  grown	  more	  dispersed	  across	  a	  range	  of	  sites	  and	  amongst	  an	  assemblage	  of	  state	  and	  non-­‐state	  institutions.	  In	  the	  process,	  notions	  of	  sovereignty	  have	  become	  deterritorialised	  and	  more	  transnational	  in	  nature.	  	  	  Australia,	   the	   European	   Union,	   Canada	   and	   the	   US	   have	   sophisticated	   border	   management	  policies,	  and	  learn	  from	  each	  other’s	  border	  enforcement	  practices	  and	  technologies.132	  Australia	  has	   emerged	   as	   a	   global	   pioneer	   in	   trialling	   punitive	   and	   pre-­‐emptive	   approaches	   to	   border	  management,	  which	  work	  to	  stop	  people	  from	  departing	  at	  their	  point	  of	  origin,	  prevent	  people	  from	  arriving	  on	  Australian	  territory,	  and	  in	  some	  cases,	  retrospectively	  denying	  that	  they	  have	  ever	   arrived.133	   While	   Australia	   fiercely	   patrols	   its	   borders,	   a	   brief	   examination	   of	   Australia’s	  maritime	  boundaries	  reveals	  the	  pluralities	  and	  fictions	  at	  work	  in	  ‘drawing	  a	  line	  in	  the	  sea’.134	  	  Australia’s	   territorial	   sea	   boundary	   lies	   12	   nautical	   miles	   (around	   20kms)	   offshore,	   the	   area	  within	   which	   is	   subject	   to	   full	   Australian	   sovereignty.	   The	   “contiguous	   zone”,	   within	   which	  Australia	  is	  authorised	  to	  take	  action	  and	  prevent	  and	  punish	  infringements	  of	   immigration	  and	  customs	  law,	  extends	  for	  a	  further	  12	  nautical	  miles.	  Australia	  has	  the	  right	  to	  exploit	  and	  manage	  natural	  resources	  within	  200	  nautical	  miles	  of	   the	  shoreline	   in	  the	  area	  known	  as	  the	  Exclusive	  Economic	   Zone.135	   While	   these	   borders	   and	   zones	   are	   recognised	   under	   the	   United	   Nations	  
Convention	   on	   the	   Law	   of	   the	   Sea	   (UNCLOS),	   the	   so-­‐called	   “migration	   zone”	   is	   completely	   an	  Australian	   legal	   construction,	   defined	   under	   the	  Migration	   Act	   1958	   as	   ‘the	   area	   of	   Australia	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where	  a	  non	  citizen	  must	  hold	  a	  visa	  in	  order	  to	  legally	  enter	  and	  remain	  in	  Australia’.136	  	  Up	  until	  May	   2013,	   the	   migration	   zone	   consisted	   of	   the	   Australian	   mainland,	   plus	   some	   external	  territories.	   It	   is	   the	   spatial	   manipulation	   of	   this	   zone,	   in	   order	   to	   keep	   asylum	   seekers	   in	   a	  permanent	  position	  of	  having	  not-­‐yet-­‐arrived,	  which	  has	  been	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  much	  controversy.	  	  	  In	  August	   2001,	   a	  Norwegian	   container	   ship,	   the	  Tampa,	   rescued	  438	   asylum	   seekers	   (most	   of	  them	   Afghans)	   from	   their	   distressed	   vessel	   just	   outside	   Australian	   territorial	   waters.	   The	  Australian	   government	   refused	   entry	   to	   the	   vessel,	   demanding	   that	   the	   asylum	   seekers	   be	  returned	  to	   Indonesia.	  The	  captain	  of	   the	  ship,	  arguing	  that	   the	  asylum	  seekers	  needed	  medical	  treatment,	   refused	   to	   turn	   back	   and	   headed	   for	   the	   Australian	   territory	   of	   Christmas	   Island.	   A	  weeklong	   standoff	   ensued,	   whereby	   the	   world’s	   media	   watched	   as	   the	   Australian	   government	  refused	  to	  allow	  the	  ship	  to	  land.	  Eventually	  Australia	  sent	  troops	  to	  board	  the	  ship	  and	  transfer	  the	  asylum	  seekers	  to	  an	  Australian	  Navy	  vessel,	  taking	  them	  to	  the	  Pacific	  Island	  nation	  of	  Nauru	  for	   processing.	   To	   authorise	   this,	   legislation	   was	   rushed	   through	   both	   houses	   of	   parliament,	  retrospectively	   authorising	   the	   seizure	   of	   the	   Tampa	   and	   providing	   for	   special	   authority	   to	  undertake	   future	   action	   of	   a	   similar	   kind.137	   In	   order	   to	   realise	   the	   offshore	   processing	   of	   the	  
Tampa	  asylum	  seeker	  claims,	  the	  Australian	  government	  brokered	  a	  deal	  with	  the	  Pacific	  Island	  nation	  of	  Nauru,	  which	  was	  part	  of	  what	  came	  to	  be	  known	  as	  the	  “Pacific	  Solution”.	  The	  Pacific	  Solution	   consisted	   of	   three	   central	   strategies	   in	   its	   execution:	   firstly,	   a	   number	   of	   islands	  were	  excised	  from	  Australian	  territory	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  the	  Migration	  Act	  including	  Christmas	  Island	  and	   Ashmore	   Reef.138	   Second,	   a	   naval	   blockade,	  Operation	   Relex,	   was	   established	   to	   ‘deter	   and	  deny’	  suspected	  illegal	  entry	  vessels	  (SIEVs)	  with	  defence	  personnel	  granted	  special	  authority	  to	  board	  vessels	  outside	  Australian	  territorial	  waters	  in	  the	  area	  of	  more	  diluted	  sovereignty	  known	  as	   the	   “contiguous	   zone”.139	   The	   third	   strategy	   was	   the	   removal	   of	   asylum	   seekers	   to	   third	  countries	   or	   offshore	   detention	   centres	   for	   processing	   of	   their	   asylum	   claim.	   Nauru	   would	  provide	   one	   such	   centre	   and,	   in	   return,	  was	   granted	   an	   initial	   aid	   package	   of	  AUD	  $10	  million,	  with	  a	  further	  AUD$20	  million	  aid	  in	  the	  form	  of	  goods	  and	  services.140	  Another	  centre	  was	  to	  be	  located	  in	  Papua	  New	  Guinea,	  and	  another	  in	  the	  now-­‐excised	  Christmas	  Island.	  	  Alongside	  its	  spatial	  manipulation	  of	  borders,	   the	  Australian	  Government	  has	  also	  undertaken	  a	  bold	  temporal	  manipulation	  of	  its	  maritime	  boundaries.	  	  In	  2003,	  when	  a	  boat	  carrying	  fourteen	  Turkish	   Kurds	   landed	   on	   Melville	   Island	   in	   the	   eastern	   Timor	   Sea,	   the	   island	   was	   excised	  retrospectively,	  from	  midnight	  prior	  to	  their	  arrival.	  While	  the	  public	  debate	  focused	  on	  whether	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or	  not	  the	  men	  had	  made	  their	  claim	  to	  asylum	  known,	  the	  claim	  was	  anyway	  invalidated	  by	  the	  excision.	  The	  Kurds	  were	  sent	  back	  into	  international	  waters	  before	  the	  Senate	  could	  disallow	  it.	  	  	  Given	   the	   far-­‐flung	   island	   territories	   had	   now	   been	   excised	   from	   the	   migration	   zone,	   the	  Australian	   authorities	   became	   increasingly	   concerned	   that	   irregular	   maritime	   migrants,	  particularly	   those	  sailing	   from	  Indonesia,	  would	  now	  attempt	   to	  reach	   the	  Australian	  mainland.	  To	   remove	   all	   incentive	   for	   reaching	   the	   mainland,	   on	   16th	   May	   2013,	   legislation	   was	   passed	  which	   excised	   the	   entire	   Australian	   mainland	   from	   its	   own	   migration	   zone.	   This	   was	   an	  unprecedented	  act	  and	  certainly	   the	  most	   farcical	  of	   the	  spatio-­‐legal	   fictions	  undertaken	  by	   the	  government.	  Strikingly,	  there	  was	  no	  opposition	  from	  the	  major	  parties	  or	  critical	  media	  scrutiny;	  instead	  Chambers	  quips,	  it	  ‘sailed	  through	  both	  houses	  of	  parliament,	  and	  into	  law,	  like	  a	  veritable	  ship	  in	  the	  night’.141	  Upon	  assuming	  office	  in	  September	  2013,	  the	  conservative	  Abbott	  coalition	  government	   launched	   the	   military	   operation	   known	   as	   Operation	   Sovereign	   Borders	   (OSB).142	  This	   is	   a	   novel	  move	   in	   that	   for	   the	   first	   time	   a	  minister	   was	  made	   responsible	   for	   a	  military	  operation,	  in	  this	  case	  the	  Minister	  for	  Immigration	  and	  Border	  Protection.143	  	  Similarly,	   the	   European	   Union	   has	   also	   seen	   islands	   and	   offshore	   territories	   across	   the	  Mediterranean	  emerge	  as	   the	  key	  sites	  of	   contestation.	  The	  southern	  external	  border	  of	   the	  EU	  has	  come	  to	  be	  seen	  as	  its	  most	  vulnerable	  border,	  with	  particular	  attention	  given	  to	  a	  number	  of	  offshore	   territories	   which	   are	   seen	   as	   “stepping	   stones”	   to	   the	   continent.	   The	   Greek	   Aegean	  islands	  near	  the	  Turkish	  mainland,	  the	  Spanish	  Canaries,	  the	  Balearics	  and	  the	  Spanish	  enclaves	  of	  Ceuta	  and	  Melilla,	  French	  Corsica,	  Italy’s	  Lampedusa	  and	  Linosa,	  and	  the	  island	  states	  of	  Malta	  and	  Cyprus	  have	  all	  seen	  arrivals	  of	  asylum	  seekers	  and	  irregular	  migrants	  seeking	  access	  to	  the	  greater	  EU	  territory.	  As	  a	  result,	  these	  territories	  have	  become	  the	  “outposts”	  of	  a	  framework	  of	  externalisation.144	   There	   are	   also	   a	   range	   of	   bilateral	   and	   multilateral	   agreements	   with,	   and	  investment	  in,	  North	  African	  states	  to	  cooperate	  on	  preventing	  irregular	  migration	  to	  Europe.145	  	  	  The	   external	   dimension	   of	   EU	   policies	   on	   migration	   and	   asylum	   is	   not	   new,	   and	   neither	   is	  scholarship	   on	   the	   topic.	   The	  European	  Parliament	   and	  European	  Commission	   has	   emphasised	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the	  need	   for	  regional	  cooperation	  and	  extraterritorial	  controls	  as	  early	  as	  1987.146	  What	   is	  new	  however,	   is	   the	   level	   of	   investment	   and	   intensity	   of	   these	   externalisation	   efforts,	   particularly	  when	  considered	  in	  relation	  to	  EU	  spending	  on	  programming	  related	  to	  upholding	  migrant	  rights.	  For	  member	  states,	  the	  focus	  is	  very	  much	  on	  the	  edge	  of	  territory	  with	  heavy	  investments	  in	  the	  management	   of	   the	   EU’s	   external	   borders.	   For	   the	   period	   2007-­‐13,	   the	   European	   Commission	  allocated	  almost	  EUR	  €4	  billion	  to	  the	  Solidarity	  and	  Management	  of	  Migration	  Flows	  Programme	  (SOLID)	  to	  support	  the	  activities	  of	  member	  states	  in	  asylum,	  integration,	  return	  of	  third	  country	  nationals,	   and	   border	   control.	   Almost	   half	   of	   this	   (€1,820	   million)	   was	   allocated	   towards	  activities,	  equipment	  and	  technological	  infrastructure	  focusing	  on	  control	  of	  the	  external	  borders	  of	  the	  Schengen	  area,	  while	  just	  17%	  (€700	  million)	  was	  allocated	  to	  support	  asylum	  procedures,	  reception	  services	  and	  the	  resettlement	  and	  integration	  of	  refugees.147	  	  	  Italy,	  which	  has	  received	  the	  largest	  numbers	  of	  migrants	  across	  the	  central	  Mediterranean	  route,	  was	   in	   2008	   ranked	   the	   fourth	   highest	   asylum	   seeker	   hosting	   country	   in	   the	   global	   North.	   In	  August	  2008,	   the	  Prime	  Minister	  Berlusconi	  effectively	  outsourced	   Italy’s	  borders	   to	  Libya,	   in	  a	  set	   of	   bilateral	   agreements	   known	   as	   the	   ‘Treaty	   on	   Friendship,	   Partnership	   and	   Cooperation’;	  similar	   to	   those	  Australia	  has	  set	   in	  place	  with	   Indonesia.148	  The	   treaty,	   signed	  with	   the	  Gadaffi	  government	   in	  Libya,	  agreed	  that	   the	   international	  waters	  between	  the	   two	  countries	  would	  be	  policed	   by	   joint	   naval	   patrols,	   a	   satellite	   control	   system	   on	   Libyan	   land	   borders	   was	   to	   be	  established	  by	  Italian	  companies,	  and	  migrants	  rescued	  at	  sea	  would	  be	  returned	  to	  Libya	  under	  a	  readmission	   clause.149	   In	   exchange,	   Libya	   would	   receive	   US$5	   billion	   and	   additional	   cultural	  development	  aid	  from	  Italy.150	  The	  Treaty	  was	  suspended	  in	  February	  2011	  during	  the	  overthrow	  of	  the	  regime	  in	  Libya;	  however	  later	  in	  2011,	  Italy	  signed	  a	  new	  bilateral	  agreement	  with	  Libya.	  Italy’s	  relationship	  with	  Tunisia	  and	  Egypt	  has	  followed	  a	  similar	  course,	  with	  early	  cooperation	  agreements	  signed	  in	  the	  late	  1990s	  with	  Tunisia	  and	  in	  2000	  with	  Egypt.	  While	  the	  agreements	  were	   temporarily	   suspended	   during	   the	   regime	   changes	   of	   2011,	   for	   the	   most	   part,	   these	  relationships	  are	  characterised	  by	  a	  high	  degree	  of	  continuity	  pre	  and	  post	  revolutions.	   In	  both	  cases,	   Italy	  was	   quick	   to	   re-­‐establish	   diplomatic	   relations	  with	   the	   new	   leadership	   in	   order	   to	  conclude	  agreements	  pertaining	  to	  migration.	  In	  the	  context	  of	  radical	  political	  transformations	  in	  North	   Africa,	   Italy’s	   core	   concern	   was	   to	   secure	   the	   continuity	   of	   its	   externalised	   border	  enforcement	  mechanisms.	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In	  February	  2011,	   faced	  with	  a	  sudden	  influx	  of	  migrants	  from	  Tunisia	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  unrest,	  the	   Italian	   government	   declare	   a	   ‘state	   of	   emergency	   in	   the	   national	   territory	   regarding	   the	  exceptional	  flows	  of	  North	  African	  citizens’.	  This	  “emergency”	  allowed	  the	  Italian	  government	  to	  achieve	   a	   number	   of	   goals.	   Italy	   was	   able	   to	   persuade	   the	   Tunisian	   government	   to	   sign	   the	  bilateral	   agreement	   on	   forced	   returns,	   garner	   greater	   support	   from	   the	   EU	   in	   terms	   of	  implementing	   articles	   pertaining	   to	   migration	   under	   the	   EU	   Treaty,	   and	   most	   importantly,	  effectively	   excised	   the	   Lampedusa	  migration	   centres	   from	   Italian	   law.	   This	  move	   of	   excision	   of	  territory,	   coupled	   with	   outsourcing	   of	   border	   patrolling	   to	   Tunisia,	   can	   be	   seen	   as	   parallel	   to	  Australia’s	  excising	  of	   its	  external	  territories	  and	  simultaneous	  outsourcing	  to	  Indonesia.	   In	  this	  way,	  both	  Australia	  and	  Italy	  create	  ambiguous	  borderscapes	  where	  shared	  sovereignties	  at	  sea	  are	  created,	  along	  the	  fault	  lines	  of	  regional	  disparities.	  	  	  	  These	  examples	  demonstrate	   the	  ways	   in	  which	  borders	  have	  become	  spatially	   and	   temporally	  mobile,	   available	   for	   manipulation	   according	   to	   the	   interests	   of	   border	   protection.151	   Through	  such	  manipulations,	  the	  notion	  of	  “arrival”	  itself	  becomes	  deterritorialised,	  or	  even	  despatialised	  entirely,	  as	  arrival	  is	  no	  longer	  marked	  by	  the	  physical	  body	  moving	  through	  space	  and	  arriving	  at	  a	  (spatialised)	  destination.	  Instead,	  the	  very	  act	  of	  arriving	  is	  declared,	  or	  nullified,	  by	  a	  regime	  of	  governance	   that	   effectively	   asserts	   boundaries	   of	   sovereignty	   devoid	   of	   territory.	   Conventional	  notions	   of	   “borders”	   and	   “border	   crossing”	   then	   become	   complicated	   by	   the	   notion	   that	   the	  border	   may	   not	   be	   spatially	   (or	   temporally)	   fixed.	   For	   Australia	   and	   the	   EU’s	   Mediterranean	  space,	   these	  borders	  are	   lines	  drawn	  in	  the	  sea,	  and	  are	  seemingly	  as	   fluid	  and	  mobile.	  Borders	  that	   once	   seemed	   solid	   now	  become	   zones	   of	   ambiguity.	   Far	   from	   a	   solid	   line	   that	   demarcates	  territories	  of	   inclusion	  and	  exclusion,	  the	  border	  is	  revealed	  as	  a	  dynamic	  landscape,	  vulnerable	  to	   manipulation.	   Scholars	   now	   speak	   of	   “mobile	   borders”,	   “virtual	   borders”,152	   and	   “biometric	  borders”153.	  	  	  Borders	  are	  being	  reconstituted	  in	  evermore-­‐ephemeral	  forms,	  and	  increasingly	  mapped	  directly	  onto	   suspect	   bodies	   in	   a	   proliferation	   of	   sites.154	   Pugliese	   has	   argued	   that	   as	   the	   global	   North	  relies	  on	  technologies	  of	  extraterritorialisation	  at	  the	  macro	  level,	  biometric	  data	  allows	  borders	  to	  be	  extraterritorialised	  at	   the	  micro	   level	  of	  embodiment.155	   “Biometric	  borders”	   refers	   to	   the	  regulation	   of	   mobility	   by	   amassing	   digital	   biological	   data	   in	   shared	   databases,	   including	  fingerprints,	   iris	   scanning	   and	   facial	   recognition	   technology.	   In	   biopolitical	   terms,	   biometric	  technologies	   inscribe	  borders	  onto	  bodies	   that	   are	   located	  well	   beyond	   the	  physical	   borders	  of	  the	  nation	  in	  order	  to	  pre-­‐emptively	  foreclose	  the	  movement	  of	  irregular	  migrants	  by	  fixing	  them	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at	  their	  point	  of	  origin.156	  Through	  the	  application	  of	  biometric	  technologies,	  the	  topology	  of	  the	  border	   is	   rendered	   both	   fixed	   and	   mobile,	   operating	   far	   beyond	   the	   reality	   of	   the	   border	  checkpoint.157	   Louise	   Amoore	   observes	   that	   the	   ‘biometric	   border	   is	   the	   portable	   border	   par	  excellence’.158	   In	   this	   sense	   the	   “real”	   borders	   now	   exist	   anywhere	   that	  migrants	  may	   come	   to	  experience	   their	   crossing,	   and	   therefore	   can	   be	   potentially	   everywhere	   that	   migrant	   bodies	  move.159	  The	  border	  becomes	  (and	  perhaps	  always	  has	  been)	  a	  ‘condition	  of	  being	  that	  is	  always	  in	  the	  act	  of	  becoming,	  it	  is	  never	  entirely	  crossed	  but	  appears	  as	  a	  constant	  demand	  for	  proof	  of	  status	  and	  legitimacy.’160	  Even	  the	  process	  of	  answering	  questions	  at	  the	  sites	  of	  border-­‐crossing	  becomes	  an	  act	  of	  performing	  one’s	  legitimacy,	  one’s	  belonging.	  Few	  occasions	  in	  life	  so	  strongly	  combine	   the	   ‘governmental	   power	   of	   bureaucratic	   normalisation	   with	   the	   sovereign	   power	   to	  ban…	   [and]	   it	   is	   the	   triumph	   of	   the	   sovereign	   that	   border	   anxiety	   is	   seen	   as	   mundane	   and	  ordinary	  in	  every	  day	  life’.161	  	  In	   his	   work	   on	   borders,	   Soguk	   has	   made	   the	   important	   argument	   that	   ‘borders	   are	   imbued	  through	  and	  through	  with	  intentionalities’,	  not	  only	  by	  those	  who	  enforce,	  but	  also	  by	  those	  who	  ‘transgress	  and	  violate	  them’.162	  Even	  the	  dead	  bodies	  of	  refugees	  washing	  up	  on	  Europe’s	  shores	  ‘mark	  the	  stages	  of	  an	  advance’,	  an	  unstable,	  mobile	  and	  evolving	  border:	  	   Surely,	   where	   refugee	   bodies	   fall,	   they	   mark	   borders	   in	   their	   resourceful	   and	   rich	   unfolding,	  temporally	   and	   spatially.	   Bodies	   fallen,	   drowned,	   mangled,	   and	   suffocated	   highlight	   borders’	  capture	   of	   people	   daring	   to	  move	   unauthorized.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   they	   also	   point	   to	   the	   trails	  through	  which	  border-­‐crossing	  people	  turn	  insurrectional,	  capturing	  borders	  and	  harnessing	  them	  to	  their	  movements.	  In	  this	  way,	  while	  reflecting	  the	  dead	  certainties,	  stoppages	  and	  terminations	  effected	  by	  the	  border,	  they	  also	  point	  to	  the	  ambiguities	  energized	  through	  border	  practices	  that	  manifest	  passages,	  continuities	  and	  interactions.163	  	  	  
The	  Geopolitics	  of	  Regional	  Migration	  Management	  The	  Mediterranean	  and	  Australasia	  are	  both	  regions	  sharply	  divided	  in	  the	  distribution	  of	  wealth	  and	  power	  among	  countries	   in	   the	  region.	  Within	   these	  regions,	  nation	  states	  have	   increasingly	  sought	  to	  coordinate	  in	  implementing	  regional	  migration	  and	  refugee	  policies,	  through	  a	  series	  of	  agreements	   that	  are	  based	  on	   fundamental	   inequalities	  between	  the	  participating	  nation-­‐states.	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While	   the	   borderscape	   may	   be	   one	   of	   continuity,	   as	   Andrijasevic	   describes,	   it	   is	   a	   continuity	  marked	  by	  a	  sharp	  asymmetry	  of	  power.	  Both	  Australia	  and	   the	  European	  Union	  have	   invested	  heavily	   in	   offshore	   arrangements	   and	   spearheaded	   bilateral	   arrangements	   with	   source	   and	  transit	  countries	  to	  prevent	  departures	  of	  potential	  asylum	  seekers,	  intercept	  them	  en	  route,	  and	  facilitate	  repatriation.164	  These	   investments	  have	  been	  accompanied	  by	   the	  growth	  of	  detention	  structures	  along	   transnational	   routes	   travelled	  by	  migrants	   in	   their	  attempts	   to	   reach	  Australia	  and	  the	  EU	  and	  make	  their	  asylum	  claims.165	  Other	  types	  of	  border	  enforcement	  also	  take	  place,	  with	  the	  support	  of	  national	  authorities	  in	  transit	  countries	  (like	  Egypt,	  Indonesia,	  Libya),	  through	  outsourcing	  border	  patrol	  and	  detention	  to	  private	  contractors	  (like	  G4S,	  Serco	  and	  Surveillance	  Australia	   Pty	   Ltd),	   and	   through	   the	   involvement	   of	   third	   parties	   like	   the	   International	  Organization	   for	   Migration	   (IOM),	   which	   operates	   on	   behalf	   of	   Australia	   on	   Nauru	   and	   in	  Indonesia.	  	  	  Offshore	   spaces	   have	   become	   the	   key	   frontlines	   for	   Australia	   and	   the	   EU	   in	   their	   attempts	   to	  thwart	  asylum	  seekers	  from	  ever	  truly	  arriving.	  Islands	  and	  maritime	  spaces	  between	  regions	  are	  the	   key	   sites	   where	   recurrent	   crises	   play	   out,	   where	   state	   sovereignty	   is	   re-­‐scaled	   and	   re-­‐articulated	  across	  time	  and	  space.166	  New	  geographical	  articulations	  are	  born	  out	  of	  moments	  of	  crisis,	  such	  as	  when	  Syrians	  and	  others	  have	  fled	  from	  North	  Africa	  en	  masse,	  attempting	  to	  reach	  Europe’s	   shores.	   These	  moments	   are	   also	   ripe	   for	   the	  production	  of	   crisis,	  which	   enables	   state	  actors	   to	   advance	   particular	   political	   agendas.167	   It	   is	   not	   only	   state	   actors	   and	   migrants	   who	  contest	   these	   interstitial	   zones.	   Activists,	   military	   personnel,	   fisherfolk,	   lawyers,	   NGOs,	   supra-­‐state	  agencies,	   traffickers,	   and	  private	   contractors	  all	   seek	   to	  assert	   their	   agency,	   influence	  and	  mobility	   in	   these	   transitional	   zones	   between	   states.168	   It	   is	   these	   complex	   assemblages	   and	  contestations	  that	  the	  term	  “migration	  management”	  seeks	  to	  contain.	  	  	  Loyd	   and	  Mountz	   point	   out	   that	   since	   the	   1980s,	   the	   two	   primary	   governance	   paradigms	   that	  have	   emerged	   to	   respond	   to	   crises	   of	  migration	  have	  been	   regionalisation	   and	  management.169	  Regionalisation	  refers	  to	  those	  coordinated	  efforts	  of	  nations	  -­‐	  such	  as	  between	  Italy	  and	  Libya,	  or	  Australia	   and	   Indonesia	   -­‐	   to	   manage	   migration	   at	   a	   regional	   level.	   Through	   articulated	  agreements,	  countries	  have	  developed	  shared	  policing	  and	  patrol	  strategies,	  interception	  efforts,	  synchronised	   travel	   and	   visa	   requirements,	   shared	   security	   information,	   and	   the	   hosting	   of	  information	  networks	  offshore,	  such	  as	  Australia’s	  Advanced	  Passenger	  Processing	  (APP)	  system,	  which	   enables	   advanced	   screening	   of	   passengers	   before	   they	   embark	   on	   their	   journey	   to	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Australia.170	  Alongside	  these	  agreements	  and	  collaborative	  efforts,	  there	  has	  also	  been	  a	  range	  of	  contestations	  and	  stand-­‐offs.	  Lines	  drawn	  in	  the	  sea	  are	  slippery,	  and	  in	  a	  number	  of	  cases,	  states	  have	   sought	   to	   reframe	   the	  problem	  of	  migration,	   and	   indeed	   the	  problems	  of	   individual	   boats	  and	  bodies,	  as	  someone	  else’s	  problem.	   In	  a	  number	  of	  cases,	   in	  both	   the	  Mediterranean	  and	   in	  Australian	   waters,	   stand-­‐offs	   have	   occurred	   at	   sea,	   while	   states	   negotiate	   who	   should	   take	  responsibility	   for	   particular	   asylum-­‐seeking	   boats.	   These	   crises	   have	   resulted	   in	  migrant	   boats	  being	  suspended	  at	   sea,	  processed	  at	   sea,	  detained	  on	   islands,	  and	   in	   some	  cases	  abandoned	  at	  sea,	  ultimately	  resulting	  in	  death.	  	  	  In	   the	   case	  of	  Australia,	   regional	   solutions	  have	   seen	   the	  processing	   and	  detention	  of	  maritime	  migrants	  moved	  to	  offshore	  territories	  like	  Christmas	  Island,	  or	  to	  other	  states	  such	  as	  Nauru	  or	  on	   Papua	   New	   Guinea’s	   Manus	   Island,	   in	   exchange	   for	   foreign	   aid	   and	   investment.	   In	   the	  Mediterranean,	  the	  Italian	  island	  of	  Lampedusa	  and	  the	  island	  state	  of	  Malta	  have	  been	  critical	  to	  regional	  arrangements.	  These	  regional	   solutions	  draw	  upon	  geopolitical	  divisions	  of	  power	  and	  colonial	  and	  neo-­‐colonial	  histories	  in	  order	  to	  secure	  states	  of	  the	  global	  North	  against	  irregular	  maritime	  migrations.	  As	  these	  regionalisation	  schemes	  and	  migration	  management	  regimes	  have	  taken	   hold	   over	   the	   last	   twenty	   years,	   Mountz	   argues	   that	   ‘islands	   have	   come	   to	   the	   fore	   as	  significant	  geographic	  locations	  from	  which	  to	  examine	  struggles	  over	  migration,	  sovereignty	  and	  enforcement’.171	  	  	  
Islands	  in	  a	  Carceral	  Archipelago	  Islands,	   as	   discrete	   and	   intimate	   entities,	   have	   long	   occupied	   a	   powerful	   place	   in	   the	   western	  imaginary	  –	  as	  paradise	  and	  gulag,	  refuge	  and	  prison,	  a	  site	  of	  dreams	  and	  wrecks.172	  The	  space	  of	  the	  island	  is	  remote	  and	  finite,	  offering	  itself	  as	  an	  ambiguous	  repository	  for	  those	  human	  desires	  and	  experiments	  which	  find	  no	  place	  on	  the	  mainland.173	  With	  their	  manageable	  size,	  separation	  and	  distance	  from	  the	  mainland,	  islands	  can	  be	  engineered	  as	  offshore	  enclaves	  where	  the	  rules	  of	  the	  parent	  state	  need	  not	  fully	  apply.174	  The	  island,	  as	  it	  enters	  the	  realm	  of	  politics,	  therefore	  functions	   in	  the	  metaphorical	  arena	  as	  well	  as	  the	  material.	  The	   island	  can	  serve	  as	  a	  metaphor	  for	   isolation	   and	   uniqueness,	   a	   distant	   state	   of	   exception	   with	   the	   heterotopic	   possibilities	   of	  absolute	   human	   control,	   or	   conversely,	   absolute	   freedom.175	   There	   is	   a	   complex	   interplay	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between	  islands	  as	  physical,	  geographical	  features	  and	  their	  metaphorical	  transformations	  within	  political	  discourse,	  whereby	  geopolitical	  claims	  about	  islands	  are	  naturalised,	  at	  the	  same	  time	  as	  geographical	   knowledge	   is	   politicised.176	   The	   political	   geography	   of	   the	   island	   is	   paradoxical;	  while	   it	   may	   be	   small	   and	   remote	   -­‐	   merely	   a	   speck	   on	   the	   map	   -­‐	   the	   island	   is	   critical	   to	   the	  constitution	   of	   the	  mainland.	   In	   his	   essay	   on	   the	   US	  military	   base	   at	   Guantanamo	   Bay,	   Joshua	  Comaroff	   reflects	   that	   islands	   are	   ‘among	   the	   great	   crucibles	   of	   the	   socio-­‐geographical	  imaginary’.177	  As	  heterotopias,	   crucibles	  or	   ‘laboratories	   for	   the	  possibilities	  of	   the	  nation-­‐state,	  islands	  exemplify	  the	  latter’s	  limit	  points,	  latent	  capabilities,	  and	  ultimate	  potentialities’.178	  	  	  Island	   detention	   centres	   have	   emerged	   as	   a	   cornerstone	   policy	   feature	   in	   the	   ongoing	  securitisation	  of	  migration,	  from	  Australia	  to	  the	  European	  Union.	  The	  island’s	  small	  size	  is	  read	  as	  manageable,	  while	   its	   isolation	   increases	   its	  security	  as	  a	  site	  of	  detention.179	  There	   is	  a	   long	  history	  of	  islands	  being	  used	  as	  penal	  colonies	  and	  prisons	  -­‐	  Robben	  Island	  held	  Nelson	  Mandela,	  Alcatraz	   held	   Al	   Capone,	   Lampedusa	  was	   an	   Italian	   penal	   colony,	   and	   the	   Australian	   continent	  itself	   was	   established	   as	   a	   penal	   colony,	   while	   several	   of	   its	   offshore	   islands	   served	   as	   high	  security	  prisons.	  Islands	  have	  served	  as	  prominent	  geographical	  sites	  of	  detention	  not	  just	  due	  to	  their	  geographical	  positioning	  in	  spaces	  between	  nations,	  but	  also	  due	  to	  their	  legal	  and	  political	  ambiguity.	  There	  is	  a	  range	  of	  terms	  today	  to	  describe	  processes	  of	  excising,	  zoning,	  quarantining,	  and	   offshoring	   that	   serve	   to	   endow	   a	   specific	   site	   within	   a	   state	   with	   particular	   privileges	   or	  penalties.180	  These	  spatial	  zoning	  practices	  have	  led	  not	  only	  to	  island	  detention	  sites	  but	  also	  to	  offshore	   finance	   centres,	   tax	   havens,	   export	   processing	   zones,	  military	   bases,	   remote	  weapons	  testing	   and	   dumping	   sites,	   special	   autonomous	   regions,	   duty	   free	   zones,	   and	   various	  combinations	  of	  these.181	  	  	  Nation	   states	   exploit	   the	   legal	   ambiguity	   of	   islands,	   their	   economic	   dependency,	   and	   colonial	  histories	  in	  order	  to	  effectively	  outsource	  the	  processing	  and	  detention	  of	  problematic	  bodies	  to	  offshore	  sites.	  This	  “offshoring’	  forms	  an	  ‘archipelago	  of	  exclusion	  that	  capitalises	  on	  sub-­‐national	  island	   jurisdictions	   to	   shrink	   spaces	   of	   asylum	   legally,	   numerically	   and	   spatially’.182	   Detaining	  migrants	  on	   islands	  serve	   to	  effectively	   isolate	   them	  from	  the	  bulk	  of	   the	  mainland	  community,	  with	   access	   to	   these	   islands	   by	   journalists,	   NGOs	   or	   members	   of	   the	   general	   public	   rendered	  difficult	  by	  transport	  costs,	  visa	  regulations,	  and	  government	  restrictions	  on	  visitors	  to	  detention	  centres.	   In	   this	   sense,	   the	   relative	   distance	   of	   island	  detention	   centres	   from	  mainland	   territory	  effectively	   isolates	  migrants	   from	   communities	   of	   advocacy	   and	   activism,	   legal	   representation,	  and,	   in	   some	   cases,	   restricts	   asylum	   claims	   that	   can	   only	   be	   made	   by	   landing	   on	   sovereign	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territory.183	  This	  distance	  needs	  to	  be	  considered	  in	  material	  terms.	  Christmas	  Island,	  an	  offshore	  territory	   of	   Australia,	   is	   governed	   from	   Canberra,	   the	   nation’s	   capital,	   some	   5,182	   kms	   away,	  more	   than	  double	   the	   distance	   from	  London	   to	  Moscow.184	   The	   scale	   of	   this	   distance	   serves	   to	  highlight	   the	   spatial	   relations	   between	   the	   administrative	   centre	   -­‐	   the	   metropole	   -­‐	   and	   the	  margins	  of	  territory,	  and	  the	  regimes	  of	  visibility	  and	  invisibility	  that	  operate	  over	  such	  distance.	  Christmas	   Island	   to	   Canberra	   is	   paradoxically	   ‘extraordinarily	   distant	   and	   constitutively	  relational’.185	   This	   distance	   also	   suggests	   how	   far	   states	   are	  willing	   to	  move,	   and	   expand	   their	  reach	  in	  response	  to	  the	  mobility	  of	  migrants.	  In	  the	  Australian	  context,	  this	  vast	  reach	  cannot	  be	  underestimated;	  the	  Border	  Protection	  Command	  (BPC)	  agency	  now	  claims	  to	  patrol	  11.5%	  of	  the	  earth’s	   oceans,	   or	   8%	   of	   the	   earth’s	   total	   surface,	   approximately	   12	   million	   square	   nautical	  miles.186	  	  	  The	   isolation	   enforced	   by	   these	   vast	   distances	   enables	   sub-­‐standard	   conditions	   and	   acts	   of	  violence	  to	  take	  place	  on	  island	  detention	  centres	  that	  would	  not	  be	  able	  to	  occur	  in	  the	  same	  way	  on	  the	  mainland.	  As	  Baldacchino	  and	  Milne	  explain:	  	   Islands	   provide	   bounded	   space	   for	   the	   emergence	   of	   ingenious	   new	   species	   of	   asymmetrical	  economies	  and	  governance.	  The	  pattern	  repeats	  itself	  again	  and	  again	  where	  typically	  large	  states	  make	  creative	  use	  of	  their	  small,	  far-­‐flung	  and	  remote	  island	  jurisdictions	  to	  facilitate	  activities	  that	  would	  be	  simply	  anathema	  on	  home	  ground.187	  	  	  The	   systemic	   deployment	   of	   offshore	   detention	   denies	   asylum	   seekers	   the	   right	   to	   access	  sovereign	   mainland	   territory,	   and	   therefore	   mobilise	   concomitant	   rights	   claims	   and	   legal	  protections.	   In	   some	   cases,	   migrants	   are	   offloaded	   into	   the	   care	   of	   states	   who	   have	   not	   even	  signed	  the	  1951	  Refugee	  Convention	  such	  as	  Libya	  or	  Indonesia,	  or	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Nauru,	  signed	  the	  Convention	  in	  order	  to	  establish	  a	  migrant	  detention	  centre	  at	  Australia’s	  behest.	  The	  process	  of	  externalisation	  of	  asylum	  therefore	  divides	  and	  obscures	  asylum	  seekers	  geographically	  from	  domestic	   systems	   of	   legal	   protection.188	   The	   use	   of	   ‘tactically	   post-­‐territorial’	   sites	   for	  military	  installations,	  camps	  and	  foreign	  bases,	  Comaroff	  has	  pointed	  out,	  are	  key	  features	  of	  US	  strategy	  in	   the	   war	   on	   terror.189	   While	   the	   concept	   of	   externalisation	   is	   not	   new,	   few	   scholars	   have	  investigated	  the	  consequences	  of	  the	  respatialisation	  of	  asylum.	  Those	  who	  have,	  such	  as	  Alison	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Mountz	   and	   Jennifer	   Hyndman,	   argue	   that	   the	   policies	   and	   spatial	   practices	   of	   externalising	  asylum	  for	  those	  who	  travel	  by	  sea	  effectively	  constitute	  neo-­‐refoulement.190	  	  	  
Continuity	  and	  Connection:	  Lampedusa,	  Christmas	  Island,	  Nauru	  and	  Melilla	  The	   islands	   and	   offshore	   sites	   utilised	   within	   the	   contemporary	   archipelago	   of	   migrant	  incarceration	  -­‐	  such	  as	  Christmas	  Island,	  Lampedusa,	  Nauru	  and	  Melilla	  -­‐	  need	  to	  be	  understood	  within	   their	   own	   particular	   histories	   and	   geographies	   of	   colonialism,	   militarism	   and	   empire.	  Tracing	  these	  historical	  and	  geographical	  particularities	  reveals	  consistencies	  in	  the	  spatialisation	  of	   power	   across	   distant	   global	   sites.	   Examining	   the	   connections	   between	   colonial	   histories,	  military	   incursions	   and	   contemporary	   uses	   of	   these	   islands	   exposes	   patterns	   of	   historical	   and	  topographical	  repetition	  in	  transnational	  relations	  of	  biopolitical	  power.	  A	  geographical	  analysis	  allows	  us	  to	  conceptualise	  islands	  ‘not	  as	  isolated	  sites,	  but	  component	  parts	  of	  broader	  patterns’	  characteristic	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  remote	  detention	  and	  the	  securitisation	  of	  migration.191	  These	   transnational	   sites	   have	   long	   been	   sites	   where	   anxieties	   pertaining	   to	   sovereignty	   and	  securing	  the	  nation’s	  borders	  manifest.	  	  	  I	  wish	   to	   trace	   a	   genealogy	   of	   exploitation	   at	   each	   of	   these	   four	   sites,	   through	   three	   particular	  schemas:	   colonialism,	  military	   instrumentality,	   and	  economic	  opportunism.	  Two	  of	   these	  sites	   -­‐	  Christmas	  Island	  and	  Lampedusa	  offer	  a	  ready	  comparison	  as	  offshore	  territories	  of	  Australia	  and	  Italy	   respectively,	   and	   host	   to	   migrant	   detention	   centres	   of	   the	   parent	   states.	   The	   other	   two	  locations	   offer	  more	   unique	   sites	   of	   enquiry:	   Nauru,	   a	   tiny	   sovereign	   nation-­‐state	   in	   the	   South	  Pacific,	   and	   Melilla,	   one	   of	   two	   Spanish	   cities	   located	   on	   the	   African	   continent,	   bordered	   by	  Morocco	  and	  the	  Mediterranean	  Sea.	  Contextualising	  these	  islands	  historically	  demonstrates	  the	  configurations	  of	  colonial,	  military	  and	  economic	  powers	  that	  shape	  a	  certain	  imagination	  about	  these	  territories,	  which	  allows	  them	  to	  be	  used	  in	  particular	  ways	  in	  the	  contemporary	  moment.	  	  
 
 
Genealogies	  of	  Colonialism	  and	  Militarism	  The	   contemporary	   uses	   of	   these	   four	   sites	   in	   the	   overall	   management	   and	   securitisation	   of	  migration	  cannot	  be	  considered	  as	  exceptional,	  but	  rather	  a	  continuation	  of	  exceptionalism	  as	  an	  historical	   project	   undertaken	   in	   waves	   by	   imperial	   and	   colonial	   forces.192	   The	   assertion	   of	  imperial	   and	   neo-­‐imperial	   power	   over	   these	   spaces	   serves	   to	   reinforce	   these	   sites	   as	   always	  already	   available	   for	   utilisation	   -­‐	   not	   only	   in	   terms	  of	   the	   exploitation	   of	   resources,	   but	   also	   in	  terms	  of	  the	  negation	  of	  local	  populations.	  There	  is	  a	  general	  feeling	  of	  surplus	  that	  infuses	  these	  territories	  -­‐	  they	  are	  extra	  bits	  of	  land,	  available	  for	  use.	  All	  four	  of	  these	  sites	  have	  been	  subject	  
                                                
190 Hyndman and Mountz, “Another Brick in the Wall?” 
191 Mountz, “The Enforcement Archipelago.”, 126. 
192 This point is made by Amy Kaplan in her 2005 study on imperialism, colonisation and militarisation of 
Guantanamo Bay. Kaplan (2005) in Ibid., 393. 
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to	   colonial	   conquests,	  which	   involved	   the	   exploitation	   of	   some	   natural	   resources	   alongside	   the	  preservation	  and	  commodification	  of	  other	  natural	  resources,	  and	  a	  denial	  of	  indigeneity	  or	  other	  claims	  of	  the	  colonised	  populations.	  	  	  Christmas	   Island,	   a	  non	   self-­‐governing	   territory	  of	  Australia,	   and	   Italy’s	   southernmost	   island	  of	  Lampedusa	  share	  a	  number	  of	  geographical	  and	  ecological	  features	  which	  have	  invited	  particular	  utilisations	   by	   Australia	   and	   Italy	   respectively.	   Christmas	   Island	   is	   located	   in	   the	   Indian	  Ocean	  around	  320	  kilometres	  south	  of	  Java,	  Indonesia	  and	  more	  than	  2,600	  kilometres	  northwest	  of	  the	  nearest	   Australian	   city	   of	   Perth,	   Western	   Australia.193	   These	   vast	   distances	   demonstrate	   the	  elastic	   spatialisation	   of	   power	   exercised	   by	   Australia	   over	   the	   territory.	   Since	   2006,	   Christmas	  Island	  has	  hosted	  a	  purpose-­‐built	   Immigration	  Reception	  and	  Processing	  Centre	  (IRPC),	  used	  to	  detain	   asylum	   seekers	   attempting	   to	   reach	   Australia.	   Similarly,	   the	   island	   of	   Lampedusa’s	  “belonging”	   to	   Italy	   is	   geographically	   tenuous.	   Lying	   at	   the	   southern	   tip	   of	   Italy,	   Lampedusa	   is	  185km	  south	  of	   the	   Sicilian	   coast	   and	   just	  120kms	   from	  Tunisia	   and	   is	   considered	  geologically	  part	  of	  Africa.194	  Since	  the	  early	  2000s,	  Lampedusa	  has	  become	  a	  key	  landing	  point	  for	  migrants	  seeking	  to	  enter	  the	  EU	  and	  has	  operated	  a	  migrant	  reception	  centre	  since	  1998.	  The	  geological	  features	   of	   both	   islands	   lend	   themselves	   as	   ideal	   sites	   within	   a	   certain	   prison	   imaginary	   -­‐	  Christmas	   Island	   is	  naturally	   fenced	  by	  dramatic	   limestone	   cliffs	   around	   the	  edge	  of	   the	   island,	  while	  Lampedusa’s	  southern	  side	  is	  riddled	  with	  deep	  gorges	  and	  the	  northern	  end	  dominated	  by	  sheer	  cliffs.	  	  	  Both	  islands	  are	  considered	  to	  be	  of	  unique	  ecological	  value,	  as	  home	  to	  several	  endemic	  species	  and	   protected	   areas	   of	   reef	   and	   rainforest.	   The	   ecological	   value	   and	   rights	   claims	   of	  environmentalists	   in	   relation	   to	   these	   sites	   sits	   in	   tension	   with	   their	   carceral	   utilisations.	  Christmas	  Island	  is	  home	  to	  a	  rare	  species	  of	  migratory	  red	  crab,	  millions	  of	  which	  transect	  the	  island	   at	   particular	   times	   of	   year.	   In	   designing	   the	   migrant	   detention	   facilities	   on	   Christmas	  Island,	  the	  architects	  were	  instructed	  to	  choose	  a	  site	  away	  from	  the	  crabs’	  main	  migratory	  route	  and	   the	   brief	   also	   mandated	   for	   the	   construction	   of	   special	   crab	   crossing	   facilities.195	   In	   this	  absurd	   and	   allegorical	   feature,	   crabs	   whose	   migration	   paths	   became	   “irregular”	   could	   be	  redirected	  in	  an	  orderly	  way	  to	  follow	  the	  specified	  migration	  paths.196	  On	  Lampedusa,	  a	  southern	  beach	  is	  famous	  as	  one	  of	  the	  last	  remaining	  egg-­‐laying	  sites	  for	  the	  Loggerhead	  Sea	  Turtle,	  which	  is	   endangered	   throughout	   the	   Mediterranean.	   The	   egg-­‐laying	   of	   the	   turtle,	   along	   with	   the	  subterranean	  life	  in	  the	  surrounding	  reefs,	  serve	  as	  prime	  tourist	  attractions	  to	  the	  island,	  which	  functions	   as	   both	   a	   prison	   and	   a	   resort.	   While	   eco-­‐tourists	   and	   environmentalists	   lobby	   for	  preserving	  the	  pristine	  waters	  and	  beaches	  of	  Lampedusa	  in	  order	  to	  save	  the	  turtle,	  the	  washed-­‐up	  bodies	  of	  asylum	  seekers	  on	  the	  same	  beaches	  go	  unremarked	  in	  these	  ecotourism	  narratives.	  
                                                
193 Christmas Island is 135 square kilometres in size. 
194 The island is just 20km square, and in 2014 has a population of around 4,500 inhabitants. 
195 Chambers, “Society Has Been Defended,” 33. 
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The	  discourses	  of	  environmental	  protection	  at	  both	  sites	  function	  as	  a	  liberal	  claim	  of	  protection	  that	  sits	  uneasily	  alongside	  incarceration.	  	  	  It	  was	  Christmas	  Island’s	  natural	  resources	  that	  originally	  garnered	  colonial	  interest	  in	  the	  island.	  Both	  Christmas	  Island	  and	  Nauru	  became	  seen	  as	  important	  resources	  following	  the	  discovery	  of	  phosphate	   on	   the	   islands.	   Christmas	   Island	   was	   annexed	   by	   the	   British	   in	   1888	   following	   the	  discovery	   of	   phosphate,	   and	   mining	   began	   using	   indentured	   labour	   from	   China,	   Malaysia	   and	  Singapore.197	   Following	  World	  War	   II,	   Christmas	   Island	   came	  under	   the	   jurisdiction	  of	   the	  new	  colony	  of	  Singapore,	  and	   the	  mining	  program	  was	  expanded	  and	  more	  workers	  were	  recruited,	  evolving	   into	   a	   permanent	   population.198	   Given	   the	  massive	   post-­‐war	   expansion	   of	   phosphate-­‐enriched	  agriculture	  in	  Australia	  and	  New	  Zealand,	  the	  economic	  importance	  of	  Christmas	  Island	  was	   quickly	   recognised	   by	   the	   Australian	   government.	   The	   phosphate	   mined	   from	   Christmas	  Island	  and	  Nauru	  was	   the	  backbone	  of	  Australian	  agricultural	   inputs,	   supplying	   fertiliser	   to	   the	  country	  for	  almost	  a	  century.	  	  	  Following	  World	  War	  II,	  Australia	  feared	  an	  ‘Asiatic	  invasion’	  and	  sought	  to	  maintain	  Australian	  security	   ‘behind	   a	   peripheral	   screen	   of	   islands’.199	   	   It	   was	   in	   this	   context	   that	   the	   government	  entered	  into	  careful	  negotiations	  with	  the	  British,	  and	  in	  1958	  the	  governance	  of	  Christmas	  Island	  was	  transferred	  to	  Australia,	  with	  a	  compensation	  payment	  made	  to	  Singapore	  to	  the	  tune	  of	  2.9	  million	  British	  pounds.200	  The	  Australian	  claim	  to	  sovereignty	  over	  Christmas	  Island	  was	  made	  in	  part	  on	   the	  basis	   that	   there	  were	  no	  other	   competing	   claims	   to	   sovereignty,	   especially	   from	  an	  indigenous	  population.201	  Australian	  went	  to	  great	  lengths	  to	  maintain	  that	  the	  inter-­‐generational	  population	   of	   Christmas	   Island	  was	   represented	   and	   documented	   as	   a	   temporary	   labour	   force,	  denying	  any	  possible	  claims	  to	  permanence	  or	  indigeneity.	  Chambers	  makes	  the	  point	  that	  rights	  claims	   have	   therefore	   always	   been	   something	   that	   the	   Australian	   government	   has	   tried	   to	  interdict	   before	   they	   have	   the	   chance	   to	   arrive	   on	   Christmas	   Island.202	   In	   1981,	   Australian	  resident	  status	  was	  officially	  conferred	  on	  all	  those	  residing	  on	  Christmas	  Island	  at	  the	  time,	  with	  universal	   eligibility	   to	   apply	   for	   Australian	   citizenship.203	   Christmas	   Island	   was	   no	   longer	  “remote”,	  but	  had	  been	  brought	  properly	  into	  Australia.	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The	   island	   Republic	   of	   Nauru,	   in	   the	   South	   Pacific,	   is	   located	   around	   4,000kms	   northeast	   of	  Sydney,	  Australia.204	   	  As	  a	  phosphate	  rock	  island,	  with	  rich	  deposits	  near	  the	  surface,	  Nauru	  has	  been	   mined	   extensively	   and	   left	   mostly	   barren.	   In	   2001,	   Nauru	   opened	   a	   migrant	   detention	  centre,	  spread	  across	  two	  camps,	  in	  exchange	  for	  Australian	  aid.	  After	  closing	  the	  centre	  in	  2008,	  the	   Australian	   government	   re-­‐opened	   it	   in	   2012	   and	   continues	   to	   detain	   asylum	   seekers	   on	  Nauru.	   Since	   April	   2014,	   recognised	   refugees	   have	   been	   temporarily	   resettled	   on	   Nauru	   and	  released	  into	  the	  island	  community.	  	  	  The	  island	  of	  Nauru’s	  first	  contact	  with	  Europeans	  began	  in	  the	  early	  19th	  century	  when	  passing	  traders	   or	   whaling	   ships	   would	   stop	   at	   the	   island	   to	   trade	   fresh	   water	   and	   food,	   giving	   the	  islanders	  alcohol	  and	  firearms	  in	  return.	  The	  balance	  between	  the	  twelve	  tribes	  on	  the	  island	  was	  disturbed	  by	  these	  introductions,	  resulting	  in	  a	  ten-­‐year	  civil	  war	  that	  reduced	  the	  population	  by	  forty	   percent.205	   The	   island	  was	   annexed	   by	   Germany	   in	   1888,	   until	  World	  War	   I	  when	   it	  was	  captured	   by	   Australian	   troops,	   held	   under	   British	   control	   until	   1920,	   and	   finally	   in	   1923	   was	  made	   an	   Australian	   mandate	   territory,	   with	   the	   UK	   and	   New	   Zealand	   as	   co-­‐trustees	   of	   the	  mandate.206	  Phosphate	  had	  been	  discovered	  on	  Nauru	  in	  1900,	  hence	  the	  intense	  interest	   in	  the	  island	  by	  the	  colonising	  forces.	  Following	  World	  War	  I,	  the	  local	  population	  suffered	  high	  fatalities	  due	   to	   epidemics	   of	   European	   infectious	   diseases,	   including	   tuberculosis	   and	   influenza.	   In	   the	  following	   decades,	   phosphate	   mining	   continued	   intensively	   until	   1961	   when,	   having	   stripped	  Nauru	  of	  it’s	  tropical	  vegetation	  and	  leaving	  a	  barren	  rocky	  wasteland,	  Australia	  declared	  Nauru	  uninhabitable	   and	   offered	   to	   resettle	   the	   residents	   on	   a	   deserted	   island	   off	   the	   coast	   of	  Queensland.207	  The	  Nauruans	  refused	  and	  instead	  opted	  for	  independence,	  becoming	  the	  world’s	  smallest	   independent	   republic	   in	   1968.	   In	   a	   final	   act	   of	   exploitation	   before	   leaving	   the	   island,	  Australia,	  New	  Zealand	  and	  the	  UK	  forced	  Nauru	  to	  borrow	  against	  its	  future	  mining	  earnings	  to	  buy	  out	  their	  shared	  phosphate	  company.208	  	  	  In	   the	   case	   of	   Lampedusa,	   the	   island	   changed	   hands	   a	   number	   of	   times,	   until	   1860	   when	   the	  island	  became	  part	  of	  the	  new	  Kingdom	  of	  Italy.	  Lampedusa’s	  role	  as	  a	  place	  of	  incarceration	  was	  founded	  soon	  after	   Italian	  unification,	  when	  the	  northern-­‐dominated	  Italian	  government	  sought	  to	  establish	  a	  place	  of	  penal	   exile	   for	   the	   remainders	  of	   the	   insurgent,	   anti-­‐unification	  South.209	  The	  descent	  of	  Northern	  Italian	  politicians	  and	  bureaucrats	  into	  the	  south	  was	  seen	  as	  a	  process	  of	  ‘discovery	  and	  colonisation’.210	  In	  tracing	  the	  island’s	  history,	  Pugliese	  has	  described	  the	  ways	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in	  which	  Africa	  became	  the	  governing	  metaphor	  through	  which	  Northern	  Italians	  made	  sense	  of	  the	  islands	  of	  the	  south,	  replete	  with	  highly	  racialised	  notions	  of	  criminality.211	  Lampedusa,	  as	  a	  penal	  colony,	  was	  constitutive	  of	   Italian	  nation-­‐building;	  offering	  a	  site	  upon	  which	   the	  nation’s	  designated	  criminal	  subjects	  could	  be	  cast	  into	  internal	  exile.212	  	  Lampedusa,	  Christmas	  Island	  and	  Nauru	  all	  became	  caught	  up	  in	  WWII	  battles	  that	  were	  playing	  out	   between	   the	   global	   powers.	   Japanese	   Forces	   occupied	   both	   Christmas	   Island	   and	   Nauru	  during	  World	  War	   II.	   The	   islands	  were	   targeted	   largely	   due	   to	   their	   rich	   phosphate	   resources,	  which	  were	  used	  in	  part	  to	  produce	  munitions	  for	  Australia	  and	  New	  Zealand.213	  Christmas	  Island	  was	   occupied	   from	   1942,	   during	   which	   time	   over	   60%	   of	   the	   population	   was	   evacuated	   to	  Japanese	  prison	   camps	   in	   Surabaya.214	  Nauru	   suffered	   shelling	  by	   the	  Germans	   in	  1940,	   and	   in	  1942	  was	  occupied	  by	   the	   Japanese	  military,	  which	   lasted	   three	  years	  until	  1945.	  The	   Japanese	  used	   the	  Nauruans	  as	   forced	   labour	  and	  deported	  many	   to	  work	  as	   indentured	   labour	   in	  other	  parts	  of	   the	  Pacific.	   In	  one	  brutal	   incident,	   the	  occupying	   forces	  reportedly	   took	  39	   lepers	   from	  their	   Nauruan	   colony,	   loaded	   them	   onto	   a	   boat	   and	   sunk	   it	   out	   at	   sea.215	   The	   Japanese	   built	   a	  significant	  airfield	  on	  Nauru,	  which	  was	  bombed	  several	  times	  by	  the	  Allied	  forces	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	   prevent	   food	   supplies	   being	   flown	   into	   Nauru.	   At	   the	   end	   of	   the	   war,	   after	   air	   raids,	  deportations	  and	  massacres,	  there	  were	  reportedly	  less	  than	  600	  Nauruans	  left	  on	  the	  island.216	  Lampedusa	  was	   also	   caught	   up	   in	   the	   battles	   of	  World	  War	   II,	   with	   Allied	   forces	   bombing	   the	  island	  in	  1943	  until	  its	  surrender.	  In	  1986,	  in	  retaliation	  for	  the	  American	  bombing	  of	  Tripoli	  and	  Benghazi,	  Libya	   fired	   two	  missiles	  at	   the	  US	  Coast	  Guard	  navigation	  station	  on	  Lampedusa.	  The	  Coast	   Guard	   station	   was	   then	   commissioned	   as	   a	   NATO	   base	   until	   1994,	   when	   it	   was	  decommissioned,	   returned	   to	   the	   Italians	  and	   later	   converted	   into	  a	  migrant	   ‘identification	  and	  deportation	  centre’.217	  The	  migrant	  detention	  centre	  on	  Lampedusa	  therefore	  follows	  directly	  in	  a	  site-­‐specific	  lineage	  of	  militarised	  and	  colonial	  infrastructure.	  	  	  As	  a	  Spanish	  enclave	  city	   located	  within	   the	  African	  continental	   landmass,	  bordered	  entirely	  by	  Morocco	  and	  the	  sea,	  Melilla	  functions	  as	  an	  island	  of	  sorts,	  particularly	  in	  terms	  of	  migration.218	  	  The	  Moroccan	  city	  of	  Melilla	  was	  seized	  by	  a	  Spanish	  fleet	  in	  1497,	  and	  during	  the	  16th	  and	  17th	  centuries	   the	   Spanish	   proceeded	   to	   build	   a	   large	   fortress	   north	   of	   the	   port.	   The	   current	  boundaries	  of	  the	  Spanish	  territory	  surrounding	  the	  fortress	  were	  established	  through	  a	  series	  of	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treaties	  with	  Morocco	  in	  the	  mid	  to	  late	  19th	  Century.	  Two	  major	  campaigns	  were	  launched	  by	  the	  local	  Rif	  Berbers	  against	  the	  Spanish,	  leading	  to	  brief	  wars	  in	  1893	  and	  again	  in	  1908,	  when	  the	  Spanish	   had	   begun	   to	  mine	   lead	   and	   iron	   in	   the	   region.	   To	   do	   so,	   the	   Spanish	   relied	   upon	   the	  Berber,	  who	  became	  migrant	  labourers	  in	  the	  territory	  that	  had	  previously	  been	  their	  own.	  In	  this	  sense,	  the	  use	  of	  migrant	  indentured	  labour	  and	  mining	  resonates	  with	  the	  labour	  and	  extraction	  histories	  of	  Christmas	  Island	  and	  Nauru.	  	  	  A	   2007	   visit	   to	   Melilla	   by	   the	   Spanish	   King	   and	   Queen	   caused	   a	   diplomatic	   dispute	   between	  Morocco	  and	  Spain.	  Morocco	  claims	  that	  the	  territories	  of	  Melilla	  and	  Ceuta	  should	  be	  returned	  to	  it,	  while	  Spain	  maintains	   that	   the	   territories	  have	  been	  Spanish	  since	  before	  Morocco	  became	  a	  sovereign	  state.219	  To	  prevent	  migration	  into	  the	  territory,	  particularly	  by	  sub-­‐Saharan	  Africans,	  Spain	  has	  constructed	  three	  parallel	  razor	  wire	  barrier	  fences,	  complete	  with	  spotlights,	  noise	  and	  movement	  sensors,	  watchtowers	  and	  video	  cameras.	  In	  spite	  of	  these	  measures,	  there	  have	  been	  a	  number	  of	  coordinated	  attempts	  by	  migrants	  to	  storm	  the	  fences	  in	  a	  synchronised	  manner	  in	  the	   hope	   that	   of	   the	   hundreds,	   or	   even	   thousands,	   who	   attempt	   to	   cross,	   some	   will	   make	   it	  through.	  Melilla	  also	  hosts	  a	  migrant	  reception	  centre.	  	  	  
The	  Stuff	  Dreams	  Are	  Made	  Of	  These	  offshore	  sites	  have	  also	  served	  as	  the	  repositories	   for	  elaborate	  transnational	  schemes	  of	  economic	  opportunism.	  On	  Christmas	  Island,	  as	  the	  phosphate	  industry	  gradually	  declined,	  a	  new	  purpose	  was	  found	  for	  this	  remote	  island	  territory.	  In	  keeping	  with	  the	  metaphor	  of	  the	  island	  as	  a	   place	   to	   find	   treasure,	   a	   grand	   casino	  was	   built	   in	   1993,	   as	   a	   joint	   venture	   by	   an	   Australian	  businessman	  and	  his	  Indonesian	  business	  partner	  who	  had	  close	  links	  to	  the	  New	  Order	  regime	  of	  then	  Indonesian	  President	  Suharto.220	  The	  casino	  and	  resort	  quickly	  became	  the	  largest	  employer	  on	   Christmas	   Island,	   at	   times	   turning	   over	   $15	   million	   dollars	   profit	   in	   a	   single	   weekend,	  contributing	  around	  $11	  million	  per	  year	   to	   the	   local	  economy,	  and	  sizeable	   tax	  revenue	   to	   the	  Australian	  government.	  The	  casino’s	  success	  relied	  upon	  the	  isolated	  nature	  of	  the	  island	  and	  on	  friendly	  business	  connections,	  as	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  clientele	  were	  New	  Order	  elite	  who	  came	  to	  the	   resort	   for	   gambling	   and	   hedonistic	   pleasures	   impossible	   in	   Jakarta	   due	   to	   the	   pressure	   of	  Islamic	   interests.221	   	  The	  casino	   thrived	  until	  1998,	  which	  saw	  the	  Asian	   financial	  crisis	  and	  the	  overthrow	  of	  Suharto	  and	  his	  regime,	  bringing	   the	  casino’s	  success	   to	  an	  abrupt	  halt.	  While	   the	  success	   of	   the	   casino	   had	   profoundly	   restructured	   the	   economy	   of	   Christmas	   Island,	   it	   was	  thrown	  into	  a	  state	  of	  insecurity	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  its	  closure.	  The	  Australian	  government,	  which	  had	  been	  pursuing	  de	  jure	  status	  of	  Christmas	  Island	  in	  order	  to	  avoid	  questions	  about	  its	  lack	  of	  self-­‐
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determination,	  now	  found	   itself	  responsible	   for	   the	  welfare	  and	  economic	  viability	  of	   the	   island	  and	  its	  population.222	  	  	  In	   June	   2001,	   the	   Australian	   government	   launched	   its	   island	   fantasies	   into	   improbable	   new	  heights,	  with	  the	  declaration	  that	  it	  would	  provide	  A$105	  million	  in	  funding	  to	  establish	  a	  satellite	  spaceport	  on	  Christmas	  Island.223	  Under	  an	  agreement	  negotiated	  with	  the	  Russian	  space	  agency,	  Russia	   would	   supply	   Soviet	   rockets	   and	   launch	   expertise	   while	   Australia	   would	   provide	  infrastructure	  and	  opportunities	  to	  launch	  commercial	  satellites	  from	  Christmas	  Island.224	  While	  Christmas	   Island	   languished	   in	  between	   the	   failed	   treasure	   island	   fantasy	  of	   the	  casino	  and	   the	  promise	  of	  Soviet	  space	  exploration,	  a	  boat	  appeared	  on	  the	  horizon	  –	   the	  Tampa	  –	   that	  was	  to	  once	  again	   transform	  Christmas	   Island,	  metaphorically,	   legally,	  politically	  and	  materially.225	  The	  remote	  territory	  of	  Christmas	  Island	  was	  brought	  centre	  stage	  in	  the	  Australian	  imagination	  with	  the	  building	  of	  the	  detention	  centre.	  	  	  On	   Nauru,	   in	   the	   decades	   following	   independence,	   the	   profits	   from	   the	   now	   nationalised	  phosphate	  mine	  resulted	  in	  Nauruans	  claiming	  one	  of	  the	  highest	  per	  capita	  incomes	  in	  the	  world,	  standing	   at	  USD$31,000	   in	   1975.226	   Phosphate	   royalties	   allowed	   the	   government	   to	   establish	   a	  comprehensive	   welfare	   state,	   including	   free	   utilities	   and	   subsidised	   housing,	   without	   taxes.227	  However,	   by	   the	   1990s,	   phosphate	   profits	   were	   in	   decline	   and	   the	   state	   of	   Nauru	   began	   to	  promote	   itself	   as	   a	   site	   for	   offshore	   banking	   services.228	   The	   island	   became	   a	   tax	   haven,	  particularly	   for	  Russian	  mafia,	   and	   foreign	  nationals	  were	  able	   to	  buy	  Nauruan	  citizenship,	   and	  even	   establish	   a	   licensed	  bank	   for	   a	   fee.	   In	  2002,	   the	   international	   Financial	  Action	  Task	  Force	  (FATF)	   listed	   Nauru	   as	   one	   of	   the	   15	   non-­‐cooperative	   countries	   refusing	   to	   take	   adequate	  measures	  to	  prevent	  money	  laundering.229	  The	  FATF	  was	  particularly	  concerned	  about	  the	  400	  or	  so	  banks	  that	  had	  no	  physical	  presence	  in	  the	  country.230	  	  	  The	  state	  of	  Nauru,	  once	  known	  as	  Pleasant	  Island,	  was	  now	  rapidly	  entering	  the	  realm	  of	  “failed	  state”	   discourses,	   dependent	   on	   cash	   injections	   from	   other	   countries	   in	   order	   to	   survive.	  Throughout	  the	  2000s,	  Nauru	  undertook	  a	  range	  of	  creative	  income-­‐generating	  measures.	  It	  used	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its	   newly	   acquired	   UN	  member	   status	   (which	   it	   obtained	   in	   1999)	   to	   de-­‐recognise	   Taiwan,	   in	  return	  for	  US$60	  million	  in	  aid	  and	  $77	  million	  in	   ‘debt	  forgiveness’	  from	  China.231	   	  Three	  years	  later,	   Nauru	   broke	   ties	   with	   China	   and	   re-­‐recognised	   Taiwan.	   In	   2009,	   Nauru	   recognised	   the	  republics	  of	  Abkhazia	  and	  South	  Ossetia,	  and	  received	  US$50	  million	  from	  Russia	  for	  doing	  so.232	  From	  2001	  –	  2013	  the	  state	  of	  Nauru	  has	  had	  nineteen	  changes	  of	  government,	  mostly	  due	  to	  no-­‐confidence	   votes.233	   All	   of	   this	   has	   allowed	   for	   heavy	   infiltration	   of	   the	   Nauruan	   state	   by	  Australian	   bureaucrats	   and	   Australian	   capital.234	   The	   representation	   of	   Nauru	   as	   a	   failed	   state,	  and	   Nauruans	   as	   the	   “irresponsible	   native”	   who	   squandered	   their	   wealth	   through	   short-­‐term	  thinking	   and	   insatiable	   greed	   is	   pervasive,235	   and	   allows	   for	   the	   ongoing	   justification	   of	  intervention	  by	  Australia.	  Nauru	  is	  economically	  bound	  to	  Australia	  –	  operating	  Australian	  dollars	  as	  their	  currency,	  receiving	  substantial	  sums	  of	  aid	  in	  exchange	  for	  the	  detention	  centre,	  and	  most	  recently	   effectively	   buffering	   the	   Australian	   detention	   centre	   from	   receiving	   any	   visitors	   by	  increasing	  the	  visitor	  visa	  fee	  to	  a	  hefty	  AUD$7,000.	  	  	  For	   the	  Mediterranean	   territories	   of	   Lampedusa	   and	  Melilla,	   the	   violent	   disjuncture	   lies	   in	   the	  radically	   asymmetrical	   relations	   of	   power	   that	   sit	   side-­‐by-­‐side	   in	   jarring	   proximity.	   Havens	   of	  leisure	  and	  privilege	  clash	  violently	  against	  the	  harrowing	  presence	  of	  desperate	  asylum	  seekers.	  Lampedusa	   is	   marked	   paradoxically	   as	   both	   a	   tourist	   destination	   and	   a	   contemporary	   penal	  colony.236	  In	  2014,	  Trip	  Advisor	  ranked	  Lampedusa’s	  Rabbit	  Beach	  fourth	  in	  its	  2014	  Traveller’s	  Choice	  awards	   for	   “Top	  25	  Beaches”.237	  One	  description	  of	   this	   ‘Mediterranean	  paradise’	   reads:	  ‘The	  sand	  is	  golden,	  the	  water	  is	  crystal	  clear	  and	  there	  are	  plenty	  of	  fish	  for	  snorkelling’.238	  In	  all	  these	  positive	   reviews	  of	   Lampedusa,	   the	  presence	  of	   the	   immigration	  detention	   centres	   is	   not	  mentioned.	  Within	  these	  tourist	  narratives,	   there	   is	  no	  space	   for	   the	   jarring	  presence	  of	  asylum	  seeker	  bodies,	  dead	  or	  alive.	  The	  Rough	  Guide	  describes	  Spanish	  Melilla	  as	  a	  ‘friendly	  little	  place,	  with	  a	  pride	  in	  its	  mix	  of	  cultures’,	  boasting	  ‘stunning	  views	  out	  across	  the	  Mediterranean’.239	  In	  his	   work	   ‘Dying	   to	   come	   to	   Australia:	   Asylum	   seekers,	   tourists	   and	   death’,	   Jon	   Stratton	   has	  documented	   the	   perverse	   and	   violently	   contradictory	   relations	   that	   at	   once	   connect	   and	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disconnect	   asylum	  seekers	   and	   tourists.240	  Within	   such	   spaces,	   the	  wealthy	  of	   the	  Global	  North	  sunbake,	   snorkel,	   play	   a	   round	   of	   golf,	   enjoy	   their	   leisure	   time,	   within	   the	   same	   geographical	  space	   as	   the	   desperate	   asylum	   seeker	   from	   the	   Global	   South.	   In	   an	   image	   that	   went	   viral	   in	  October	  2014,	  African	  migrants	  seeking	  entry	  to	  the	  Spanish	  enclave	  were	  caught	  atop	  the	  razor	  wire	  fence	  along	  the	  border,	  looking	  down	  at	  white-­‐clad	  golfers	  teeing	  off	  in	  an	  elite	  club.241	  It	  is	  worth	  noting	  that	  these	  highly	  spectacular	  visual	  renderings	  of	  migrants	  attempting	  to	  climb	  the	  fences	  in	  Melilla	  show	  us	  a	  particular	  refugee	  body	  –	  the	  black	  body.	  These	  migrants	  are	  routinely	  described	  as	  “African”	  without	  attention	  to	  specificity	  of	  origins,	  of	  histories,	  or	  of	  the	  conflict	  or	  circumstances	  they	  might	  be	  fleeing.	  	  While	   some	   bodies	   are	   encouraged	   to	   enjoy	   the	   crystal	   clear	   waters,	   others	   are	   met	   with	  excessive	  force.	  This	  was	  the	  case	  in	  February	  2014	  when	  nine	  migrants	  drowned	  as	  a	  result	  of	  Spanish	   security	   forces	   firing	   rubber	   bullets	   at	   a	   group	   attempting	   to	   swim	   from	   a	   beach	   in	  Morocco	  to	  Spain’s	  other	  enclave	  of	  Ceuta.242	  Foucault	  wrote	  of	  the	  ‘epoch	  of	  simultaneity’	  as	  the	  epoch	  of	   juxtaposition,	   the	  epoch	  of	   the	  near	  and	   far,	  of	   the	  side-­‐by-­‐side,	  of	   the	  dispersed.243	   In	  this	  sense,	  the	  asylum-­‐seeker	  and	  the	  pleasure-­‐seeker	  are	  cast	  into	  ‘an	  ensemble	  of	  relations	  that	  make	   them	   appear	   as	   juxtaposed,	   set	   off	   against	   one	   another,	   implicated	   by	   each	   other	   –	   that	  makes	   them	   appear,	   in	   short,	   as	   a	   sort	   of	   configuration’.244	   In	   these	   sites,	   conflicting	   and	  incompatible	   ontologies	   of	   living	   and	  dying	   are	   revealed,	   producing	   ‘dispositions	  of	   bodies	   and	  subjects	  that	  remain	  proximate,	  yet	  invisible	  to	  each	  other’.245	  	  Through	  offering	  a	  genealogy	  of	   these	   four	  sites	  at	   territory’s	  edge,	   I	  have	  attempted	   to	   track	  a	  series	   of	   parallels.	   In	   the	   contemporary	   moment,	   all	   four	   sites	   represent	   fault	   lines	   in	   the	  North/South	  division	   of	   labour	   and	  distribution	   of	   death	   in	   relation	   to	  migration	  management,	  and	  all	  four	  sites	  are	  nodes	  in	  a	  global	  archipelago	  of	  migrant	  detention.	  By	  tracing	  the	  histories	  of	  colonialism,	  annexation,	  militarism	  and	  transnational	  experiments	  of	  capital	  enterprise,	  I	  wish	  to	  argue	   that	   these	   parallels	   are	   ‘structural,	   not	   coincidental,	   within	   transnational	   biopolitical	  economies’.246	  These	  sites	  are	  inscribed	  with	  colonial	  histories	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  contemporary	  usages	  reflect	  past	  colonial	  ambitions	  –	  from	  the	  Italian	  state	  using	  Lampedusa	  as	  a	  penal	  colony	  for	   its	   undesirables,	   to	   Spain	  maintaining	   its	   exclusive	   African	   enclaves,	   through	   to	   Australia’s	  exploitation	   of	   the	   resources	   of	   Christmas	   Island	   and	  Nauru,	  whilst	   undermining	   any	   claims	   to	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indigenous	   sovereignty	   on	   the	   islands.	   These	   sites	   have	  been	  used	   for	  decades	   as	   the	   stage	   for	  battles	  between	  the	  broadly	  Anglo-­‐American	  alliance	  and	  their	  enemies	  –	  Germany,	  Italy,	   Japan,	  Libya	  –	  at	  great	  cost	  to	  the	  local	  population.	  These	  islands	  and	  offshore	  territories	  are	  written	  in	  such	   a	  way	   that	   they	  do	  not	   possess	   their	   own	  histories,	  whereas	   the	  nation	   state	   is	   saturated	  with	   histories.	   Instead,	   these	   sites	   function	   as	   footnotes	   in	   the	   histories	   of	   nations,	   as	  playgrounds,	   battlegrounds,	   and	   banks.	   They	   exist	   almost	   as	   prostheses,	   augmenting	   the	  imagined	  reach	  of	  the	  state	  even	  further	  into	  the	  offshore	  realm.	  	  	  These	  offshore	  sites	  have	  hosted	  grand	  transnational	  fantasies	  of	  capital	  –	  from	  mining	  to	  casinos,	  Russian	   space	   stations,	   offshore	  havens	   for	   international	  money	   laundering,	   tourist	   resorts,	  UN	  vote-­‐buying,	  and	  migrant	  detention	  centres.	  Looking	  through	  the	  lenses	  of	  colonialism,	  militarism	  and	   transnational	   economic	   opportunism,	   we	   can	   see	   structural	   patterns	   emerge	   across	   both	  temporal	  and	  spatial	  axes	  at	  these	  sites.	  The	  pattern	  rendered	  visible	  is	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  the	  ‘transnational	  infrastructure	  of	  biopolitical	  and	  colonial	  regimes	  ensures	  the	  reproduction	  across	  different	  sites	  and	  bodies,	  of	  violent	  relations	  of	  power’.247	  	  	  In	   this	  chapter,	   I	  have	  explored	   the	  relationship	  between	  sovereign	  power	  and	   territory.	   I	  have	  looked	   at	   the	   ways	   in	   which	   sovereign	   power	   is	   spatialised	   through	   creative	   and	   ambiguous	  technologies	  of	  border	  management.	  These	  novel	  approaches	  to	  bordering	  are	  co-­‐constitutive	  of	  the	   intense	   securitisation	   of	  migration	   in	   the	   contemporary	   era.	   I	   have	   argued	   that	  within	   this	  context,	   “regional	   solutions”	   are	   predicated	   upon	   vastly	   disparate	   diplomatic	   and	   economic	  power	   relationships,	   which	   allow	   certain	   powers	   to	   shirk	   their	   global	   responsibilities	   through	  outsourcing	   and	   offshoring	   techniques.	   Through	   an	   examination	   of	   four	   offshore	   sites,	   I	   have	  argued	  that	  the	  contemporary	  uses	  of	  offshore	  sites	  need	  to	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  continuation	  of	  historical	  relationships	  of	  colonialism,	  dispossession,	  militarism	  and	  exploitation.	  	  	  I	  have	  also	  tried	  to	  pinpoint	  or	  hint	  at	  something	  elusive,	  which	  manifests	  at	  a	  number	  of	  points	  and	  is	  somehow	  a	  defining	  characteristic	  of	  these	  places	  and	  the	  paradigms	  that	  govern	  them.	  The	  histories	  and	  geographies	  of	  these	  islands	  and	  offshore	  sites	  are	  replete	  with	  scattered	  allusions	  that	   register	   as	   fantastic,	   or	   even	   absurd.	   	   It’s	   the	   absurdity	   of	   the	   Australian	   government	  traveling	  back	  in	  time	  to	  retrospectively	  excise	  Melville	  Island	  from	  the	  migration	  zone,	  and	  ten	  years	  later	  excising	  the	  entire	  mainland	  from	  its	  own	  migration	  zone.	  It’s	  the	  brilliant	  bright	  red	  allegory	   of	   millions	   of	   crabs	   crossing	   Christmas	   Island	   through	   designated	   channels,	   weaving	  their	  way	  past	  other	  migrants	  whose	  movements	  were	  not	  facilitated	  in	  the	  same	  way.	  To	  imagine	  the	  site	  of	  Suharto	  and	  his	  cronies	  gambling	  away	  millions,	  proposed	  as	  a	  Russian-­‐Australian	  joint	  space	   station,	   and	  ultimately	  becoming	   the	  Christmas	   Island	  migrant	  detention	   centre.	   	   For	   the	  island	  state	  of	  Nauru	  to	  be	  exploited	  for	  phosphorous	  (a	  mineral	  produced	  by	  the	  excrement	  of	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seabirds),	  which	   fuelled	  Australia’s	  war	  munitions	  and	  agricultural	   industry,	   to	   later	   see	  Nauru	  insolvent	  and	  home	  to	  400	  non-­‐existent	  banks.	  The	  bizarre	  juxtaposition	  of	  Lampedusa’s	  tourists	  flocking	   to	   see	   rare	   turtles	   and	   marine	   life,	   while	   ignoring	   the	   bodies	   washing	   up	   on	   the	  neighbouring	   beaches;	   or	   Melilla’s	   golfers	   teeing	   off	   beneath	   the	   gaze	   of	   hundreds	   of	   African	  migrants	   stranded	   on	   the	   barbed	  wire	   fences.	   These	   absurd,	   fantastical	   collisions	   of	  metaphor,	  capital	  and	  remote	  spaces	  are	  not	  unusual	  either.	  The	  town	  of	  Eloy	  in	  the	  desert	  of	  Arizona,	  USA,	  is	  awash	  with	  funding	  from	  the	  Corrections	  Corporation	  of	  America	  (CCA)	  for	  operating	  a	  migrant	  detention	   centre.	   This	   former	   mining	   town-­‐turned-­‐prison	   town	   had	   an	   alternative	   that	   was	  stymied	   in	   favour	  of	   the	  migrant	  detention	  facility	  –	  a	  rock’n’roll	   theme	  park,	  billed	  as	  an	  Elvis-­‐themed	  family	   friendly	  oasis	   to	  rival	  Disneyland	  and	  Seaworld.	  What	  does	   this	  reveal	  about	   the	  feeling	  of	  excess	  that	   imbues	  these	   locations?	  Indeed	  there	   is	  a	  consistent	  sense	  that	  these	  sites	  are	   indeed	   repositories	   for	   unfulfilled	   dreams,	   places	   endowed	   with	   a	   magical	   sense	   that	   the	  regular	  rules	  do	  not	  apply.	  	  It	  is	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  these	  remote,	  surplus	  sites	  are	  imagined,	  which	  enables	   their	   exceptional	   utilisations.	   This	   manifests	   historically,	   and	   in	   the	   contemporary	  examples	  of	  the	  use	  of	  offshore	  spaces	  as	  nodes	  in	  migration	  management.	  	  	  I	   have	   highlighted	   in	   this	   chapter	   the	   particular	   and	   important	   role	   of	   islands	   and	   peripheral	  territories	   in	   past	   and	   present	   assertions	   of	   sovereign	   power.	   It	   is	   particularly	   evident	   that	   in	  moments	  of	  crisis,	  when	  the	  sovereign	  power	  of	  the	  nation	  is	  challenged,	  maritime	  contestations	  are	   heightened,	   and	   the	   role	   of	   the	   “offshore”	   becomes	   even	  more	   significant.	   In	   the	   following	  chapter,	  I	  will	  focus	  on	  these	  moments	  of	  crisis,	  and	  the	  way	  that	  the	  securitisation	  of	  migration	  is	  enacted	  through	  both	  security	  and	  humanitarian	  imperatives.	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Chapter	  3:	  Human	  Security?	  Risky	  Bodies	  in	  Times	  of	  Crisis	  	  In	   the	   previous	   chapter,	   I	   looked	   at	   the	   geographical	   ordering	   of	   exclusion	   through	   the	   use	   of	  offshore	   territories	   -­‐	   a	   process	   that	   has	   become	   critical	   to	   the	   contemporary	   management	   of	  mobile	  bodies.	  I	  examined	  the	  symbolic	  and	  material	  ordering	  that	  takes	  place	  through	  the	  spatial	  management	  of	  the	  border	  and	  those	  who	  seek	  to	  cross	  it.	  If	  spatiality	  and	  the	  use	  of	  the	  offshore	  constitute	   one	   form	   of	   ordering	   in	   contemporary	   migration	   management,	   the	   conflation	   of	  humanitarianism	   and	   securitisation	   imperatives	   constitutes	   another	   key	   tenet	   of	   the	  contemporary	  paradigm.	   In	  previous	  chapters	   I	  discussed	   the	  notion	  of	   crisis,	  and	   the	  way	   that	  crisis	   is	   perpetuated	   to	   enable	   exceptional	   measures.	   In	   this	   chapter,	   I	   will	   examine	   the	  production	   of	   that	   crisis,	   which	   serves	   to	   render	   certain	   bodies	   as	   hypervisible	   sources	   of	  insecurity.	   In	  responding	  to	  these	  insecure	  bodies,	  the	  state	  draws	  upon	  both	  humanitarian	  and	  security	  imperatives,	  which	  are	  deployed	  to	  order	  bodies	  according	  to	  a	  register	  of	  exclusion	  and	  inclusion.	  	  	  Focusing	  on	  an	  example	  from	  Egypt,	  I	  offer	  here	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  production	  of	  others	  as	  abjects	  –	   excluded,	   dangerous	   or	   risky	   others	   –	   and	   how	   this	   enables	   certain	   “rescue	   or	   punish”	  regimes.248	   I	   will	   look	   at	   the	   securitisation	   of	   Syrian	   refugees	   in	   Egypt,	   the	   impact	   of	   this	   for	  Syrians,	  and	   the	   resulting	  exodus	   from	  the	  country.	  To	   think	   through	   this	  example,	   I	  have	  used	  two	   key	   texts	   –	   one	   is	   Paul	   Amar’s	   critical	   examination	   of	   human	   security	   paradigms,	   and	   the	  second	   by	   Claudia	   Aradau	   analysing	   the	   functioning	   of	   securitisation	   in	   relation	   to	   victims	   of	  trafficking.	  	  	  In	  Paul	  Amar’s	  (2013)	  book	  ‘The	  Security	  Archipelago:	  Human-­‐Security	  States,	  Sexuality	  Politics,	  and	   the	   End	   of	   Neoliberalism’	   he	   considers	   transnational	   flows	   of	   security	   practices	   and	  humanitarian	   discourses.	   He	   argues	   that	   Cairo	   and	   Rio	   are	   two	   sites	   of	   the	   Global	   South	  generative	   of	   new	   forms	   of	   human-­‐security	   governance,	   which	   he	   views	   as	   signifying	   a	  paradigmatic	  shift	   from	  liberalisation	  to	  securitisation.	  He	  argues	  that	  human	  security	  modes	  of	  governance	  blend	  parahumanisation	  (the	  creation	  of	  politically	  disabled	  victim	  subjects	  that	  must	  be	   constantly	   protected	   or	   rescued	   by	   enforcement	   interventions	   regardless	   of	   their	   consent);	  
hypervisibilisation	   (the	   spotlighting	   of	   certain	   identities	   and	   bodies	   as	   sources	   of	   radical	  insecurity	  and	  moral	  panic	  in	  ways	  that	  actually	  render	  invisible	  the	  real	  nature	  of	  social	  control);	  and	   securitisation	   (the	   reconfiguration	   of	   political	   debates	   and	   claims	   around	   social	   justice,	  political	  participation,	  or	  resource	  distribution	   into	   technical	  assessments	  of	  danger,	  operations	  of	   enforcement	   and	   targetings	   of	   risk	   populations).249	   In	   this	   way,	   Amar	   does	   not	   see	   human	  security	  as	  an	  alternative	  or	  liberatory	  paradigm	  as	  such,	  but	  rather	  problematizes	  its	  claims	  and	  
                                                
248 Aradau, Rethinking Trafficking in Women: Politics out of Security, 8. 
249 Amar, The Security Archipelago. 
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the	   ways	   in	   which	   human	   security	   paradigms	   serve	   to	   conceal	   violence	   and	   control,	   within	   a	  broader	  social	  justice-­‐oriented	  humanitarian	  discourse.	  	  	  For	  Paul	  Amar,	  security	  practices	  and	  the	  grammar	  of	  humanitarianism	  are	  increasingly	  coming	  together	   in	  new	  human	  security	  modes	  of	  governance,	  which	   ‘aim	  to	  protect,	  rescue	  and	  secure	  certain	  idealised	  forms	  of	  humanity	  identified	  with	  a	  particular	  family	  of	  sexuality,	  morality	  and	  class	   subjects,250	   grounded	   in	   certain	  militarised	   territories	   and	   strategic	   infrastructures’.251	  He	  argues	  that	  increasingly	  there	  is	  a	  point	  of	  alignment	  between	  the	  progressive	  claims	  of	   liberals	  and	  conservative	  security	  doctrines,	  such	  that	  everyone	  is	  speaking	  the	  same	  language	  within	  the	  increasing	  humanitarianisation	  of	  military	  and	  police	  security	  apparatuses.252	  	  	  	  Securitisation,	   as	   a	   key	   node	   in	   Amar’s	   human	   security	   governance	   framework,	   has	   been	  conceptualised	   in	   a	   range	   of	   ways	   within	   security	   studies	   literature.	   Initial	   movements	   within	  critical	   security	   studies	   literature	   sought	   to	   establish	   security	   as	   a	   construction,	   while	   later	  contributions	   emphasised	   the	   embedded	   nature	   of	   security	   practises.	   My	   understanding	   of	  securitisation,	   particularly	   in	   relation	   to	   migration,	   draws	   upon	   the	   work	   of	   Claudia	   Aradau	  (2008)	  in	  her	  book	  ‘Rethinking	  Trafficking	  in	  Women:	  Politics	  Out	  of	  Security’253.	  Aradau’s	  book	  takes	   as	   its	   focus	   the	   securitisation	   discourses	   and	   practices	   surrounding	   female	   “victims	   of	  trafficking”.254	  Aradau	   thinks	   through	   the	  ways	   in	  which	  security	   functions	   in	  order	   to	  consider	  the	   liberatory	   possibilities	   of	   a	   genuine	   outside.	   Building	   upon	   debates	   of	   securitisation	   as	   a	  discursive	   construction	   versus	   securitisation	   as	   embedded	   in	   everyday	   practise	   and	   process,	  Aradau	  conceives	  of	  securitisation	  as	  a	  dispositif	  based	  on	  a	  triad	  of	  representation,	  intervention	  and	  subjectivity.	  She	  argues	  that	  the	  element	  of	  subjectivity	  –	  that	  is,	  the	  way	  securitisation	  serves	  to	   reformulate	   the	   Self/Other	   relationship	   is	   critical	   to	   the	   process.	   In	   this	  way,	   Aradau	   builds	  upon	   and	   goes	   beyond	   other	   critical	   security	   studies	   formulations,	  which	   tend	   to	   focus	   on	   the	  representational	   aspects	   of	   securitisation,	   or	   the	   everyday	   bureaucratic	   interventions	   that	  constitute	  securitisation.	  	  	  Traditionally,	  security	  was	  seen	  as	  an	  objective	  problem,	  with	  the	  main	  problem	  posed	  being	  how	  to	   deal	   with	   the	   seemingly	   endless	   threats	   posed	   to	   security.255	   Security	   within	   more	   critical	  security	   studies	   literature	   however,	   is	   understood	   as	   a	   practice	   which	   functions	   as	   a	   way	   of	  ordering	   the	   social.256	   Security	   entails	   an	   ‘imaginary	  promise	  of	   a	  desirable	   state	   in	   the	   future’,	  which	  requires	  intervention	  into,	  and	  management	  of,	  present	  problems	  in	  view	  of	  the	  projected	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254 Through a thorough examination of this issue, Aradau makes an intervention into the field of critical security 
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future.257	  These	  security	  interventions	  have	  been	  variously	  viewed	  by	  critical	  security	  scholars	  as	  exceptional	  and	  undemocratic	  practices;	  as	  practices	  that	  converge	  disproportionately	  upon	  the	  enemy	  (specifically	  the	  migrant);	  and	  as	  an	  imaginary	  of	  certainty	  built	  into	  the	  modern	  political	  subject.258	   The	   promise	   of	   security	   generates	   a	   certain	   understanding	   of	   social	   ordering,	  which	  reveals	  both	  the	  subject	  who	   is	   to	  be	  made	  secure,	  as	  well	  as	   the	  abject	  other,	  who	  needs	  to	  be	  either	  eliminated	  or	  neutralised.259	  The	  promise	  of	  security	  therefore	  depends	  upon	  the	  exclusion	  of	   other	   subjects;	   in	   other	   words,	   upon	   their	   insecurity.	   The	   false	   promise	   of	   ontological	   and	  epistemological	   certainty	   based	   on	   the	   other’s	   exclusion	   Aradau	   argues,	   ‘exposes	   the	   very	  promise	  of	  security	  as	  an	  impossible	  promise’.260	  	  	  In	   this	   chapter,	   I	   will	   consider	   a	   sample	   of	   securitising	   “speech	   acts”	   that	   were	   enunciated	   in	  Egypt,	  and	  the	  impact	  that	  these	  speech	  acts	  had	  upon	  its	  audience	  (the	  subjects	  of	  the	  Egyptian	  state)	   and	   those	   it	   sought	   to	   render	  as	   risky	   (the	  Syrian-­‐refugee-­‐as-­‐terrorist).	  Along	  with	   these	  speech	   acts,	   the	   securitisation	   of	   everyday	   bureaucratic	   processes	   also	   made	   life	   increasingly	  difficult	   for	   Syrians	   in	   Egypt	   by	   erecting	   a	   range	   of	   barriers	   to	   accessing	   services	   and	   basic	  security.	   The	   securitisation	   process	   in	   Egypt	   brought	   about	   a	   fundamental	   change	   to	   the	  Self/Other	   relationship	   between	   Egyptians	   and	   Syrians.	   While	   undertaking	   this	   intense	   and	  violent	  process	  of	  securitisation,	  the	  Egypt	  state	  articulated	  security	  imperatives	  intertwined	  with	  commitments	  to	  uphold	  a	  humanitarian	  response,	  infused	  with	  pan-­‐Arab	  fraternity.	  By	  analysing	  this	   example,	   I	   aim	   to	   highlight	   the	   ways	   in	   which	   violence	   gets	   concealed	   by	   a	   humanitarian	  discourse	   that	   seeks	   to	   at	   once	   recognise	   the	   humanity	   of	   those	   it	   governs,	   while	   enabling	  particularly	  violent	  forms	  of	  ordering.	  	  	  
Terrorist-­‐Insider-­‐Outsider	  
	   …	   in	   the	  name	  of	   the	  Egyptian	  people,	   I	   speak	   to	   every	  Syrian	  who	   is	   staying	   in	  Egypt,	   to	   give	   a	  warning	  message	  that	  has	  an	  ultimatum	  of	  48	  hours.	  The	  Egyptian	  people	  have	  all	   the	  addresses	  that	   you	   are	   staying	   in.	   Those	   of	   you	  who	   are	   renting	   flats,	   those	   of	   you	  who	   are	   living	   in	  New	  Damietta	  –	  living	  where?	  In	  New	  Damietta.	  Living	  where?	  In	  Sadat	  City.	  And	  those	  in	  6th	  October	  -­‐	  all	  the	  addresses,	  the	  Egyptian	  people	  have	  them.	  And	  I	  am	  giving	  you	  an	  ultimatum	  of	  48	  hours,	  if	  you	   stayed	  with	   the	   [Muslim]	   Brotherhood	   after	   these	   48	   hours,	  we	  will	   ki-­‐-­‐-­‐	   ki-­‐-­‐-­‐	   destroy	   your	  houses.	  We	  have	  all	  your	  addresses!	  The	  Egyptian	  people	  will	  come	  out	  and	  destroy	  your	  houses	  –	  in	  New	  Damietta,	  6th	  October,	  Sadat,	  10th	  District	  in	  Nasr	  City.	  Do	  you	  hear	  me???	  The	  people	  are	  not	   playing	   games!	   The	   people	   are	   not	   willing	   to	   allow	   any	   agent	   or	   spy	   to	   jump	   over	   their	  victory.261	  	  Tawfiq	  Okasha,	  “Egypt	  Today”,	  15th	  July	  2013262	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  This	   speech,	   made	   by	   Egyptian	   TV	   presenter	   and	   former	   National	   Democratic	   Party	   (NDP)	  parliamentary	  member	  Tawfiq	  Okasha	  was	  broadcast	  on	  the	  Egyptian	  satellite	  television	  channel	  Al	   Fara’een	   on	   15th	   July	   2013.	   Okasha,	   who	   also	   owns	   the	   channel,	   is	   a	   widely	   known	   and	  controversial	   figure	   in	   Egyptian	   popular	   media,	   famed	   (among	   other	   things)	   for	   his	   hatred	   of	  political	   Islam.	   In	   this	   speech,	   he	   directly	   addresses	   the	   Syrian	   refugee	   and	   asylum	   seeker	  population	   in	   Egypt,	  which	   at	   that	   time	  maybe	   have	   been	   between	  100,000	  people	   or	  more.263	  This	  speech	  was	  made	  twelve	  days	  after	  a	  coalition	  led	  by	  the	  Egyptian	  army	  chief	  General	  Abdel	  Fattah	  el-­‐Sisi	  had	  removed	  the	  former	  President	  of	  Egypt,	  Mohammad	  Morsi	   from	  power	  on	  3rd	  July	  2013,	  and	  suspended	  the	  Egyptian	  constitution.	  The	  move	  had	  been	  preceded	  by	  four	  days	  of	  widespread	  national	  protests	  against	  Morsi’s	  Freedom	  and	  Justice	  Party	  (FJP)	  government.264	  The	  military	  had	  issued	  the	  government	  with	  an	  ultimatum	  to	  respond	  to	  and	  satisfy	  its	  critics	  within	  48	  hours,	  or	   face	   the	   implementation	  of	  a	  military	   “road	  map”.	  This	  power	  shift	  had	  significant	  consequences	  for	  Syrians	  in	  Egypt	   in	  terms	  of	  securitisation	  measures,	  humanitarian	  responses,	  and	  ultimately	  resulted	  in	  forms	  of	  forced	  mobility	  and	  forced	  immobility.	  	  
 Syrians	  escaping	  the	  conflict	  in	  Syria	  had	  been	  arriving	  in	  Egypt	  since	  2011.	  As	  the	  conflict	  wore	  on,	  the	  numbers	  of	  Syrians	  arriving	  in	  Egypt	  continued	  to	  rise,	  reaching	  a	  peak	  in	  May	  2013	  when	  UNHCR	  tallied	  15,890	  arrivals	   for	  the	  month.265	  Some	  of	   these	  people	  had	  been	   living	   in	  a	   third	  country	  in	  the	  region	  but	  relocated	  to	  Egypt	  as	  the	  situation	  became	  more	  protracted	  in	  order	  to	  conserve	   their	   resources	  with	  Egypt’s	   relatively	  cheaper	  cost	  of	   living.	  At	   first,	   the	  situation	   for	  Syrians	   in	   Egypt	   was	   favourable	   and	   they	   enjoyed	   a	   relatively	   open	   door	   policy,	   with	   a	  Presidential	  Decree	   in	  September	  2012	   formalising	  Syrian	  access	   to	  Egyptian	  public	  health	  and	  education	   services.	   Historically,	   Syrians	   have	   not	   needed	   an	   entry	   visa	   to	   come	   to	   Egypt,	   and	  instead	  refugees	  were	  able	   to	  regularise	   their	  stay	   through	   the	  Department	  of	   Immigration	  and	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Interior	  without	  any	  pre-­‐conditions.	  Throughout	  2012,	  there	  was	  an	  outpouring	  of	  Egyptian	  public	   support	   towards	   Syrians.	   In	   addition	   to	   the	   support	   provided	  by	  humanitarian	  actors	   such	   as	   UNHCR,	   WFP	   and	   partner	   organisations,	   individual	   Egyptians	   and	   community	  groups	  mobilised	  significant	  amounts	  of	  material	  support	  for	  Syrians.	  Syrians	  described	  receiving	  ‘excellent	   support’	   at	   this	   time,	   recounting	   cases	   of	   individual	   Egyptian	   donors	   providing	   them	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with	  rent-­‐free	  or	  discounted	  apartments,	   local	  store	  owners	  delivering	  them	  boxes	  of	  groceries,	  Egyptian	   families	   donating	   second-­‐hand	   furniture	   and	   clothes,	   local	   appliance	   stores	   donating	  fridges	  and	  washing	  machines	  to	  help	  Syrians	  establish	  their	  homes.266	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  formal	  and	  informal	  networks	  of	  support	  were	  mobilised,	  particularly	  through	  faith-­‐based	  networks	  and	  community	  initiatives	  attached	  to	  mosques.	  	  	  Material	  support	  at	  this	  time	  was	  fortified	  by	  an	  overall	  discursive	  climate	  of	  support	  for	  Syrian	  refugees	  in	  Egypt.	  In	  June	  2013,	  former	  President	  Mohamed	  Morsi	  had	  severed	  ties	  with	  the	  Al-­‐Assad	  regime	  in	  Syria,	  stating	  at	  a	  Syria	  support	  conference	  organised	  by	  the	  MB	  that	  ‘Egypt	  and	  its	   army	   will	   support	   Syrians	   until	   their	   rights	   are	   granted	   and	   a	   new	   elected	   leadership	   is	  chosen’.267	   The	   former	   President	   also	   stated	   at	   this	   time	   that	   he	   was	   collaborating	   with	  international	  civil	  society	  organisations	  to	  provide	  aid	  to	  rebels	  in	  Syria	  and	  to	  Syrian	  refugees	  in	  Egypt.268	   He	   called	   upon	   the	   Egyptian	   people	   to	   ‘welcome	   Syrian	   refugees	   and	   treat	   them	   as	  brothers’.269	   Syrians	   at	   this	   time	   were	   broadly	   seen	   as	   Arab	   brothers,	   as	   fellow	   anti-­‐regime	  revolutionaries,	   and	  as	  deserving	  of	  Egyptian	  assistance.	   Syrians	  were	  able	   to	  open	  businesses,	  gain	  employment,	  trade,	  and	  travel	  in	  and	  out	  of	  Egypt,	  with	  many	  Syrians	  reporting	  maintaining	  business	  links	  in	  Syria	  and	  the	  region.270	  	  The	  levels	  of	  material,	  popular	  and	  political	  support	  extended	  towards	  Syrians	  in	  the	  period	  prior	  to	   July	   2013,	   is	   in	   stark	   contrast	   to	   an	   obvious	   (but	   often	   unrecognised)	   foil	   -­‐	   Egypt’s	   longer-­‐standing	  African	  refugee	  population.	  State	  services	  such	  as	  education,	  while	  formally	  extended	  to	  Sudanese,	   are	  not	   extended	   to	   other	   refugee	  populations	   in	  Egypt,	   such	   as	   Somalis,	   Ethiopians,	  Eritreans.	  The	  sense	  of	   recognition	  extended	   to	  Syrians	   -­‐	  of	  Arabness,	  of	  Sunni	   Islam,	  of	  people	  overthrowing	  an	  established	  authoritarian	  regime	  -­‐	   is	  not	  offered	  to	   the	  unrecognisable	  African	  refugee,	  particularly	  those	  non-­‐Arabic	  speaking	  communities.	  This	  division	  was	  amplified	  by	  the	  new	   and	   substantial	   flows	   of	   humanitarian	   funding	   arriving	   in	   Egypt,	   much	   of	   it	   “dedicated	  funding”	   tied	   exclusively	   to	   Syrian	   refugees,	   which	   generated	   resentment	   from	   other	   refugee	  communities.	  	  	  In	   the	  days	   following	   the	  change	   in	  Egyptian	   leadership	  on	   July	  3rd	  2013,	  a	  Syrian	  national	  was	  allegedly	  arrested	  at	  a	  rally	  in	  support	  of	  the	  former	  ousted	  president.	  For	  many	  Egyptians,	  this	  incident	  further	  galvanised	  the	  existing	  association	  between	  Syrians	  and	  Islamist	  political	  groups,	  particularly	  the	  Muslim	  Brotherhood.	  Three	  days	  after	  this	  incident,	  on	  July	  8th,	  the	  new	  military-­‐
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led	   government	   of	   Egypt	  modified	   the	   entry	   rules	   for	   Syrians	   and	   for	   the	   first	   time	   in	   history,	  Egypt	  required	  Syrians	  to	  have	  an	  entry	  visa	  and	  security	  clearance	  before	  traveling	  to	  Egypt.	  The	  new	  rules	  were	  applied	  immediately,	  with	  as	  many	  as	  250	  people	  denied	  entry	  on	  that	  day,	  and	  95	   Syrians	   were	   sent	   back	   to	   Syria	   on	   a	   flight	   to	   Latakia.271	   As	   the	   rules	   were	   effected	  immediately,	   many	   Syrians	   residing	   in	   Egypt	   who	   were	   temporarily	   out	   of	   the	   country	   were	  denied	   re-­‐entry.272	   While	   obviously	   impacting	   Syrians	   planning	   to	   travel	   to	   Egypt,	   it	   also	  devastated	  Syrian	  families	  in	  Egypt	  who	  were	  denied	  family	  reunification,	  and	  often	  it	  was	  their	  primary	  breadwinner	  who	  was	   stranded	  outside	  of	   the	   country.273	  Alongside	   this	   shift,	   a	  broad	  anti-­‐Syrian	  media	   campaign	  was	   launched,	   re-­‐inscribing	   Syrians	  with	   a	   new	   political	  meaning.	  Syrians	   in	   Egypt	   became	   demonised	   as	   the	   terrorist	   allies	   of	   the	   Muslim	   Brotherhood	   and	  supporters	  of	  the	  former	  president,	  cast	  as	  one	  node	  in	  a	  regional	  assemblage	  of	  Islamist	  terror.	  This	  assemblage	  also	  prominently	   featured	  Hamas	   in	  the	  Gaza	  strip,274	  which	   is	  associated	  with	  the	   smuggling	   of	   weapons	   and	   persons	   through	   the	   tunnels	   at	   Rafah,	   violence	   in	   the	   Sinai	  Peninsula	   aimed	   at	   destabilising	   the	   Egyptian	   state,	   and	   ultimately	   the	   global	   discourse	   of	  terrorism.	  	  	  
Speech	  Acts	  and	  Exceptional	  Politics	  	  Tawfiq	  Okasha’s	  speech	  quoted	  above	  could	  be	  considered	  a	  securitising	  “speech	  act”	  within	  the	  paradigm	  proffered	  by	  the	  Copenhagen	  School	  for	  Peace	  Studies,	  where	  the	  term	  ‘securitisation’	  originally	  emerged	  in	  the	  late	  1990s.	  Scholars	  of	  the	  Copenhagen	  School	  saw	  security	  as	  a	  matter	  of	   construction,	   as	   an	  assemblage	  of	   representations	  and	   interventions	   that	   together	   constitute	  securitisation.275	  Scholars	  of	   the	  Copenhagen	  School	  attempted	  to	  describe	  how	  political	  speech	  acts	   or	  media	   representations	   ‘produce	   subjects	   of	   politics	   that	   are	   used	   to	   transfer	   every	   day	  social,	   economic	  and	  cultural	  governance	   into	   the	   realm	  of	  emergency	  police	  enforcements	  and	  military	  occupations’.276	  The	  Copenhagen	  School	  has	  argued	  that	  issues	  are	  securitised	  through	  a	  process	  of	  discursive	   construction:	   ‘security	   is	   a	  quality	   actors	   inject	   into	   issues	  by	   securitising	  them,	  which	  means	   to	  stage	   them	  on	   the	  political	  arena…	  and	   then	   to	  have	   them	  accepted	  by	  a	  sufficient	  audience	  to	  sanction	  extraordinary	  defensive	  moves’.277	  In	  this	  sense,	  the	  broad	  support	  of	   the	   Egyptian	   public	   was	   necessary	   for	   the	   government	   to	   undertake	   a	   range	   of	   “counter-­‐terrorism”	   measures	   in	   the	   period	   following	   the	   July	   power	   transition.	   In	   some	   cases	   the	  government	   explicitly	   expressed	   its	   desire	   to	   garner	   a	   mandate	   from	   the	   Egyptian	   people,	   to	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authorise	   its	   extreme	  measures.	   As	   theorised	   by	   the	   Copenhagen	   School,	   securitisation	  means	  that	   ‘an	  issue	  is	  presented	  as	  an	  existential	  threat	  requiring	  emergency	  measures,	  and	  justifying	  actions	   outside	   the	   normal	   bounds	   of	   political	   procedure’.278	   Security	   discourses	   generate	   a	  specific	   rhetorical	   structure	   of	   survival,	   immediacy	   and	   urgency,	   a	   dynamics	   of	   exceptional	  politics	   rhetorically	   modelled	   upon	   war.	   Indeed	   this	   rhetorical	   structure	   was	  mobilised	   to	   full	  effect	  by	  the	  Egyptian	  state	  and	  state-­‐friendly	  media.	   	  Through	  mobilising	  this	  rhetoric,	  securitisation	  calls	  into	  being	  a	  spectre	  of	  violence	  that	  hovers	  permanently	  in	  the	  shadows	  of	  political	  communities,	  reminding	  us	  of	  the	  inherent	  contradiction	  entailed	  in	  the	  promise	  of	  security.279	  Scholars	  of	  critical	  security	  studies	  see	  the	  effects	  of	  these	  exceptional	  measures	  as	  unequally	  affecting	  some	  members	  of	  the	  political	  community	  more	  than	  others.	  This	  was	  certainly	  the	  case	  in	  Egypt,	  where	  members	  of	  the	  Muslim	  Brotherhood	  were	  the	  key	  targets	  of	  the	  exceptional	  measures,	  while	  Syrians	  were	  securitised	  as	  a	  secondary	  (regionally	  significant)	  target.	  	  	  
The	  Interfering	  Brother	  While	  the	  state	  rapidly	  effected	  the	  securitisation	  of	  the	  reconfigured	  Syrian-­‐refugee-­‐as-­‐terrorist,	  it	   simultaneously	   maintained	   its	   official	   humanitarian	   stance	   towards	   Syrians.	   Syrians,	  collectively,	   had	   been	  made	   available	   for	   both	   expulsion	   and	   rescue.	   The	   spokesperson	   for	   the	  Ministry	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs,	  Badr	  Abdelatty,	  said	  in	  September	  2013	  that	  the	  changes	  to	  the	  visa	  regime	  for	  Syrians	  was	  a	  temporary	  measure	  due	  to	  Egypt’s	  ‘domestic	  security	  concerns’,	  and	  that	  Syrians	  were	  still	  ‘welcome	  in	  Egypt’	  and	  that	  services	  would	  continue	  to	  be	  available	  to	  them.280	  While	  purportedly	  allaying	  domestic	  insecurities	  through	  the	  policing	  of	  political	  and	  nationalist	  categories,	   the	   state	   in	   fact	   further	   incites	   greater	   insecurities	   -­‐	   not	   just	   for	   Syrians,	   but	   for	  particular	  categories	  of	  Egyptians	  as	  well.281	  Another	  popular	  television	  commentator,	  Youseff	  Al-­‐Husseiny	   (far	   less	   inflammatory	   than	  Tawfiq	  Okasha	  and	  ostensibly	  more	   liberal),	   captures	   the	  state	  sentiment	  at	  the	  time	  in	  his	  10th	  July	  broadcast	  on	  “The	  Respectable	  Gentlemen”	  (Al-­‐Sadah	  Al-­‐Mohtaramon),	  saying:	  	   Anyway,	  the	  Syrian	  refugees	  in	  Egypt	  are	  most	  welcome.	  And	  all	  the	  Syrians	  and	  Palestinians	  are	  “on	   our	   eyes	   and	   heads”	   and	   in	   our	   protection.	   And	   they	   shouldn’t	   be	   under	   any	   circumstances	  persecuted	   or	   targeted…	   Egypt	   was,	   and	   will	   be,	   until	   this	   very	   moment,	   a	   secure	   country	   and	  people	  who	  enter	  it	  are	  secure,	  right?	  We	  receive	  Syrians	  in	  the	  time	  of	  the	  big	  Syrian	  crisis	  and	  we	  
                                                                                                                                                     
277 Buzan and Waever (1998:204) in Aradau, Rethinking Trafficking in Women: Politics out of Security, 45. 
278 Buzan (1997:14) in Ibid., 68. 
279 Ibid., 67. 
280 Joel Gulhane, “Syrian Refugees in Post-Morsi Egypt,” Daily News Egypt, March 9, 2013, 
http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2013/09/03/syrian-refugees-in-post-morsi-egypt/. 
281 These categories include not only Muslim Brotherhood supporters, but also communities in the Sinai who 
suffered under the state’s counter-insurgency campaign, and low-ranking military conscripts who are drawn 
disproportionately from poorer classes of Egyptians. 
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will	  keep	  receiving	  them…	  but	  we	  want	  to	  tell	  them	  something	  –	  who	  receives	  you	  and	  takes	  care	  of	   you	   is	   the	   Egyptian	   people	   and	   the	   Egyptian	   state,	   and	   not	   the	   Muslim	   Brotherhood.	   Who	  receives	  you	  and	  takes	  care	  of	  you	  and	  protects	  you	  is	  the	  whole	  of	  the	  Egyptian	  people	  with	  all	  it’s	  institutions,	  so	  please	  keep	  away	  from	  the	  Brotherhood	  protests	  and	  keep	  away	  from	  Mohammad	  Morsi	  issues	  and	  leave	  us	  to	  work	  out	  our	  problems.	  Please,	  don’t	  interfere.	  Stop	  at	  this	  line.	  Here,	  you	   are	   not	   a	   refugee,	   but	   you	   have	   all	   the	   traditions	   and	   the	   rights	   of	   a	   guest,	   of	   a	   generous	  hospitality.	  As	  a	  brother,	  not	  as	  a	  refugee.	  But,	  as	  a	  brother	  who	  stays	  in	  my	  house,	  do	  not	  interfere	  with	  what	  happens	  in	  my	  house.	  Respect	  the	  laws	  of	  this	  state,	  and	  its	  traditions…	  otherwise,	  don’t	  blame	   anyone	   else	   but	   yourself.	   Now,	   let’s	  watch	   a	   group	   of	   Brotherhood	  members	   and	   Syrians	  dancing	   the	   Syrian	   dabka	   together	   at	   one	   of	   the	   Brotherhood	   sit-­‐ins	   between	   Rabaa	   and	   the	  Republican	   guard.	   Let’s	   watch	   it	   together.	   Cuts	   to	   footage	   of	   men	   dancing	   “Syrian	   dabka”	   as	  
“evidence”	  of	  Syrian	   involvement	   in	   the	  MB	  sit-­‐ins.	   	  Youseff	  Al-­‐Husseiny,	  Al-­‐Sadah	  Al-­‐Mohtaramon,	  10th	  July	  2014282	  	  In	  this	  speech,	  we	  can	  see	  the	  explicit	  reference	  to	  security,	  followed	  by	  a	  clarification	  of	  exactly	  
who	   provides	   the	   security	   -­‐	   it	   is	   the	   Egyptian	   state	   and	   the	   Egyptian	   people,	   not	   the	   Muslim	  Brotherhood.	  In	  this	  statement,	  it	  is	  made	  clear	  that	  the	  MB	  is	  neither	  the	  state,	  nor	  are	  they	  part	  of	   the	   Egyptian	   people.	   They	   are	   the	   terrorist-­‐outsider-­‐inside.	   Syrians	   are	   reminded	   that	   they	  have	   a	   privileged	   position	   above	   the	   degraded	   refugee	   category	   -­‐	   they	   are	   brothers	   -­‐	   but	   are	  warned	  to	  behave	  as	  a	  grateful	  guest,	  or	  face	  the	  consequences	  (which	  Syrians	  themselves	  would	  be	  held	  responsible	  for).	  Meanwhile,	  the	  humanitarian	  discourse	  of	  care,	  protection,	  and	  rights	  is	  maintained,	  at	  the	  same	  time	  as	  being	  embedded	  in	  a	  fairly	  explicit	  threat.	  	  	  	  	  For	  Syrians,	  the	  months	  following	  the	  July	  transition	  were	  experienced	  as	  the	  peak	  of	  anti-­‐Syrian	  sentiment.	  The	  relative	   inconspicuousness	  and	  acceptance	   in	  public	  space	  (compared	  to	  African	  refugees)	  that	  they	  had	  previously	  enjoyed,	  was	  replaced	  with	  a	  high	  degree	  of	  negative	  attention	  directed	  towards	  them.	  Syrians	  had	  been	  rendered	  highly	  visible	  as	  the	  ‘interfering	  brother’,	  the	  traitorous	   guest	   towards	   their	   Egyptian	   hosts.	   Syrians	   respondents	   at	   this	   time	   felt	   fearful,	  particularly	  of	  arrests,	  detention	  and	  deportation.	  One	  measure	  of	  this	  insecurity	  is	  the	  significant	  spike	  in	  UNHCR	  registrations	  in	  the	  months	  following	  the	  transition	  -­‐	  registrations	  jumped	  from	  around	  69,000	  at	   the	  end	  of	   June	  2013,	   to	  125,000	  by	   the	  end	  of	  October,	  despite	   the	   fact	   that	  there	  were	  almost	  no	  new	  arrivals	  in	  this	  period.283	  	  Syrians,	  rendered	  as	  a	  security	  threat	  to	  the	  Egyptian	  state,	  had	  lost	  their	  own	  sense	  of	  security.	  The	  primary	  reason	  cited	  by	  Syrians	  I	  spoke	  to	  for	  why	  they	  suddenly	  chose	  to	  register	  after	  July	  2013	  was	  security,	  followed	  by	  the	  need	  for	  material	   support	  given	   the	  overall	  decline	  of	   support	   for	  Syrians,	  particularly	   through	   Islamist-­‐affiliated	   networks.	   Syrians	   had	   previously	   felt	   afraid	   of	   UNHCR	   registration	   from	   a	   security	  
                                                
282 ONTV, “Brotherhood members and Syrians are dancing Syrian dabka in Raba’a Al-Adawya sit-in”, 2013, 
Youseff Al-Husseiny https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DozUkV3CqJw&feature=youtube_gdata_player. 
283 Ibid. 
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perspective,284	   and	   also	   many	   resisted	   identifying	   with	   the	   refugee	   label.285	   Following	   the	  transition,	  Syrians	  sought	  formal	  (and	  decidedly	  international)	  protection	  in	  the	  refugee	  category.	  	  	  Syrians’	   security	   fears	  particularly	  pertained	   to	   residency	   security,	   given	   the	  new	  challenges	   in	  renewing	   or	   regularising	   their	   stay	   in	   Egypt,	   and	   the	   increase	   in	   detentions	   and	   risk	   of	  deportation.	   Numbers	   of	   Syrians	   had	   been	   arrested,	   primarily	   for	   residency-­‐related	  infringements,	   and	   from	   August	   2013,	   groups	   of	   detained	   Syrians	   were	   deported	   to	   Turkey,	  Lebanon,	  Jordan	  and	  even	  back	  to	  Syria.286	  Within	  this	  campaign	  of	  securitisation,	  one	  particular	  group	   of	   Syrians	   were	   particularly	   undesirable	   -­‐	   Palestinian	   Syrians.	   The	   undesirability	   of	   the	  Palestinian	   Syrians	   embodies	   a	   conflation	   of	   exclusions	   -­‐	   discursive	   and	   bureaucratic.	   With	  restricted	   travel	   documents	   and	   minimal	   protection	   from	   UNHCR287,	   combined	   with	   the	  unwillingness	   of	   Jordan	   and	   Lebanon	   to	   accept	   Palestinian	   refugees	   from	   Syria,288	   Palestinian	  Syrians	  were	  given	  the	  option	  to	  be	  deported	  back	  to	  Syria	  or	  to	  Gaza.	  	  	  Syrians	  also	  feared	  their	  personal	  bodily	  security,	  especially	  for	  women	  and	  girls	  moving	  in	  public	  space.	   Young	   Syrian	   women	   in	   Alexandria,	   made	   visible	   in	   new	  ways	   by	   the	  media	   campaign,	  spoke	  of	  their	  attempts	  to	  dress	  in	  a	  ‘more	  Egyptian	  style’	  in	  order	  to	  blend	  in	  and	  avoid	  Syrian-­‐targeted	   harassment.289	   Other	   Syrians	   mentioned	   trying	   to	   disguise	   their	   accents	   in	   public	  encounters.	   Syrians	   cited	  a	   list	  of	  other	   threats,	  discrimination	  and	  actual	   attacks	  made	  against	  them:	  being	  fired	  from	  their	  jobs,290	  evicted	  from	  their	  apartments,	  extorted	  for	  more	  rent	  money	  by	   landlords,	  extorted	  by	  police	   in	  order	   to	  keep	  their	  businesses	  open,	  molotovs	  being	   thrown	  through	  the	  window	  of	  their	  business,	  and	  in	  one	  case	  a	  young	  man	  being	  stabbed	  but	  too	  fearful	  due	  to	  his	  residency	  status	  to	  go	  to	  the	  police.291	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  there	  was	  a	  massive	  decline	  in	  charitable	   support	   levels	   to	  Syrians.	   Some	  NGOs	  had	   their	  assets	   frozen	  under	  a	   court	  order,292	  others	   ceased	   to	   provide	   support	   due	   to	   fear	   of	   security	   repercussions,	   while	   many	   adopted	  wholesale	  the	  new	  discourse	  regarding	  Syrians	  as	  threatening	  the	  stability	  of	  the	  Egyptian	  state.	  	  	  	  
                                                
284 They were fearful that this information could be passed on to the Syrian regime. 
285 This is one manifestation of the relatively privileged position of many Syrians from a class and capital 
perspective, vis-a-vis other refugee groups. 
286 Those deported had been caught attempting to leave Egypt by boat, detained in Alexandria and later deported. 
287 Due to Palestinians being officially under the mandate of UNRWA, UNHCR provides limited support to 
Palestinians. However in Egypt, UNRWA does not operate, so by law Palestinians (including those from Syria) 
should fall under the remit of UNHCR, however the government does not permit UNHCR to assist Palestinians in 
Egypt. 
288 This is justified by these states as owing to their own internal dynamics of a long-standing Palestinian 
population, careful sectarian balance in Lebanon, an influx of Syrian refugees, and a long standing tendency of 
Arab states to use the notion of right of return to deny assistance to displaced Palestinians. 
289 Personal communication. 
290 In one case recounted in U’bour, a whole glass factory had relied upon Syrian labour, only to dismiss all of its 
workers and replace them with Egyptians following the July shift. 
291 This is a summary of stories I heard across different locations from Syrians and people working with Syrians. 
292 More than 1,000 NGOs had their assets frozen by a court order accusing them of being MB-affiliated entities. 
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This	  was	  accompanied	  by	  a	  host	  of	  bureaucratic	  and	  procedural	  difficulties,	  supposedly	  to	  ensure	  the	   security	   of	   the	   Egyptian	   state,	   exacerbating	   the	   prevailing	   sense	   of	   insecurity	   for	   Syrians.	  Syrians	   faced	   discrimination	   and	   harassment	   and	   bureaucratic	   problems	   attempting	   to	   renew	  their	  visas	  and	  access	  public	  services,	  particularly	  schools.	  While	  officially	  their	  access	  to	  services	  was	  upheld,	   in	  practice	   it	  was	  made	  increasingly	  difficult.	  Even	  in	  accessing	  services	  from	  those	  NGOs	   still	   providing	   support,	   Syrians	  described	  being	  harassed	  and	  accused	  of	   treason	  by	  NGO	  staff	  themselves	  whilst	  in	  the	  process	  of	  providing	  them	  with	  support.293	  	  	  
Securitising	  Practices	  	  The	  bureaucratic	  and	  administrative	  forms	  of	  exclusion	  and	  harassment	  that	  Syrians	  experienced	  reveals	  one	  of	   the	  major	  critiques	  of	   the	  Copenhagen’s	  School’s	  emphasis	  on	   the	  discursive	  and	  symbolic	  construction	  of	  security.	  Their	  emphasis	  on	  the	  representational	  has	  been	  critiqued	  for	  failing	   to	   adequately	   attend	   to	   the	   importance	   of	   institutional	   practices	   and	   actors.	  Didier	  Bigo	  has	  argued	  that	  the	  ability	  to	  “speak	  security”	  relies	  upon	  more	  than	  the	  symbolic	  power	  of	  those	  authorised	   to	   speak,	   but	   upon	   a	   set	   of	   knowledges	   and	   technologies	   which	   enable	   those	   who	  speak	  security	  to	  ‘produce	  a	  discourse	  on	  the	  figure	  of	  the	  enemy	  and	  impose	  their	  own	  definition	  of	   what	   constitutes	   a	   threat’.294	   While	   for	   the	   Copenhagen	   School	   securitisation	   is	   a	   ‘political	  spectacle	   where	   the	   main	   actors	   are	   the	   political	   elites’,	   for	   Bigo	   it	   is	   the	   bureaucracies	   and	  professionals	  who	  are	   important	   in	  the	  securitisation	  process.295	  While	  media	  analysis	  has	  been	  used	   extensively	   in	   theorising	   the	   creation	   of	   ‘moral	   panics’,	   Bigo	   has	   maintained	   that	  securitisation,	   although	   reinforced	   by	  media	   representations,	   remains	   the	   remit	   of	   institutions,	  with	   journalists	   often	   repeating	   the	   messages	   that	   they	   hear	   from	   those	   in	   security	  bureaucracies.296	   For	   the	   Copenhagen	   school,	   securitisation	   is	   modelled	   on	   a	   state	   of	   war;	  whereas	   for	  Bigo,	   securitisation	   takes	  place	   through	  every	  day	   technologies	  of	   ‘policing’	   (in	   the	  Foucauldian	  sense).297	  It	   is	  these	  everyday	  forms	  of	  policing	  that	  Syrians	  experienced,	  alongside	  the	  mobilising	  effects	  of	  the	  politicised	  speech	  acts	  of	  the	  state	  and	  public	  figures	  like	  Okasha.	  	  	  Building	   upon	   the	   theories	   of	   discursive	   construction	   versus	   securitising	   practces,	   Aradau	  emphasises	  the	  complex,	  co-­‐dependent	  and	  shifting	  nature	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  discourse	  and	  practice.	  She	  calls	  for	  consideration	  of	  a	  security	  dispositif	  based	  on	  a	  triad	  of	  representation,	  intervention	   and	   subjectivity.298	   She	   argues	   that	   security	   practices	   have	   ‘constitutive	   effects	   in	  terms	  of	  subjectivity	  and	  political	  effects	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  constitution	  and	  reproduction	  of	  political	  communities’.299	   In	   the	   case	   of	   Syrians	   in	   Egypt,	   we	   see	   all	   three	   points	   of	   Aradau’s	   triad	   in	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operation:	   speech	   acts	   and	   shifts	   in	   discursive	   representation,	   interventions	   of	   a	   governmental	  and	  humanitarian	  nature,	  and	  shifts	  in	  subjectivity	  through	  the	  changing	  nature	  of	  the	  Self/Other	  relationship	  between	  Egyptians	  and	  Syrians.	  	  	  
"We	  are	  dealing	  with	  humans"	  Against	   the	   overwhelmingly	   climate	   of	   securitisation	   and	   political	   division,	   Syrians	   sought	   to	  leave	   Egypt.	   September	   2013	   marked	   the	   peak	   for	   UNHCR	   in	   registrations	   as	   well	   as	   case	  closures,	  as	  Syrians	  themselves	  closed	  their	  files	  and	  sought	  to	  leave	  the	  country.	  Some	  returned	  to	   Syria,	   others	   sought	   to	   depart	   Egypt’s	   northern	   shores	   by	   boat	   in	   the	   hope	   of	   crossing	   the	  Mediterranean	   Sea.	   During	   July-­‐September	   2013,	   the	   European	   border	   patrol	   agency	   Frontex	  reported	  a	  massive	  upswing	   in	   arrivals	   across	   the	  Central	  Mediterranean	   route,	   coming	  mostly	  from	  Egypt	  and	  Libya,	  and	  landing	  in	  Italy.300	  The	  numbers	  arriving	  were	  higher	  than	  during	  the	  peak	  of	  the	  Arab	  uprisings	  in	  2011,	  and	  Frontex	  predicts	  that	  2014	  figures	  (not	  released	  yet)	  will	  surpass	   those	   of	   2013.301	   In	   Egypt,	   the	   cycle	   of	   attempted	   departure,	   arrest,	   detention,	   and	  deportation	   continued	   throughout	   the	   summer	   of	   2014,	   with	   Syrians	   and	   Palestinian	   Syrians	  being	   held	   across	   Alexandria’s	   police	   stations.302	   Some	   refugees	   reported	   that	   they	   had	   made	  several	  unsuccessful	  attempts	  at	  leaving	  by	  boat,	  only	  to	  be	  released	  and	  try	  again.	  Syrians	  were	  subjected	   to	   forms	   of	   coercive	   movement	   (in	   the	   form	   of	   deportations	   and	   shifting	   sites	   of	  detention)	   as	  well	   as	   coercive	   sedentarism	   (being	   detained)	   -­‐	   strategies	   of	   forced	  mobility	   and	  containment	   that	   are	   fundamental	   to	   international	   migration	   management	   regimes.303	   In	   this	  sense,	  detention	  cannot	  be	  disconnected	  from	  deportation.	  	  In	   response	   to	   the	   growing	   numbers	   of	   detained	   migrants	   across	   Alexandria’s	   prisons,	   in	  September	  2014,	  the	  Governorate	  of	  Alexandria	  undertook	  an	  experiment	  in	  opening	  Egypt’s	  first	  migrant-­‐specific	  detention	  centre,	  a	  re-­‐purposing	  of	   the	  Anfoushy	  Youth	  Centre	  building.	   In	  this	  act,	  Egypt	  added	  its	  name	  to	  a	  growing	  list	  of	  global	  migrant	  detention	  sites.	  Not	  surprisingly,	  this	  detention	   centre	   was	   opened	   in	   Alexandria,	   a	   coastal	   city	   at	   territory’s	   edge	   and	   a	   frequent	  departure	   point	   for	   irregular	   maritime	   travel	   to	   Europe.	   In	   a	   video	   released	   by	   Alexandrian	  Governor	   Tareq	   Mahdy’s	   You	   Tube	   channel,	   the	   governor	   is	   shown	   welcoming	   the	   first	   227	  detainees,	  who	  had	  been	  arrested	  while	  attempting	   to	  depart	   from	   the	  port	  at	  Rasateen.	   In	   the	  video,	  the	  governor	  is	  shown	  inspecting	  the	  premises,	  confirming	  with	  his	  staff	  the	  preparation	  of	  soap	   and	   towels	   and	   water	   for	   the	   detainees.	   After	   all,	   as	   he	   proclaims,	   ‘we	   are	   dealing	   with	  
                                                
300 Frontex, “Irregular Arrivals Were at Record High in the Third Quarter of 2013,” Frontex, 2014, 
http://frontex.europa.eu/news/irregular-arrivals-were-at-record-high-in-the-third-quarter-of-2013-qZCQJR. 
301 The most detected nationalities were Syrians and Somalis, followed by Egyptians and Eritreans. 
302 The Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights (EIPR) has documented around 627 cases of refugee deportations 
from Egypt January through until November 2014. These refugees were not only Syrians but come from a number 
of other countries. 
303 De Genova and Peutz, “The Deportation Regime,” 12. 
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humans,	  not	   criminals!’	  The	  detainees	  are	   shown	  arriving	  by	  army	  buses,	   and	  Governor	  Mahdy	  addresses	  the	  group:	  	   Noone	  worry.	  You	  made	  a	  mistake,	  but	  you	  will	  not	  be	  held	  accountable	  for	  this.	  This	  mistake	  ends	  here.	  Our	  Egyptian	  children304	  will	  be	  sent	  back	  to	  wherever	  they	  came	  from,	  and	  our	  Arab	  children	  will	  be	  classified	  and	  categorized.	  UNHCR	  exists	  in	  Alexandria	  and	  we	  will	  ask	  them	  if	  they	  can	  give	  you	  some	  money	  and	  if	  they	  can	  help	  you	  with	  staying	  in	  a	  place.	  All	  we	  need	  [to	  release	  you]	  is	  to	  have	  a	  place	  -­‐	  we	  are	  talking	  about	  the	  Arabs.	  	  You	  are	  our	  guests,	  there	  will	  be	  breakfast,	  lunch	  and	  dinner.	  You	  made	  a	  mistake,	  but	  you	  are	  our	  guests	  on	  a	  human	  level,	  on	  a	  moral	   level,	  and	  on	  a	  country	   level	   –	   the	   Iraqis,	   the	   Sudanese,	   the	   Syrians	   –	   are	   our	   guests,	   and	   it	   doesn’t	   need	   to	   be	  mentioned	  that	  the	  Egyptians	  are	  our	  guests.	  	  Governor	  Tareq	  Mahdy,	  Alexandria,	  17th	  September	  2014305	  	  In	   this	   speech,	   Mahdy	   plays	   the	   role	   of	   the	   all-­‐forgiving	   parental	   state	   who	   lightly	   chides	   ‘our	  children’	   for	   their	  mistakes	  and	  promises	   them	  that	   they	  will	  not	  be	  held	  accountable,	  which	   is	  ironic	  given	  that	  they	  are	  now	  incarcerated.	  What	  is	  absent	  from	  the	  speech	  is	  any	  recognition	  of	  
why	  they	  might	  be	  in	  such	  circumstances;	  there	  is	  no	  mention	  of	  the	  violence	  that	  they	  are	  fleeing,	  only	  blame	  cast	  upon	  them	  for	  attempting	  to	  move	  outside	  the	  law.	  The	  displacements	  that	  pre-­‐figured	   this	   ill-­‐fated	   boat	   journey	   are	   absent.	   Waving	   food	   in	   his	   hand,	   Mahdy	   assures	   all	   the	  Arabs	  that	  they	  will	  be	  looked	  after,	  making	  no	  mention	  of	  the	  fate	  of	  any	  non-­‐Arabs	  among	  the	  227.	   In	   stating	  Egypt’s	  moral	   and	  national	   obligations	   to	   fellow	  Arabs,	   he	   avoids	   the	  use	  of	   the	  term	  refugee.	  For	  this,	  he	  makes	  a	  clear	  deferral	  of	  responsibility	  to	  UNHCR.	  	  	  	  His	  opening	  remarks,	  separating	  humans	   from	  criminals	   in	   terms	  of	   their	  right	   to	  water,	  makes	  clear	   the	   division	   between	   the	   ‘other’	   and	   what	   Aradau	   calls	   ‘the	   other	   other’.	   His	   statement	  serves	   to	   imply	   that	   criminals	   are	   something	   less	   than	  human,	   and	  also	  points	   to	   the	  oft-­‐spoke	  global	  fallacy	  about	  refugee	  detention	  -­‐	  that	  it	  is	  administrative,	  rather	  than	  criminal.	  Despite	  his	  proclamation	  that	   the	  detainees	  were	  not	   in	   fact	  criminals,	  detention	  should	  be	  considered	  as	  a	  ‘productive	   strategy,	  which	  brings	   forth	   categories	  of	   illegality	   and	  undesirability	   as	   it	   seeks	   to	  contain	  them’.306	  In	  another	  euphemism	  with	  global	  echoes,	  Foreign	  Ministry	  spokesperson	  Badr	  Abdel	  Aty	  referred	  to	  Anfoushy	  as	  a	  "rehabilitation	  center”.307	  He	  stated	  that	  refugees	  would	  be	  ‘held	  for	  a	  transitional	  period’	  and	  it	  turned	  out	  to	  be	  transitional	  indeed.	  The	  dream	  of	  dedicated	  migrant	  detention	  facilities	  in	  Egypt	  was	  short-­‐lived;	  a	  lack	  of	  consensus	  between	  the	  governorate	  
                                                
304 The Arabic “waledna” is the preferred paternalistic term of address for the Egyptian state towards its citizens, 
with the literal translation being “our children”, regardless of age. 
305  Alexandra Governorate, “Video: The Governor of Alexandria welcomes 227 people who attempted an illegal 
migration and provides a youth centre as their place of detention”, 2014, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sOe0lCXsXnM&feature=youtube_gdata_player. 
306 Hall (2010:894) in Mountz et al., “Conceptualizing Detention,” 6. 
307 The use of euphemistic language to conceal, or otherwise downplay the carceral aspects of migrant detention 
centres has been explored in a paper by the Global Detention Project. Mariette Grange, Smoke Screens: Is There a 
Correlation between Migration Euphemisms and the Language of Detention, Working Paper, Global Detention 
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and	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Youth	  and	  Sports	  officially	  responsible	  for	  the	  facilities	  led	  to	  the	  centre	  being	  closed	   after	   just	   two	   months.	   The	   remaining	   detainees,	   who	   had	   not	   been	   deported,	   were	  distributed	  amongst	  Alexandria’s	  police	  stations	  once	  more.	  	  	  In	   Mahdy’s	   speech,	   and	   indeed	   in	   the	   whole	   staged	   performance,	   he	   explicitly	   enunciates	   the	  humanity	  of	  the	  detained	  bodies	  before	  him.	  He	  makes	  a	  firm	  distinction	  between	  the	  humanity	  of	  the	   refugees,	   as	   opposed	   to	   the	   (less-­‐than-­‐human)	   criminal.	   The	   violence	   of	   incarceration,	   and	  potentially	   deportation,	   is	   hereby	   masked	   by	   the	   humanitarian	   discourse	   he	   espouses.	   The	  humanitarian	  rhetoric	   itself	   invites	  the	  operationalising	  of	  particular	  managerial	  categories	  that	  sort	   and	  order	   bodies,	   and	   serve	   to	   facilitate	   -­‐	   or	   at	   least	   soften	   -­‐	   forms	  of	   coercive	  movement	  (deportation)	  and	  coerced	  sedentarism	  (detention).	  	  	  
Others	  and	  ‘Other	  Others’	  Security	   relies	   upon	   a	   fundamentally	   inegalitarian	   process	   of	   sorting	   and	   ordering	   particular	  bodies	   -­‐	   separating	   those	  who	   are	   risky	   from	   those	  who	   are	   not.	   In	   the	   case	   described	   above,	  terror	  suspects	  are	  sorted	   from	  the	  rest	  of	   the	  Egyptian	  population;	  Syrians	  are	  separated	  from	  other	   refugee	   groups	   and	   against	   other	   terror	   suspects;	   Arabs	   are	   sorted	   from	   non-­‐Arabs;	  migrants	  are	  distinguished	  from	  criminals.	  Mahdy	  himself	  states	  that	  the	  Arabs	  will	  be	  ‘classified	  and	  categorised’.	  This	  inegalitarian	  ordering	  of	  security	  has	  been	  challenged	  by	  liberal	  claims	  that	  seek	  to	  enact	  a	  form	  of	  equality	  through	  the	  more	  equitable	  distribution	  of	  security.	  In	  order	  for	  securitisation	  to	  be	  expanded	  to	  include	  risky	  others	  (such	  as	  irregular	  migrants),	  these	  subjects	  first	   have	   to	   be	   dis-­‐identified	   from	   categories	   of	   ‘dangerous	   abjects’.308	   This	   strategy	   of	   dis-­‐identification	  then	  needs	  an	  alternative	  discourse	  through	  which	  to	  categorise	  the	  risky	  bodies	  of	  trafficked	  women	  or	  irregular	  migrants.	  A	  humanitarian	  discourse	  of	  pity	  and	  suffering	  functions	  as	   just	   such	   an	   alternative.	   Through	   representing	   asylum	   seekers	   as	   victims,	   the	   appropriate	  response	   is	   to	  rescue	  rather	   than	   to	  punish.309	  The	  humanitarian	  discourse	  emerges,	  as	   its	  own	  type	   of	   speech	   act,	   which	   renders	   these	   bodies	   as	   suffering	   bodies,310	   as	   injured	   identity	  categories,311	  and	  therefore	  available	  for	  rescue.	  	  	  The	   identification	   and	   ordering	   of	   the	   vulnerable	   body-­‐in-­‐pain	   gives	   rise	   to	   a	   new	   form	   of	  self/other	   relationality;	   and	   the	   focus	   of	   security	   shifts	   from	   the	   state-­‐under-­‐threat,	   to	   the	  possibility	  of	  secure	  futures	  and	  new	  starts	  for	  the	  rescued	  category.	  These	  humanitarian	  speech	  acts	  seek	  to	  contest	  and	  replace	  the	  security	  speech	  act	  by	  emphasising	  suffering;	  that	  is,	  a	  ‘form	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311 cf. Wendy Brown, States of Injury: Power and Freedom in Late Modernity (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 1995). 
59 
of	  pathos	  to	  offer	  up’	  that	  is	  both	  embodied	  and	  universally	  recognisable.312	  In	  order	  to	  feel	  pity	  for	  a	  suffering	  body,	  the	  suffering	  must	  be	  undeserved;	  those	  who	  are	  in	  any	  way	  responsible	  for	  their	   suffering	   cannot	   be	   pitied.	  While	   some	   are	   cast	   as	   ‘innocent	   victims’,	   others	   are	   seen	   as	  somehow	   deserving	   of	   punishment	   through	   knowingly	   undertaking	   the	   reckless	   journey	   of	  (illegal)	  migration.	  As	  Mahdy	  says,	  ‘You	  have	  made	  a	  mistake’.	  	  	  What	  do	  we	  do	  with	  the	  victim	  status	  of	  one	  who	  had	  prior	  knowledge	  of	  their	  perilous	  (and	  lets	  not	  forget,	  illegal)	  journey,	  and	  still	  undertook	  it?	  Are	  they	  still	  deserving	  of	  pity?	  Instead,	  they	  are	  read	  as	  having	  expressed	  a	  dangerous	  and	  subversive	   form	  of	   intentionality	  by	  moving	  without	  prior	   permission,	   and	   are	   seen	   as	   suspect	   potential	   reoffenders	   (they	  might	  move	   again).313	   In	  this	  way,	  knowledge	  of	  risk	  functions	  as	  a	  confession	  of	  guilt.	  	  	  Aradau	   looks	   critically	   at	   these	   supposedly	   emancipatory	   “alternative”	   discourses	   which	   have	  sought	   to	   expand	  or	   democratise	   security,	  which	   she	   argues	   only	   shifts	   the	   spaces	   of	   abjection	  towards	  other	  categories	  of	  people.314	  Turning	  trafficked	  women	  into	  subjects	  to	  be	  secured	  often	  perpetuates	  a	  dynamic	  of	  ‘insecuring’	  another.315	  In	  the	  case	  of	  trafficked	  women	  or	  refugees,	  the	  trafficker	  (morally	  culpable)	  is	  the	  obvious	  other,	  as	  well	  as	  ‘other	  others’	  which	  in	  Aradau’s	  case	  she	  identifies	  as	  sex	  workers	  or	  asylum	  seekers.316	  In	  the	  case	  of	  refugees,	  the	  ‘other	  others’	  could	  be	  failed	  asylum	  seekers,	  irregular	  economic	  migrants,	  or	  human	  traffickers.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  Syrians	  in	  Egypt,	   the	   ‘other	  others’	   are	   the	   terrorist	   and	   the	   criminal.	  We	   can	   see	   from	   these	   examples	  that	   the	  problematic	  nature	  of	  securitisation	   is	  not	  suspended	  or	  challenged,	  but	  merely	  shifted	  from	  one	  category	  of	  bodies	  to	  another.	  These	  shifts	  also	  rely	  upon	  artificial	  distinctions	  between	  the	  categories.	  For	  example,	   in	  blaming	  evil	  human	  smugglers	  for	  exploiting	  the	  vulnerability	  of	  asylum	   seekers,	   states	   are	   heavily	   invested	   in	   the	   distinction	   between	   these	   two	   categories.	   In	  reality,	   most	   recent	   cases	   in	   Egypt	   and	   Italy	   where	   smugglers’	   identities	   have	   been	   revealed	  (either	   through	   arrest	   or	   through	   journalistic	   investigation),	   they	   are	   themselves	   found	   to	   be	  asylum	   seekers	   -­‐	   Palestinian,	   Somali,	   Syrian.	   In	   Australia,	   many	   of	   those	   charged	   with	   people	  smuggling	  are	  poor	  Indonesian	  fisherfolk	  attempting	  to	  make	  more	  money	  from	  their	  boats.	  	  	  Shifting	  the	  spaces	  of	  abjection	  onto	  other	  categories	  fits	  within	  Amar’s	  human	  security	  paradigm	  also.	  A	  human	  security	  paradigm	  allows	  for	  the	  securing	  of	  some	  bodies	  and	  the	  rescue	  of	  others,	  offering	  a	  chance	  to	  reconcile	  human	  rights	  imperatives	  with	  national	  security	  concerns	  through	  the	   process	   of	   differently	   ordered	   bodies,	   some	   of	   which	   are	   deserving	   of	   rescue.	   In	   this	   way,	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human	   security	   governance	   serves	   to	   align	   humanitarianism	   and	   militarism.317	   Given	   that	  security	   relies	   upon	   exclusion	   however,	   it	   cannot	   actually	   be	   universalised,	   as	   this	   would	   be	  incompatible	   with	   the	   inherent	   logic	   of	   security.	   We	   cannot	   all	   be	   equal	   sharers	   in	   security;	  therefore,	  Aradau	  asks,	   ‘who	   is	  going	  to	  be	  made	  dangerous	  so	   that	  others	  can	  be	  made	  secure,	  what	   forms	   of	   life	   are	   to	   be	   disqualified?’318	   Security,	   always	   already	   entails	   the	   sacrifice	   of	  someone	   else’s	   individual	   security,	   and	   therefore	   cannot	   offer	   an	   emancipatory	   politics,	   an	  alternative	  nor	  an	  ‘outside’	  to	  normative	  securitisation	  regimes.	  	  	  Aradau’s	  security	  dispositif	  of	  representation,	   intervention	  and	  subjectivity	  helps	  to	  understand	  how	  humanitarian	   responses	   by	  NGOs	   and	   other	   actors	   come	   to	   operate	  within	   the	   spheres	   of	  securitisation,	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  using	  the	  rhetoric	  of	  anti-­‐securitisation.	  The	  work	  of	  NGOs,	  in	  the	  field	  of	  irregular	  migration	  in	  particular,	  requires	  doing	  the	  work	  of	  prevention.	  Prevention	  of	  teenagers	  from	  getting	  on	  crowded	  boats	  bound	  for	  Europe,	  prevention	  of	  migrant	  drownings	  at	  sea,	  prevention	  of	  self-­‐harm	  in	  detention	  centres.	  Prevention	  -­‐	  as	  an	  intervention	  in	  the	  present	  to	  minimise	  harmful	  effects	  in	  the	  future	  -­‐	  necessarily	  entails	  an	  assessment	  of	  risk.319	  Prevention	  strategies	  are	  based	  on	  the	  assumption	  of	  risk,	  on	  the	  assumption	  that	  a	  danger	  exists,	  even	  if	  it	  is	  a	  danger	  yet	  to	  manifest.	  As	  these	  correlations	  can	  only	  be	  proven	  after	  the	  fact,	  dangerousness	  becomes	  ‘a	  quality	  immanent	  to	  a	  subject’.320	  	  	  The	   potentiality	   of	   danger	   is	   therefore	   impressed	   upon	   certain	   individuals	   and	   groups	   to	   be	  categorised	  as	  ‘high	  risk’.321	  Any	  attempt	  by	  risky	  individuals	  to	  resist	  the	  securitisation	  practices	  by	  the	  state	  or	  by	  NGOs	  can	  be	  re-­‐appropriated	  by	  regimes	  of	  power/knowledge	  and	  technologies	  of	   security.322	   Consider	   acts	   of	   self-­‐harm	   by	   detained	   asylum	   seekers	   for	   example;	   these	   acts,	  rather	   than	   being	   read	   as	   political	   acts	   of	   protest	   or	   resistance,	   are	   re-­‐appropriated	   by	   the	  security	  dispositif	  to	  reiterate	  that	  these	  people	  are	  dangerous,	  irrational,	  manipulative,	  not-­‐like-­‐us	  and	  ultimately	  need	  to	  be	  “managed”.323	  By	  pathologising	  the	  agency	  of	  resistant	  risky	  bodies,	  these	  acts	  are	  depoliticised	  and	  rendered	  meaningless.	  Medicalised	  and	  pathologised,	  their	  acts	  of	  resistance	   are	   read	   ‘only	   as	   a	   pathological	   reaction	   rather	   than	   a	   political	   statement’.324	   The	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pathologisation	  of	  the	  subject,	  Aradau	  concludes,	  allows	  for	  the	  reincorporation	  of	  resisting	  forms	  of	  agency	  within	  the	  dominant	  modes	  of	  securitising	  governance.325	  	  	  
Ordering	  of	  Exclusion	  In	   the	   intense	  and	  violent	   social	   ordering	  of	  bodies	   that	  has	   taken	  place	   in	  Egypt	   following	   the	  events	  of	  July	  2013,	  those	  ‘others’	  excluded	  as	  abject,	  dangerous	  and	  risky,	  turned	  into	  ‘life	  which	  is	  not	  life	  and	  ‘materiality’	  which	  does	  not	  matter’326	  were	  those	  persons	  categorised	  as	  members	  and	   supporters	   of	   the	   Muslim	   Brotherhood	   and	   the	   former	   president.	   A	   host	   of	   symbolic	   and	  material	  technologies	  of	  the	  state	  were	  mobilised	  in	  full	  force	  towards	  these	  abject	  others,	  wholly	  underwritten	  and	   justified	  by	   the	  grammar	  of	  securitisation.	  The	  existential	   threat	  posed	  to	   the	  Egyptian	  state	  justified	  a	  host	  of	  immediate	  emergency	  measures,	  within	  a	  broader	  rhetoric	  of	  a	  nation	   at	   war.	   In	   the	   Copenhagen	   School’s	   schema	   of	   securitisation,	   the	   political	   actors	   had	  spoken,	   the	   audience	   (the	   Egyptian	   public)	   had	   accepted	   the	   speech	   act,	   and	   extraordinary	  measures	   were	   sanctioned.327	   Within	   the	   pervasive	   global	   discourse	   on	   the	   existential	   threat	  posed	   by	   Islamist	   terror,	   the	   Global	   South	   is	   certainly	   not	   exempt,	   including	   Muslim-­‐majority	  countries	   such	   as	   Egypt.	   States	   of	   the	   Global	   South	   are	   also	   nodes	   in	   these	   assemblages	   that	  connect	   local	   and	   global	   discourses	   on	   Islamism	   as	   a	   threat	   to	   national	   security,	   enabling	   the	  generation	  of	  crisis	  and	  the	  mobilisation	  of	  human-­‐security	  governance	  technologies.	  	  	  By	   association,	   Syrian	   (and	   Palestinian	   Syrian)	   refugees	   became	   a	   secondary	   target	   of	  securitisation	   measures,	   infused	   with	   humanitarian	   discourses	   that	   were	   not	   extended	   to	   the	  primary	   targets	   of	   security	   measures.	   Conservative	   security	   doctrines	   have	   merged	   with	  humanitarian-­‐speak,	   and	   vice	   versa,	   to	   the	   extent	   that	   the	   state	   is	   talking	   about	   human	   rights	  while	  deporting	  people	  back	  to	  Syria;	  and	  NGOs	  are	  withholding	  passports	  and	  accusing	  Syrians	  of	   undermining	   the	   state,	   whilst	   handing	   out	   food	   baskets.	   The	   state	   rhetoric	   around	   Syrians	  demonstrates	   the	   privileging	   of	   a	   human	   security	   discourse	   in	   relation	   to	   certain	   categories	   of	  dangerous	   others,	   while	   a	   more	   wholly	   punitive	   approach	   is	   applied	   to	   other	   dangerous	  categories.	  In	  some	  cases,	  such	  as	  in	  the	  counter-­‐insurgency	  strategies	  in	  the	  Sinai,	  state	  security	  is	  privileged	  above	  all	  other	  forms	  of	  individual	  or	  human	  security,	  even	  if	  state	  security	  comes	  at	  the	   expense	   of	   some	   individuals’	   security.	   In	   a	   human	   security	   discourse,	   the	   protection	   and	  rescue	  of	  some	  (others)	  within	  an	  explicitly	  humanitarian	  framework,	  can	  go	  hand	  in	  hand	  with	  the	  militarised	  annihilation,	  or	  at	  least	  neutralisation,	  of	  other	  others.	  	  	  Securitised	   speech	  acts,	  media	   representations	   and	  political	   spectacle	  worked	   in	  harmony	  with	  bureaucratic	   and	   administrative	   acts	   of	   policing,	  which	   fundamentally	   redefined	   the	   self/other	  relationship	   between	   Egyptians	   and	   Syrians.	   Syrians,	   seeking	   a	   way	   out,	   attempted	   to	   move	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without	   approval,	   and	  were	   punished	   severely	   (by	   detention	   and	   deportation)	   for	   undertaking	  such	   a	   dangerous	   and	   subversive	   act.	   It	   is	   not	   coincidental	   that	   it	   was	   during	   this	   period	   of	  Egyptian	  national	  crisis	  that	  the	  country’s	  first	  migrant	  detention	  centre	  was	  opened.	  It	  is	  not	  only	  a	  matter	  of	  regional	  geopolitical	  factors	  that	  led	  to	  an	  influx	  of	  Syrian	  refugees,	  and	  later	  a	  mass	  exodus	   requiring	   policing	   and	   management	   by	   the	   Egyptian	   state.	   Rather,	   the	   detention	   of	  migrants	  should	  be	  seen	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  crises	  of	  sovereignty	  and	  governance	  that	  were	  taking	  place	  in	  Egypt	  during	  this	  period.	  Migrant	  detention	  centres,	  in	  their	  contemporary	  manifestation,	  enable	  the	  state	  to	  enact	  competing	  modes	  of	  sovereignty,328	  as	  seen	  in	  the	  Governor’s	  speech	  in	  Alexandria.	  The	   state	   is	   at	  once	   the	  authoritarian	   sovereign	   that	   can	  act	  with	   impunity	  and	   the	  modern	  sovereign	  that	  rescues,	  protects	  and	  honours	  rights.	  It	  is	  at	  this	  junction	  that	  we	  see	  the	  performance	  of	  human	  security	  governance.	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Chapter	  4:	  Visual	  Regimes:	  Surveillance,	  Shipwrecks	  and	  the	  
Spectacle	  of	  Suffering	  	  	  In	  previous	  chapters,	  I	  have	  considered	  the	  spatialisation	  of	  exclusion	  through	  the	  use	  of	  offshore	  territories,	   and	   the	   exclusionary	   processes	   of	   social	   ordering	   which	   take	   place	   within	  enforcement-­‐based	   “rescue	   or	   punish”	   securitization	   regimes.	   The	   spatial,	   temporal	   and	   legal	  ambiguity	  of	  these	  zones	  of	  liminality	  rely	  upon	  ‘statist	  regimes	  of	  visuality’	  that	  are	  increasingly	  sophisticated329,	   in	   order	   to	   render	   migrants	   visible	   through	   technologies	   of	   surveillance	   and	  exposure;	   while	   at	   once	   ensuring	   their	   erasure	   and	   invisibility.	   The	   distant	   geographies	   of	  offshore	   sites	   -­‐	   the	   high	   seas,	   remote	   island	   detention	   centres,	   or	   other	   offshore	   territories	   -­‐	  ensure	   that	   irregular	   migrants	   are	   largely	   out	   of	   sight.	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   visual	   technologies	  enable	  migrants	   to	   be	   rendered	   visible	   in	  material	   and	   discursive	   terms.	   Despite	   the	   distances	  that	   these	   remote	   geographies	   entail,	   technology	   allows	   visual	   messages	   to	   cross	   borders	   in	  multiple	  directions	  -­‐	  going	  to	  and	  from	  offshore	  spaces.	  Visuality,	  and	  the	  host	  of	  technologies	  it	  employs,	  plays	  a	  critical	  role	  in	  the	  exercise,	  consolidation	  and	  reproduction	  of	  state	  power.330	  	  	  Migrant	  bodies	  are	  made	  visible	  through	  the	  production	  of	  a	  spectacle	  that	  serves	  to	  support	  an	  ongoing	  process	  of	  legitimation	  of	  the	  state’s	  migration	  management	  measures.	  These	  spectacles	  most	   often	   play	   out	   at	   the	   edge	   of	   territory	   and	   beyond.	   The	   spectacle	   attached	   to	   migration	  upholds	  the	  overall	  perception	  of	  crisis,	  allows	  the	  state	  to	  perform	  its	  own	  militarised	  spectacles	  of	  border	  enforcement,331	  and	  attaches	  to	  the	  migrant	  body	  a	  kind	  of	  abject	  horror.	  Within	  these	  visual	  registers,	  particular	  migrant	  bodies	  are	  rendered	  hypervisible,	  yet	  simultaneously	  erased.	  These	  technologies	  of	  visibility	  and	  invisibility	  operate	  across	  necropolitical	  registers	  in	  that	  the	  production	  of	   trauma	  and	  disaster	   is	   fundamentally	   connected	   to	   the	   interrelated	  modalities	  of	  the	  right	  to	  save	  and	  the	  right	  to	  let	  die.332	  The	  visual	  not	  only	  conveys	  the	  differential	  allocations	  of	  suffering	  and	  trauma,	  but	   is	  crucial	   to	   the	  way	  that	   trauma	  and	  disaster	  are	  understood,	  and	  the	  ways	  that	  particular	  disasters	  are	  made	  to	  matter.	  In	  this	  way,	  visual	  representations	  serve	  to	  establish	  and	  maintain	  an	  ongoing	  relationship	  between	  the	  migrant	  and	  the	  citizen-­‐subject	  (who	  is	   at	   once	   spectator	   and	   actor	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   trauma).	   The	   spectacle	   of	   suffering	   and	   the	  production	   of	   trauma	   are	   therefore	   fundamental	   to	   the	   operation	   of	   state	   power	   and	   the	  governance	  of	  particular	  mobile	  bodies.	  In	  this	  chapter	  I	  will	  focus	  on	  the	  regimes	  of	  visuality	  that	  serve	  to	  both	  expose	  and	  erase	  migrant	  bodies	  within	  offshore	  spaces,	  at	  sea	  or	  on	  remote	  island	  detention	  centres.	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Statist	  Visualities	  and	  Surveillance	  The	  way	  that	  we	  know	  about	  migrants’	  maritime	  movements	  is	  partially	  through	  the	  materiality	  of	  bodies	  and	  boats	  arriving	  on	  territories	  or	  encountered	  at	  sea,	  but	  also	  in	  large	  part	  through	  a	  sophisticated	   web	   of	   surveillance	   technologies.	   The	   powers	   of	   the	   global	   north	   now	   operate	  (directly	  and	   indirectly)	  a	  whole	  host	  of	   scopic	   technologies	   that	  are	  networked	  and	   integrated	  into	  a	  broader	  system	  of	  global	  border	  control.	  These	  visualising	  technologies	  are	  able	  to	  monitor	  the	  world’s	  oceans,	  detect	  body	  heat	  and	  movement	  at	  border	  crossings,	   read	   the	   irises	  of	  eyes	  and	  the	  contours	  of	  fingerprints.	  This	  global	  gaze	  has	  an	  intensely	  biopolitical	  dimension,	  where	  the	  surveilling	  agents	  of	  the	  state	  choose	  who	  will	   live	  and	  who	  will	  be	  “let	  to	  die”.333	  There	  are	  numerous	  cases,	  in	  both	  the	  Mediterranean	  and	  Australia’s	  northern	  waters,	  of	  lethal	  incidents	  at	  sea,	  where	  boats	  in	  distress	  have	  been	  ignored,	  abandoned,	  or	  disputed,	  despite	  being	  directly	  in	  the	  line	  of	  sight	  of	  authorities	  and	  technologies	  surveilling	  these	  water	  bodies.	  	  	  This	  was	  the	  case	  with	  the	  so-­‐called	  “left	  to	  die	  boat”	  which	  departed	  from	  Libya	  on	  27th	  March	  2011	  with	  72	  asylum	  seekers	  on	  board	  and	  was	  detected	  drifting	  in	  the	  Mediterranean.	  This	  boat	  was	  left	  to	  drift	  across	  the	  Mediterranean	  for	  two	  weeks,	  and	  despite	  an	  alert	  being	  raised	  by	  the	  Italian	   Coastguard,	   no	   rescue	   attempt	   was	   ever	   made.	   Of	   the	   72	   on	   board,	   63	   people	   died	   of	  starvation	  and	  dehydration	  during	  the	  two	  weeks	  at	  sea,	  before	  the	  ship	  ultimately	  drifted	  back	  to	  the	  Libyan	  coast.	  In	  Mbembe’s	  terms,	  such	  negligence	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  states	  surveilling	  the	  water	  could	  be	  considered	  one	  example	  of	  a	  ‘particular	  terror	  formation’	  that	  combines	  ‘biopower,	  the	  state	  of	  exception,	  and	  the	  state	  of	  siege’.334	  He	  argues	  that	  in	  the	  colonies,	  this	  particular	  terror	  formation	  synthesised	  for	  the	  first	  time	  massacre	  and	  bureaucracy.335	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  left-­‐to-­‐die	  boat,	   there	   were	   63	   deaths	   as	   a	   result	   of	   being	   let	   to	   die	   whilst	   drifting	   within	   complex	  bureaucratic	  networks	  of	  documentation,	  surveillance	  and	  shared	  accountabilities.	  The	  violence	  of	  such	  negligence	  is	  justified	  in	  the	  name	  of	  deterrence,	  allowing	  the	  deaths	  of	  migrants	  at	  sea	  to	  be	  ‘naturalised	  through	  an	  economy	  of	  the	  unavoidable-­‐though-­‐regrettable’.336	  	  	  A	   group	   of	   activist/artists/scholars	   have	   used	   the	   available	   digital	   visual	   data	   to	   recreate	   the	  ship’s	  path	  in	  the	  form	  of	  a	  video	  installation,	  in	  order	  to	  highlight	  how	  exposed	  the	  vessel	  was	  to	  surveillance	   regimes,	   whilst	   being	   completely	   out	   of	   sight.	   In	   this	   work,	   “Liquid	   Traces”,	   the	  producers	   have	   used	   the	   very	   same	   remote	   sensing	   technologies	   data	   that	   is	   usually	   used	   for	  surveillance	  and	  repurposed	  it	  as	  evidence	  to	  tell	  a	  story	  of	  maritime	  neglect.337	  Using	  the	  digital	  traces	  of	   the	   ill-­‐fated	  vessel,	   survivors’	   testimonies,	  and	  an	  oceanographer’s	  analysis,	   the	  artists	  were	  able	  to	  visually	  map	  the	  trajectory	  of	  the	  boat.	  The	  visualised	  reconstruction	  found	  that	  the	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vessel	   was	   drifting	   inside	   NATO’s	   declared	   surveillance	   area	   off	   Libya’s	   north	   coast,	   within	   an	  assemblage	   of	   remote	   sensing	   technologies	   that	   can	   detect	   the	   movement	   of	   ships,	   as	   well	   as	  under	  the	  watchful	  eyes	  of	  NATO’s	  Synthetic	  Aperture	  Radar	  Image	  technologies,	  which	  generates	  satellite	  images	  of	  the	  earth’s	  surface	  as	  they	  orbit.	  A	  signal	  was	  emitted	  by	  the	  Italian	  coast	  guard	  every	   4	   hours	   for	   10	   days	   alerting	   ships	   in	   the	   area	   to	   the	   boat	   in	   distress,	   and	   despite	   the	  presence	  of	  38	  warships	  and	  a	  large	  number	  of	  commercial	  and	  fishing	  vessels,	  none	  responded	  to	   the	   distress	   signals.	   Outside	   of	   Italy	   and	   Malta’s	   jurisdictions,	   the	   coast	   guards	   of	   these	  countries	  also	  did	  not	  respond.	  There	  were	  two	  close	  encounters	  for	  the	  drifting	  boat	  -­‐	  one	  with	  a	  military	   helicopter	   and	   another	   with	   a	   military	   vessel	   that	   they	   met	   when	   around	   half	   the	  migrants	   were	   already	   dead	   on	   board.	   In	   both	   cases,	   the	  military	   vehicles	   (reportedly	   just	   10	  metres	   away	   from	   the	   drifting	   vessel)	   did	   nothing	   -­‐	   except	   take	   photographs.	   They	   then	   left	  without	   providing	   further	   assistance.	   The	   vessel	   had	   drifted	   in	   the	   most	   surveilled	   waters	   on	  earth,	   yet	   was	   completely	   out	   of	   sight.	   The	   only	   exception	   to	   this	   invisibility	   was	   when	   the	  authorities	   sought	   to	   render	   the	   distressed	   boat	   visible	   through	   digital	   photographic	  documentation.	  These	  were	  maritime	  deaths	  that	  were	  counted,	  traced	  and	  visually	  documented	  within	  a	  broader	   regime	  of	   statist	   visuality,	  but	  deaths	   that	  did	  not	   count	   in	   the	   sense	  of	  being	  lives	  that	  did	  not	  matter,	  lives	  that	  noone	  is	  held	  accountable	  for.	  The	  ship	  served	  as	  a	  spectacle	  -­‐	  of	  suffering,	  of	  trauma	  -­‐	  with	  its	  passengers	  literally	  left	  to	  die.	  	  	  	  The	   example	   of	   “Liquid	   Traces”	   is	   not	   only	   an	   illustration	   of	   the	   state’s	   highly	   selective	  surveillance	   regimes	   and	   their	   biopolitical	   lethality,	   but	   also	   of	   the	   ways	   in	   which	   the	   data	  produced	  by	  visual	  surveillance	  technology	  can	  also	  be	  hacked	  by	  activists	  and	  advocates	  to	  serve	  a	   different	   political	   agenda.	   In	   this	  way,	   the	   flimsy	   loyalties	   of	   the	   spectacle	   are	   revealed	   -­‐	   the	  spectacular	  power	  of	  the	  shipwreck	  can	  not	  wholly	  be	  managed	  by	  the	  state,	  and	  in	  this	  example	  is	  hijacked	  and	  re-­‐appropriated.338	  	  
	  
Shipwrecks	  as	  Spectacle	  The	   shipwreck	   as	   spectacle	   has	   a	   much	   longer	   history	   than	   the	   tragedies	   of	   contemporary	  crossings	  of	  the	  Mediterranean	  or	  the	  seas	  north	  of	  Australia.	  In	  her	  article	  on	  the	  geopolitics	  and	  biopolitics	   of	   the	   2004	   tsunami,	   Suvendrini	   Perera	   discusses	   Alain	   Corbin’s	   analysis	   of	   the	  aesthetic	  and	  affective	  nature	  of	  the	  shipwreck	  in	  18th	  century	  Europe	  in	  his	  book	  “The	  Lure	  of	  the	  Sea”.339	   During	   this	   period,	   the	   maritime	   realm	   was	   wholly	   implicated	   in,	   and	   infused	   with,	  imperial	  endeavours	  on	  a	  global	  scale.	  Corbin	  traces	  the	  emergence	  of	  a	  ‘type	  of	  pleasure’	  in	  the	  ocean	   and	   the	   ways	   in	   which	   the	   European	   public	   performed	   their	   ‘unconscious	   desires	   and	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obsolete	  emotions’	  on	  the	  ‘coastal	  stage’	  from	  the	  mid	  18th	  century	  onwards.340	  Corbin	  identifies	  a	  range	   of	   complex	   emotions	   that	  were	   inspired	   by	   the	   spectacle	   of	   the	   shipwreck	   among	   those	  who	  looked	  upon	  it.	  Many	  shipwrecks	  occurred	  within	  sight	  of	   land,	  from	  where	   ‘the	  spectators	  could…	   watch	   the	   tragedy	   unfold	   from	   the	   shore	   and	   hear	   the	   cries	   and	   prayers	   of	   the	  survivors’.341	   The	   spectators	   also	   became	   actors	   in	   this	   ‘theatre	   of	   coastal	   catastrophe’,	  themselves	  performing	  a	  range	  of	  actions,	  words,	  cries	  and	  gestures,	  so	  that	  ‘between	  those	  who	  were	  perishing	  and	  those	  who	  were	  watching,	  torturous	  dialogues	  could	  sometimes	  develop’.342	  	  Indeed	   ‘torturous	   dialogues’	   developed	   in	   the	   case	   of	   SIEV	  221,343	   an	   Indonesian	   fishing	   vessel	  carrying	   an	   estimated	   70-­‐100	   people	   that	   became	   shipwrecked	   on	   15th	   December	   2010	   on	  Christmas	   Island’s	   Rocky	   Point.344	   The	   vessel	   was	   first	   sighted	   at	   5:40am	   by	   a	   Customs	   and	  Border	  Protection	  Officer	  stationed	  on	  Christmas	  Island,	  when	  it	  was	  approximately	  500m	  from	  the	  coast.345	  The	  vessel	  was	  not	  considered	  to	  be	  in	  immediate	  danger,	  and	  so	  was	  considered	  a	  security	   issue.346	  By	  6:16am,	   it	  was	  reported	  that	  SIEV	  221	  had	  broken	  down	  and	  was	  now	  just	  100m	  offshore,	  and	  that	  a	  ‘major	  catastrophe	  was	  unfolding’.347	  At	  6:29am,	  the	  boat	  crashed	  into	  the	  rocks	  of	  Christmas	  Island.348	  	  Media	   images	   circulating	   at	   the	   time	   showed	   groups	   of	   Australians	   standing	   on	   top	   of	   the	  headland,	   looking	   out	   at	   the	   distressed	   boat.	   The	   government’s	   review	   of	   the	   incident	   quoted	  witnesses	  saying	  ‘women	  and	  children	  were	  in	  the	  water	  and	  could	  be	  heard	  screaming.	  Attempts	  were	  being	  made	  to	  throw	  life	   jackets	  over	  the	  cliff	  to	  approximately	  60	  people	  in	  the	  water’.349	  From	  this	  point	  onwards,	  the	  logic	  of	  border	  security	  gave	  way	  to	  humanitarian	  concerns	  and	  the	  response	   moved	   into	   a	   rescue	   phase.	   This	   moment	   of	   ‘torturous	   dialogues’	   between	   the	  Australian	  actor-­‐spectators	  on	  top	  of	  the	  rocks	  and	  those	  in	  the	  doomed	  vessel	  is	  characterised	  by	  a	  desperate	  asymmetry	  between	  those	  on	  the	  shore	  and	  those	  at	  sea,	  ‘between	  those	  who	  perish	  in	   the	   disaster	   and	   those	   who,	   in	   acting	   as	   spectators	   and	   witnesses,	   also	   achieve	   a	   form	   of	  mastery	  over	  it’.350	  	  	  Looking	   at	   the	   2003	   tsunami,	   Perera	   argues	   that	   in	   the	   contemporary	   global	   arena,	   Corbin’s	  torturous	  dialogues	  are	  restaged,	  and	  that	  these	  dialogues	  are	  ‘echoed,	  amplified	  and	  refracted	  by	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the	   technologies	   that	   enable	  direct	   and	   indirect	   spectatorship’.351	  These	   technologies	   enable	   an	  enframing	  of	  the	  shipwreck	  as	  spectacle,	  rendering	  an	  ungovernable	  disaster	  into	  a	  picture,	  which	  simultaneously	  guarantees	  the	  position	  of	  the	  spectator	  watching	  from	  the	  safety	  of	  the	  shore	  or	  screen.352	   In	   the	   moment	   of	   witnessing	   the	   spectacular	   suffering,	   the	   line	   is	   clearly	   marked	  between	  us	  and	  them.	  ‘The	  spectacle’,	  Guy	  Debord	  has	  argued,	  ‘is	  not	  a	  collection	  of	  images;	  it	  is	  a	  social	  relation	  between	  people	  mediated	  by	  images.353	  In	  this	  sense,	  the	  distressing	  image	  of	  the	  shipwreck	   enables	   a	   social	   relation	   between	   the	   ship’s	   passengers	   and	   the	   citizen-­‐subject-­‐spectator.	  Within	  this	  relationship,	  ‘the	  Western	  subject	  is	  positioned	  as	  both	  spectator	  and	  actor,	  a	  benevolent	  interventionist	  (as	  coloniser,	  missionary,	  aid	  organisation,	  or	  volunteer)’.354	  	  	  	  The	  technologies	  of	  enframing	  serve	  to	  obscure	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  natural	  or	  elemental	  aspects	  of	   the	  disaster	  and	  the	  political	  dimensions	  of	   inequality	  and	  the	  violence	  of	   the	  border	  itself.	  The	  framing	  of	  these	  disasters	  tends	  to	  capture,	  highlight	  and	  memorialise	  certain	  aspects,	  while	  obscuring	  or	  otherwise	  not	  naming	  other	  aspects.	  The	  innate	  qualities	  of	  the	  sea	  itself	  -­‐	  as	  powerful,	   ungovernable,	   unrelenting	   -­‐	   serve	   to	   absolve	   border	   regimes	   of	   responsibility	   for	  deaths.	   Instead,	  shipwrecks	  are	  positioned	  as	  unavoidable	  tragedy	  that	  plays	  out	   in	  a	   ‘terrifying	  theatre	  of	  sublime	  trauma,	  as	  representational	  and	  affective	  spectacle’.355	  	  	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  Lampedusa	  shipwreck	  of	  3rd	  October	  2013,	  in	  which	  more	  than	  360	  people	  died	  (mostly	  Eritreans,	  Somalis	  and	  Syrians),	  the	  most	  common	  image	  in	  circulation	  was	  that	  of	  rows	  and	   rows	   of	   unmarked	   coffins.	   The	   scale	   of	   the	   October	   2013	   shipwreck	   at	   Lampedusa	   was	  unparalleled.	   Speaking	   at	   a	   press	   conference	   soon	   after	   the	   tragedy,	   European	   Commission	  President	   Jose	  Manuel	  Barroso	  said	  he	  would	  never	   forget	   the	  sight	  of	  hundreds	  of	   coffins:	   ‘It’s	  something,	   I	   think,	   one	   cannot	   forget	   -­‐	   coffins	  of	  babies,	   coffins	  of	   a	  mother	   and	   child	   that	  was	  born	  at	  that	  moment.	  This	  is	  something	  that	  profoundly	  shocked	  me.’356	  The	  ship	  was	  reportedly	  just	  500m	  off	  the	  coast	  of	  Lampedusa	  when	  it	  suffered	  an	  engine	  failure	  and	  started	  sinking.357	  In	  an	  attempt	  to	  attract	  attention,	  some	  passengers	  set	   fire	  to	  a	  piece	  of	  material,	  only	  to	  have	  the	  fire	  ignite	  some	  petrol	  and	  spread	  to	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  ship.	  In	  an	  attempt	  to	  escape	  the	  flames,	  the	  passengers	  either	  jumped	  into	  the	  sea,	  or	  crowded	  to	  one	  side	  of	  the	  vessel,	  causing	  it	  to	  capsize.	  Survivors	   stated	   that	   they	   used	   their	   ship’s	   horn	   and	   signalled	   SOS	   optically,	   and	   while	   three	  
                                                                                                                                                     
350 Perera, “Torturous Dialogues,” 32. 
351 Ibid. 
352 Ibid. 
353 Debord in Joseph Pugliese, “The Tutelary Architecture of Immigration Detention Prisons and the Spectacle of 
‘Necessary Suffering,’” Architectural Theory Review 13, no. 2 (2008): 206. 
354 Perera, “Torturous Dialogues,” 37. 
355 Ibid. 
356 TesfaNews, “Italy to Hold State Funeral for Lampedusa Victims, Eritrea Objects,” TesfaNews: Eritrean News 
and Views, September 10, 2013, http://www.tesfanews.net/italy-to-hold-state-funeral-for-lampedusa-victims-
eritrea-objects/. 
357 Gaia Pianigiani, “Scores of Migrants Dead After Boat Sinnks Off Sicily,” The New York Times, March 10, 
2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/04/world/europe/scores-die-in-shipwreck-off-sicily.html?_r=0., BBC, 
68 
fishing	  boats	  allegedly	  passed	  them,	  they	  did	  not	  assist	  nor	  notify	  the	  coast	  guards.358	  The	  Italian	  coast	  guard	  took	  more	  than	  two	  hours	  to	  be	  alerted	  to	  the	  vessel,	  and	  a	  further	  hour	  to	  reach	  the	  survivors,	   who	   at	   that	   stage	   had	   been	   in	   the	   water	   for	   more	   than	   three	   hours,	   clinging	   to	  whatever	  they	  could.	  Fisherman	  reported	  that	  they	  were	  hindered	  in	  rescuing	  people,	  and,	  in	  act	  reminiscent	  of	  the	  left-­‐to-­‐die	  boat,	  also	  reported	  that	  the	  coastguard	  officers	  wasted	  time	  filming	  the	  operation.359	  	  Italian	   Prime	   Minister	   Enrico	   Letta	   tweeted	   that	   the	   shipwreck	   was	   an	   ‘immense	   tragedy’360,	  while	   the	   Mayor	   of	   the	   island,	   Giusi	   Nicolini,	   described	   the	   scene	   of	   bodies	   laid	   out	   on	   the	  dockside	  as	  a	  ‘continuous	  horror’.361	  The	  Italian	  authorities	  were	  so	  moved	  that	  they	  called	  for	  a	  national	  day	  of	  mourning	  in	  recognition	  of	  the	  tragedy,	  and	  honoured	  those	  who	  died	  with	  a	  state	  funeral.	  In	  a	  bizarre	  and	  grotesque	  move,	  the	  Italian	  Prime	  Minister	  also	  announced	  that	  all	  those	  who	  died	  would	  posthumously	  receive	  Italian	  citizenship,	  and	  had	  the	  right	  to	  be	  buried	  in	  Italian	  soil.	   What	   was	   omitted	   from	   his	   speech	   was	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   public	   prosecutor	   had	  simultaneously	   announced	   that	   they	   planned	   to	   charge	   the	   114	   survivors	   of	   the	   tragedy	   with	  illegal	  migration,	  which	  is	  punishable	  by	  a	  5,000	  Euro	  fine	  and	  expulsion.362	  This	  declaration	  by	  the	   Italian	   state	   is	   reminiscent	   of	   the	   “trials	   by	   ordeal”	   used	   to	   determine	   who	   was	   guilty	   of	  witchcraft	  -­‐	  the	  guilty	  witches	  would	  be	  revealed	  by	  their	  capacity	  to	  float	  and	  survive	  (only	  to	  be	  punished),	   while	   the	   genuinely	   innocent	   would	   sink	   and	   drown,	   being	   posthumously	   (and	  uselessly)	  awarded	  their	  innocent	  verdict	  and	  therefore	  freedom.	  	  	  What	  does	  it	  mean	  to	  be	  awarded	  posthumous	  citizenship?	  As	  Mbembe	  asks,	  ‘what	  place	  is	  given	  to	  life,	  death,	  and	  the	  human	  body	  (in	  particular	  the	  wounded	  or	  slain	  body)?’363	  Let	  us	  consider	  the	   relationship	   between	   pathos	   and	   agency	   discussed	   in	   Chapter	   3.	   A	   humanitarian	   response	  requires	   the	   demonstration	   of	   suffering	   and	   pathos,	   while	   demonstrating	   agency	   invokes	   a	  securitised	  response.	   If	  pathos	  is	  awarded	  rights	  under	  a	  humanitarian	  regime,	  than	  being	  dead	  can	  be	  considered	  the	  ultimate	  pathos	  -­‐	  in	  this	  case	  rewarded	  with	  Italian	  citizenship.	  Unlike	  the	  survivors	  who	  remain	  categorised	  as	  dangerous	  bodies,	  those	  who	  drowned	  were	  stopped	  dead	  in	   their	   tracks,	   no	   longer	   posing	   the	   risk	   of	   being	   a	   mobile	   body.	   In	   this	   way,	   even	   the	   act	   of	  “escape”	  can	  be	  co-­‐opted	  by	  the	  state,	  with	  the	  conferring	  of	  posthumous	  citizenship	  rendered	  a	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generous	   act	   of	   symbolic	   forgiveness	   bestowed	   upon	   those	   who	   died	   attempting	   to	   reach	   the	  nation’s	  shores.	  	  	  Humanitarian	   and	   security	   responses	  were	   deployed	   simultaneously	   upon	   the	   one	   boatload	   of	  people,	   categorised	  and	   fundamentally	   separated	   into	  differential	   legal	   categories	  of	   citizenship	  based	  on	  whether	   they	  were	  dead	  or	  alive.	   In	   the	   treatment	  of	   those	  shipwrecked	  passengers	   -­‐	  who	  were	  first	  ignored,	  then	  reluctantly	  rescued,	  then	  shrouded	  in	  body	  bags	  or	  new	  tracksuits,	  and	  then	  either	  granted	  Italian	  citizenship	  or	  charged	  with	  illegal	  migration	  -­‐	  we	  see	  the	  complete	  enmeshment	  of	   the	  biopolitical	   imperative	  to	  save	  and	  the	  necropolitical	   imperative	  to	  make	  or	  let	  die.	  One	  Eritrean	  woman	  who	  had	  been	  placed	  among	  the	  bodies	  recovered	  from	  the	  sea	  was	  later	   found	   to	   be	   breathing	   and	   was	   taken	   to	   hospital.364	   With	   this	   breath,	   she	   lost	   her	  posthumous	   right	   to	   Italian	   citizenship	   and	  became	  once	  again	   an	   illegal	  migrant,	  with	   charges	  pending.	  	  	  Roy	   uses	   the	   evocative	   phrase	   ‘magical	   realism	   of	   disaster’	   to	   describe	   the	   ‘surplus	   or	  inexpressible	  excess	  that	  attaches	  to	  the	  deepest	  experiences,	   that	  which	  cannot	  be	  rendered	  in	  the	  prosaic	  terms	  of	  reportage	  or	  official	  inquiry’.365	  The	  graphic	  accounts	  of	  this	  shipwreck	  -­‐	  that	  is,	  the	  spectacle	  of	  hundreds	  of	  migrants	  crowded	  onto	  the	  vessel,	  sinking	  in	  the	  dark	  hours	  of	  the	  early	   morning,	   the	   burning	   flames,	   the	   fearful	   clamouring,	   the	   capsized	   boat,	   the	   desperate	  passengers,	   some	   trapped	   in	   the	   boat,	   others	   adrift	   in	   the	  water	   -­‐	   invoke	   just	   such	   a	   sense	   of	  magical	  realism	  and	  inexpressible	  excess.	  	  The	  sense	  of	  magical	  realism	  also	  appears	  in	  relation	  to	  the	   ‘surpassing	   or	   unmaking	   of	   normative	   classifications’;366	   in	   this	   case	   citizenship,	   which	   is	  absurdly	   and	   uselessly	   conferred	   posthumously,	   exposing	   the	   fallacies	   and	   arbitrary	   nature	   of	  such	  normative	  categories.	  	  	  The	   ‘sublime	  trauma’	  and	  spectacle	  of	  suffering	  that	  these	  portrayals	  generate	  become	  attached	  to	  the	  abject	  refugee	  body	  -­‐	  bodies	  that	  burn,	  bodies	  that	  give	  birth	  on	  ships,	  bodies	  that	  drown,	  bodies	  that	  line	  the	  shores.	  	  At	  the	  same	  time	  as	  the	  refugee	  body	  is	  rendered	  discursively	  legible	  as	   the	   traumatised	   body,	   it	   is	   simultaneously	   made	   materially	   invisible.	   We	   are	   shown	   living	  bodies	  on	  overcrowded	  boats,	  and	  then	  shown	  rows	  and	  rows	  of	  coffins.	  What	  we	  do	  not	  see	   is	  the	  actual	  bodies	  of	  refugees	  -­‐	   the	  drowned,	  bloated,	  watery	  bodies.	  The	  abject	  body	   is	   implied,	  whilst	   concealed	   from	   sight.	   These	   registers	   of	   visibility	   and	   invisibility	   have	   a	   geographical	  dimension:	  it	  is	  the	  offshore	  location	  of	  these	  tragedies	  that	  render	  them	  unable	  to	  be	  seen	  by	  the	  citizen-­‐subject	   until	   they	   land	   upon	   territory’s	   edge.	   Once	   they	   land,	  we	   see	   the	   remnants,	   the	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remains	  of	   tragedy	   -­‐	   the	   survivors,	   the	  debris,	   the	  bodies	  already	  safely	  wrapped	  and	  sealed	   in	  body	  bags.	  	  	  
Manufacturing	  Horror	  on	  Manus	  Island	  Spectacles	  of	  trauma	  attached	  to	  the	  migrant	  body	  -­‐	  with	  shipwrecks	  being	  just	  one	  example	  -­‐	  are	  mobilised	   by	   the	   state	   in	   multiple	   ways.	   While	   the	   production	   of	   refugee	   trauma-­‐as-­‐spectacle	  serves	  to	  establish	  a	  particular	  social	  relation	  between	  migrant	  and	  citizen-­‐subject,	  it	  also	  speaks	  to	   potential	   migrants	   by	   attempting	   to	   dispense	   lessons	   of	   deterrence.	   This	   function	   is	   highly	  apparent	   in	  the	  visual	  communication	  materials	  produced	  by	  the	  Australian	  government,	  aimed	  at	   deterring	   would-­‐be	   asylum	   seekers	   from	   attempting	   to	   undertake	   maritime	   journeys	   to	  Australia.	  	  	  In	   a	   recent	   controversial	   campaign,	   the	   Australian	   government	   released	   an	   ominous-­‐looking	  poster	   depicting	   a	   ship	   sailing	   in	   rough	   seas	   with	   the	   words	   “NO	   WAY:	   You	   will	   not	   make	  Australia	  home”	  emblazoned	  above	  the	   image	  in	  red	  letters.	  The	  poster	  has	  been	  published	  and	  distributed	   in	   17	   languages	   and	   has	   attracted	   much	   criticism	   for	   its	   brutal,	   hard-­‐line	   stance.	  Earlier	   in	   the	   campaign,	   the	   Australian	   government	   had	   published	   an	   18-­‐page	   graphic	   novel,	  which	   sought	   to	   represent	   the	   traumatic	   nature	   of	   the	   entire	   refugee	   journey.367	   The	   graphic	  novel	  produced	  as	  a	  deterrent	  communication	  material,	  was	  originally	  published	  in	  Dari	  targeting	  Hazara	  Afghanis	  and	  was	  later	  translated	  into	  other	  languages.	  The	  graphic	  novel	  on	  its	  front	  page	  shows	  two	  images	  -­‐	  the	  first	  a	  crowded	  ship	  at	  sea,	  the	  second	  a	  line	  of	  people	  moving	  within	  the	  enclosed	  space	  of	  a	  detention	  facility.	  The	  implied	  connection	  here	  is	  explicit	  -­‐	  travel	  by	  boat	  and	  end	  up	  in	  detention.	  	  	  The	   graphic	   novel	   begins	  with	   scenes	   of	   a	   young	  man	  working	  with	   his	   father	   to	   repair	   a	   car.	  While	  the	  son	  labours,	  appearing	  dirty	  and	  unhappy,	  a	  thought	  bubble	  appears	  above	  the	  father’s	  head	   showing	   his	   vision	   for	   his	   son	   -­‐	   to	   be	   walking	   among	   the	   clean	   leafy	   streets	   and	   new	  skyscraper	  buildings	  of	  Australia.	  The	  parents	  beg	   the	  son	   to	   travel	  and	  are	  shown	  emotionally	  handing	  him	  their	  savings	  to	  make	  the	  journey.	  The	  young	  man	  leaves	  his	  teary	  parents	  in	  their	  village	  and	  makes	  the	  journey	  to	  a	  city,	  where	  he	  negotiates	  with	  various	  men	  until	  he	  arrives	  at	  Jinnah	  International	  airport	  in	  Karachi,	  Pakistan.	  He	  then	  takes	  a	  Pakistani	  International	  Airlines	  flight	  to	  an	  unknown	  destination,	  presumably	  Indonesia,	  where	  he	  strikes	  a	  deal	  to	  board	  a	  boat.	  The	   boat	   journey	   is	   depicted	   as	   perilous	   -­‐	   overcrowding,	   rough	   seas,	   sick	   passengers	   -­‐	   until	  finally,	  the	  boat	  is	  boarded	  by	  people	  in	  military	  uniform	  (presumably	  the	  Australian	  Navy)	  who	  take	   the	   asylum	   seekers	   to	   shore,	  where	   they	   are	   frisked.	   The	   asylum	   seekers	   are	   then	   shown	  behind	  bars	  with	  a	  blonde	  man	  in	  uniform	  giving	  them	  information.	  They	  are	  transferred	  by	  plane	  
                                                
367 ACBP, “Australian Customs and Border Protection Service” (Australian Customs and Border Protection 
Service, 2013), http://www.customs.gov.au/site/operation-sovereign-borders.asp. 
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to	  an	  island	  (potentially	  Manus	  Island,	  Nauru,	  or	  Christmas	  Island),	  where	  they	  are	  taken	  to	  their	  tent	   accommodation.	   A	   close	   up	   of	   the	   young	  man’s	   face	   at	   this	   point	   depicts	   his	   horror	   upon	  seeing	  the	  rows	  of	  tents.	  He	  sits	  down	  on	  one	  of	  the	  foldout	  stretcher	  beds	  and	  puts	  his	  head	  in	  his	  hands	  in	  despair.	  He	  wakes	  up	  during	  the	  night,	  distressed	  after	  dreaming	  of	  a	  celebration	  in	  his	  home	   village.	  Meanwhile	   his	   parents	   are	   shown	   also	   looking	  miserable,	  missing	   their	   son.	   The	  final	   frame	  shows	  the	  young	  man	  again	  on	   the	  stretcher	  bed,	  amidst	  a	  group	  of	  other	   idle	  men,	  sitting	  with	  his	  head	  in	  his	  hands.	  	  	  This	  particular	  visual	   communication	  material	   reveals	  much	  about	   the	  Australian	  government’s	  discursive	   and	   material	   treatment	   of	   asylum	   seekers,	   particularly	   those	   who	   travel	   by	   boat.	  Tellingly,	   the	   dealing	   with	   brokers	   to	   negotiate	   the	   travel	   is	   given	   significant	   attention	   in	   the	  graphic	   novel,	  while	   the	   original	   conflict	   the	   asylum	   seeker	   is	   fleeing	   is	   not	   represented	   at	   all.	  Absent	   from	  this	  script	   is	   the	  trajectory	  of	  violence	  that	   led	  the	   family	  to	   leave	  Afghanistan	  and	  flee	  to	  Pakistan.	  Instead,	  he	  is	  shown	  as	  motivated	  by	  his	  father’s	  desire	  for	  him	  to	  have	  a	  more	  comfortable	   life	   than	   being	   a	   car	  mechanic	   in	   Pakistan.	   In	   this	  way,	   the	   discourse	   of	   economic	  opportunism	  and	  bogus	  asylum	  claims	  are	  mobilised.	  There	  are	  a	  number	  of	  instructive	  lessons	  at	  work	   throughout	   the	   graphic	   novel:	   don’t	   use	   your	   parents’	   savings	   on	   maritime	   travel	   to	  Australia,	  don’t	  deal	  with	  smugglers,	  traveling	  by	  boat	  is	  scary	  and	  dangerous,	  and	  ultimately	  you	  will	   be	   caught	   and	   transferred	   to	   an	   island	   detention	   centre.	   The	   most	   powerful	   deterrent	  message	   conveyed	   in	   the	   novel	   however,	   is	   the	   depiction	   of	   trauma	   and	  mental	   suffering	   that	  accompanies	  the	  detention	  experience.	  The	  trauma	  of	  being	  incarcerated	  as	  a	  refugee	  is	  framed	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  any	  potential	  asylum	  seeker	  is	  meant	  to	  realise	  that	  it	  is	  better	  to	  be	  a	  free	  human	  subject	  (even	  if	  poor)	  than	  to	  be	  imprisoned	  (on	  a	  remote	  island).	  	  	  The	   conditions	   of	   detention	   shown	   in	   the	   novel	   -­‐	   a	   remote	   island	  detention	   centre,	  with	   crude	  accommodation	  and	  bedding,	  with	  an	  indefinite	  waiting	  period	  and	  seemingly	  little	  to	  do,	  leading	  to	  mental	  health	  problems	  -­‐	  are	  curated	  by	  the	  Australian	  government	  discursively	  and	  materially	  to	   function	  precisely	  as	  a	   lesson	   in	  deterrence.	  Liz	  Thompson,	  a	   former	  Manus	   Island	  employee	  turned	   whistle	   blower,	   said	   of	   the	   Manus	   Island	   detention	   centre:	   “It’s	   not	   designed	   as	   a	  processing	   facility,	   it’s	   designed	   as	   an	   experiment	   in	   the	   active	   creation	   of	   horror	   to	   secure	  deterrence’.368	   The	   euphemistically	   titled	   Regional	   Processing	   Centre369	   on	   Manus	   Island	   has	  indeed	   been	   host	   to	   a	   whole	   range	   of	   horrors.	   	   The	  Manus	   Island	   facility	   is	   one	   of	   Australia’s	  offshore	  processing	  centres,	   located	  in	  Papua	  New	  Guinea.	   	  Detainees	  on	  Manus	  Island	  (all	  men,	  numbering	   around	   1,000	   as	   of	   December	   2014)370	   are	   given	   little	   or	   no	   information	   on	   the	  
                                                
368 ManusRiot Insider: “It’s Designed as an Experiment in the Active Creation of Horror’, Dateline, 2014, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WrnqrXSNBtc&feature=youtube_gdata_player. 
369 The use of euphemistic language to conceal, or otherwise downplay the carceral aspects of migrant detention 
centres has been explored in a paper by the Global Detention Project. Grange, Smoke Screens. 
370 There Manus Island facility has also hosted unaccompanied boys under the age of 18 who were travelling 
without a parent or guardian. 
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Refugee	  Status	  Determination	  (RSD)	  process,	  are	  detained	  on	  an	  indefinite	  basis,	  and	  according	  to	  recent	  Australian	  government	  policy,	  have	  no	  chance	  of	  ever	  being	  resettled	  in	  Australia,	  even	  if	  found	  to	  be	  a	  genuine	  refugee.371	  The	  Manus	  Island	  facility	  has	  been	  condemned	  by	  UN	  agencies	  and	  international	  human	  rights	  groups	  for	  the	  conditions	  of	  detention	  in	  the	  centre.	  Manus	  Island	  has	  been	  host	   to	  a	   range	  of	  horrors	   -­‐	  mental	  health	  problems,	  hunger	   strikes,	   self-­‐harming	  and	  suicide	  attempts,	  claims	  of	  sexual	  abuse	  of	  detainees	  by	  guards,	  riots,	  and	  in	  2014,	  two	  deaths	  in	  custody	  -­‐	  one,	  Iranian	  Reza	  Berati,	  as	  a	  result	  of	  injuries	  sustained	  in	  a	  riot	  and	  the	  other,	  Hamid	  Kehazaei	   (also	   Iranian)	   from	   a	   bacterial	   infection	   after	   cutting	   his	   foot	   and	   not	   receiving	  treatment.	   In	   February	   2014,	   following	   a	  meeting	   between	  detainees	   and	   officials,	   a	   riot	   broke	  out,	  which	  left	  Reza	  Berati	  dead,	  another	  detainee	  partially	  blinded,	  almost	  150	  injured	  (including	  broken	   bones,	   bullet	   wounds,	   loss	   of	   sight,	   lacerations,	   loss	   of	   consciousness)	   and	   an	   ongoing	  public	  dispute	  between	  the	  Australian	  government,	  PNG	  authorities,	  private	  contractors	  and	  NGO	  staff	   over	   accountabilities	   and	   failures	   prior	   to,	   and	   during,	   the	   riot.	   Images	   of	   the	   rioting	  detainees	   were	   beamed	   across	   Australian	   television	   for	   days	   to	   follow.	   Aside	   from	   images	   of	  protest	  and	  rioting,	  Manus	  Island	  is	  kept	  almost	  completely	  out	  of	  view	  of	  the	  Australian	  public	  -­‐	  access	  to	  the	  facility	  is	  highly	  restricted	  and	  journalists	  are	  unable	  to	  enter.	  	  	  ‘In	   both	   form	   and	   content,’	   Debord	   writes,	   ‘the	   spectacle	   serves	   as	   a	   total	   justification	   of	   the	  condition	  and	  goals	  of	  the	  existing	  system’.372	  The	  spectacle	  of	  detainees	  indulging	  in	  spectacular	  forms	   of	   violence	   and	   self-­‐harm	   -­‐	   jumping	   off	   buildings,	   hanging	   themselves,	   sewing	   their	   lips	  together,	  destroying	  detention	  centre	  property	  -­‐	  functions	  to	  confirm	  the	  dangerous,	  risky	  agency	  of	  the	  asylum	  seeker.	  The	  spectacle	  of	  the	  irrational,	  ungrateful,	  (self-­‐)destructive	  detainee	  serves	  to	  legitimate	  the	  treatment	  they	  receive	  in	  detention,	  and	  re-­‐enforces	  fundamental	  divisions	  of	  us	  and	   them.	   The	   source	   of	   the	   refugee’s	   ‘spectacular	   pathologies’	   can	   be	   ‘conveniently	   and	  reductively	   located	   within	   the	   body	   of	   the	   refugee’	   rather	   than	   attributed	   to	   the	   traumatic	  conditions	   of	   incarceration.373	   The	   conditions	   of	   detention	   itself	   becomes	   instrumental	   in	   the	  pathologisation	  of	   the	  detainees,	  whose	  acts	  of	  resistance	  are	  re-­‐appropriated	  and	  depoliticised	  as	   pathological,	  which	   can	   only	   justify	   their	   ongoing	   incarceration.374	   The	   incarcerated	   refugee	  body	  is	   instrumentalised	  as	  a	  scopic	  spectacle:	   ‘of	  violence,	   indiscipline	  and	  bodily	  and	  affective	  excess’.375	   This	   spectacle	   and	   the	   suffering	   of	   the	   incarcerated	   refugee	   is	   available	   for	  consumption	  by	  the	  citizen-­‐spectator,	  and	  is	  mobilised	  as	  a	  lesson	  in	  deterrence	  by	  the	  Australian	  government	   in	   highly	   visual	   ways.	   The	   choice	   of	   the	   medium	   -­‐	   a	   graphic	   novel	   to	   graphically	  illustrate	  suffering	  -­‐	  was	  surely	  chosen	  not	  only	  to	  overcome	  illiteracy	  or	   language	  barriers,	  but	  was	  selected	   for	   its	   capacity	   to	  pictorially	   convey	   trauma	  and	  suffering.	  The	  deterrence	   lessons	  
                                                
371 AI, This Is Breaking People: Human Rights Violations at Australia’s Asylum Seeker Processing Centre on 
Manus Island, Papua New Guinea (Amnesty International, 2013). 
372 Debord in Pugliese, “Tutelary Architecture,” 210. 
373 Ibid., 211. 
374 Aradau, Rethinking Trafficking in Women: Politics out of Security, 107. 
375 Pugliese, “Tutelary Architecture,” 214. 
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contained	   in	   the	  story	   -­‐	  of	  painful	   separation	   from	   family,	  dangerous	  boat	   journeys,	  evil	  people	  smugglers,	  the	  bare	  conditions	  of	  the	  camp,	  and	  ultimately	  the	  mental	  anguish	  of	  incarceration	  -­‐	  could	  not	  have	  been	  so	  evocatively	  conveyed	  by	  text.	  	  While	  the	  Australian	  government	  seeks	  to	  mobilise	  the	  horrors	  of	  Manus	  Island	  in	  its	  deterrence	  materials,	   it	   also	   attempts	   to	  maintain	   a	   safe	   distance	   from	   culpability	   for	   such	   horror.	   All	   the	  functions	   of	   the	   Manus	   Island	   detention	   centre	   are	   outsourced	   to	   the	   Papua	   New	   Guinean	  government	   and	   private	   contractors.	   At	   the	   time	   of	   the	   February	   2014	   riot,	   the	   centre	   was	  managed	  by	  the	  world’s	  largest	  security	  company,	  G4S,376	  with	  other	  services	  being	  outsourced	  to	  other	   providers,	   such	   as	   healthcare	   by	   Integrated	   Health	   Management	   Services	   (IHMS)	   and	  welfare	   services	   provided	   by	   the	   Salvation	   Army.377	   	   Following	   the	   riot,	   actors	   on	   all	   sides	   -­‐	  detainees,	   PNG	   police,	   PNG	   government,	   G4S,	   the	   Salvation	   Army,	   the	   Australian	   authorities	   -­‐	  sought	  to	  establish	  accountability	  and	  culpability	  for	  the	  death	  of	  Reza	  Berati,	  the	  injuries,	  and	  the	  damage	   to	   property	   in	   the	   centre.	   This	   parastatal	   coalition	   of	   government	   bureaucrats	   (both	  Australian	  and	  Papuan),	  NGOs,	  private	  security	  agencies,	  local	  police,	  private	  medical	  contractors,	  demonstrates	   the	   extent	   to	  which	   the	   public	   functions	   of	   the	   state	   had	   been	   outsourced	   into	   a	  ‘parallel	   realm	   of	   reduced	   accountability	   and	   unregulated	   power’.378	   In	   its	   outsourcing	   of	   all	  aspects	   of	   the	  detention	   centre’s	  management,	   the	  Australian	   government	  was	   able	   to	  distance	  itself	  from	  the	  spectacular	  violence	  that	  had	  taken	  place,	  whilst	  remaining	  clearly	  very	  proximate	  to	   the	   overall	   project.	   In	   this	   sense,	   outsourcing	   to	   private	   contractors	   serves	   as	   the	   capital	  equivalent	  of	  offshoring	  onto	  islands	  and	  remote	  territories	  -­‐	  it	  functions	  as	  a	  re-­‐spatialisation	  of	  accountability	  through	  a	  masquerade	  of	  externalisation,	  which	  allows	  the	  Australian	  government	  to	   defer	   its	   failures	   to	   protect	   onto	   other	   actors.	   In	   the	   case	   of	   the	   Manus	   Island	   riot,	   the	  responsible	  actors	  to	  which	  the	  government	  deferred	  were	  G4S	  and	  the	  PNG	  government.	  	  	  In	  his	  21st	  February	  press	  conference,	  just	  days	  after	  the	  incident,	  then	  Immigration	  Minister	  Scott	  Morrison	  announced	  a	  review	  into	  the	  incident:	  ‘I	  wish	  to	  stress	  that	  the	  review	  will	  look	  closely	  at	  any	  actions	  of	  those	  contracted	  to	  provide	  services	  at	  the	  centre	  in	  a	  safe	  and	  secure	  manner’,	  stating	   that	   what	   was	   needed	   was	   a	   ‘more	   integrated	   contract’.379	   In	   response	   to	   journalists’	  questions	  on	  ultimate	  accountability,	  he	  said	   ‘…control	  and	  management	  of	   the	  centre	   is	  placed	  within	   the	  PNG	  Government,	   consistent	  with	   their	   sovereign	   responsibility.	  Under	   the	   terms	  of	  the	  MOU	  with	  PNG,	  the	  Australian	  government	  provides	  support	  to	  the	  PNG	  government	   in	  this	  
                                                
376 The G4S contract expired in February 2014 and following claims of poor management, was not renewed and 
the tender was won by Transfield Services, who were awarded a $1.2 billion contract to manage both centres, 
Nauru and Manus for a 20 month period. The Salvation Army contract was not renewed and Transfield took 
responsibility for both security and welfare service provision, as well as catering, cleaning and overall 
maintenance and management of the centre. 
377 The Salvation Army had a $74 million contract with the government, which expired on January 31st 2014, and 
was not renewed by the government. 
378 Amar, The Security Archipelago, 18. 
379 Scott Morrison, “Manus Island Incident, Operation Sovereign Borders, Joint Review,” February 21, 2014, 
http://www.minister.immi.gov.au/media/sm/2014/sm212027.htm. 
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role’.380	   In	   this	   way,	   the	   state	   not	   only	   outsourced	   the	   management	   of	   the	   centre,	   but	   also	  outsourced	   the	   brutal	   and	   dehumanising	   conditions	   of	   incarceration,	   a	   process	   Jamieson	   and	  McEvoy	   have	   called	   ‘state	   crime	   by	   proxy	   and	   juridical	   othering’.381	   In	   outsourcing	   the	  management	  of	  the	  centre,	  the	  government	  is	  effectively	  outsourcing	  the	  ‘creation	  of	  horror’	  that	  Liz	   Thompson	   described.	   The	   horror	   is	   outsourced	   onto	   the	  market	   and	   onto	   less	   civil	   others,	  such	   as	   the	   PNG	   police	   and	   PNG	   locals.	   By	   emphasising	   the	   investigation	   of	   service	   providers,	  Morrison	   is	   essentially	   blaming	   a	  market	   failure,	  which	   allows	   for	   the	   possibility	   of	   having	   the	  right	  contractor,	  with	  the	  right	  contractual	  terms,	  in	  order	  to	  prevent	  such	  failings.	  Invoking	  the	  “sovereignty”	   of	   PNG	   as	   responsible	   for	   overall	  management	   of	   the	   centre,	  Morrison	   is	   able	   to	  attribute	  responsibility	  to	  PNG,	  which	  he	  represents	  as	  unfortunately	  less-­‐than-­‐capable	  and	  less	  human	  rights	  oriented	   than	  Australia.382	  While	   remaining	  external	   to	   creating	   the	   conditions	  of	  spectacular	  horror,	  the	  Australian	  government	  mobilises	  and	  circulates	  the	  very	  same	  spectacles	  in	  highly	  visual	  ways	  in	  order	  maintain	  the	  status	  quo	  and	  to	  issue	  deterrence	  lessons.	  	  	  The	  spectacle	  of	  suffering	  and	  the	  production	  of	  trauma	  are	  critical	  to	  a	  particular	  imagination	  of	  the	  refugee	  body	  as	  abject.	  The	  abject	  body	  invites	  particular	  forms	  of	  compulsory	  rescue	  and/or	  punish	  regimes	  and	  modes	  of	  governance	  to	  regulate	  mobile	  bodies.	  The	  regimes	  of	  visuality	  that	  serve	  to	  simultaneously	  expose	  and	  erase	  migrant	  bodies	  within	  offshore	  spaces	  are	  fundamental	  to	  the	  operation	  of	  state	  power	  in	  migration	  governance.	  	  
Chapter	  5:	  Conclusion	  	  In	   the	   contemporary	   management	   of	   mobile	   bodies,	   the	   “state	   of	   exception”	   appears	   as	  increasingly	  unexceptional	  and	  rather	  fundamental	  to	  the	  functioning	  of	  contemporary	  power.	  As	  Aradau	  argues,	  the	  state	  of	  exception	  is	  not	  a	  ‘limit	  moment’	  of	  liberal	  democracy	  where	  it	  verges	  into	   a	   different	   mode	   of	   politics,	   but	   rather	   she	   sees	   exceptional	   moments	   as	   ‘inbuilt	   into	   the	  functioning	   of	   democracy	   and	   liberal	   law	   when	   they	   govern	   the	   social’.383	   In	   the	   context	   of	  neoliberalism’s	   collapsing	   legitimacy	   as	   the	   dominant	   global	   order	   and	   the	   growing	   number	   of	  battlefronts	   in	   the	   international	  war	  on	   terror,	  neoliberal	  market	  states	  are	   facing	  a	  moment	  of	  crisis.	   These	   crises	   of	   sovereignty	   give	   rise	   to	   a	   range	   of	   new	   discursive	   and	   policy	   strategies	  designed	  to	  uphold	  regimes	  of	   intensified	  governance	  and	  regulation.	  New	  articulations	  emerge	  out	  of	   these	  moments	  of	  crisis,	  which	  play	  out	  across	  various	  sites	  of	  governance,	   including	  the	  management	  of	  migration.	  It	  is	  particularly	  evident	  that	  in	  moments	  of	  crisis,	  when	  the	  sovereign	  power	   of	   the	   nation	   is	   challenged,	   maritime	   contestations	   are	   heightened,	   and	   the	   role	   of	   the	  
                                                
380 Ibid. 
381 (2005:504) in Amar, The Security Archipelago, 18. 
382 In a series of Department of Immigration emails obtained under the Freedom of Information Act, departmental 
staff referred to the need to maintain a “light touch” to ensure that the PNG government was seen to be in charge 
of the detention facility. 
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“offshore”	  becomes	  even	  more	  significant.	  The	  contemporary	  management	  of	  migration	  entails	  a	  violent	   ordering	   of	   bodies	   –	   desirable	   and	   undesirable	   –	   that	   takes	   place	   through	   novel	  geographical	   articulations	   of	   space	   and	   territory,	   the	   aligning	   of	   security	   and	   humanitarian	  concerns,	  and	  technologies	  of	  visual	  production.	  	  	  Increasingly,	  these	  articulations	  are	  not	  only	  being	  expressed	  by	  the	  state	  but	  by	  an	  assemblage	  of	  parastatal	   actors.	   These	   diverse	   actors	   all	   seek	   to	   assert	   their	   agency	   and	   influence	   within	  governance	   spheres,	   while	   at	   the	   same	   time	   functioning	   as	   a	   recipient	   of	   outsourcing	   which	  results	  in	  an	  overall	  state	  of	  reduced	  accountability.	  Outsourcing	  takes	  place	  across	  geographical,	  financial	   and	   legal	   registers,	   leading	   to	   slippery	   terrain	   where	   ultimate	   responsibility	   is	  externalised.	  	  	  Migration	  management	   relies	   upon	  mobilising	   spatial	   frames	   in	   new	  ways	   to	   produce	   shifting	  geographical	   articulations	   of	   sovereignty.	   Borders	   have	   become	   mobile	   in	   new	   ways,	   and	  increasingly	   located	   in	  whichever	   locations	   bodies	   seek	   to	  move	   in.	   Patterns	   on	   a	   global	   scale	  suggest	   that	   the	   spaces	   between	   nation-­‐states	   and	   at	   the	   edge	   of	   territory	   –	   beaches,	   oceans,	  islands	   and	   offshore	   territories	   –	   are	   the	   key	   sites	   where	   sovereignty	   is	   tested	   and	   contested.	  While	  these	  geographical	  expressions	  of	  externalisation	  -­‐	  particularly	  at	  the	  sites	  between	  states	  –	  may	  appear	  as	  exceptional,	  an	  historical	  contextualisation	  of	  these	  sites	  reveals	  continuity	  rather	  than	   exception.	   Islands	   and	   other	   offshore	   spaces	   are	   not	   exceptional	   in	   their	   contemporary	  usages;	   in	   fact	   they	   demonstrate	   a	   continuation	   of	   exceptionalism	   as	   an	   historical	   project	  undertaken	  in	  waves	  by	  imperial	  and	  colonial	  forces.	  	  	  Tracing	  the	  historical	  and	  geographical	  particularities	  of	  offshore	  locations	  reveals	  consistencies	  in	   the	   spatialisation	   of	   power	   across	   distant	   global	   sites.	   These	   consistencies	   run	   laterally	  between	   spatial	   sites	   and	   also	   temporally,	   serving	   to	   connect	   historical	   and	   contemporary	  colonialisms.	   This	   analysis	   demonstrates	   the	   configurations	   of	   colonial,	   military	   and	   economic	  powers	  that	  shape	  a	  certain	  imagination	  about	  these	  territories,	  which	  allows	  them	  to	  be	  used	  in	  the	   contemporary	  moment	   in	   particular	  ways.	   	   These	   spaces	  were	   imagined	   as	   always	   already	  available	   for	   utilisation,	   a	   utilisation	  which	   is	   dependent	   upon	   a	   general	   feeling	   of	   surplus	   and	  excess	  that	  infuses	  these	  sites,	  but	  also	  a	  complete	  negation	  of	  indigeneity	  and	  local	  populations.	  These	   consistencies	   and	   continuities	   demonstrate	   that	   these	   remote,	   isolated	   sites	   are	   actually	  nodes	   in	   a	  broader	  arrangement	   that	   serves	   to	   connect	   remote	  detention	  and	   the	  offshoring	  of	  accountabilities,	  with	  the	  securitisation	  of	  migration.	  	  	  Contemporary	   regional	   migration	   management	   arrangements	   reflect	   geopolitical	   divisions	   of	  power	   and	   colonial	   histories	   in	   order	   to	   secure	   states	   of	   the	   global	   North	   against	   irregular	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maritime	   migrations.	   Regionalisation	   and	   externalisation	   strategies	   serve	   to	   divide	   asylum	  seekers	  geographically	  from	  systems	  of	  protection,	  and	  increasingly	  put	  them	  at	  risk	  of	  expulsion,	  either	  in	  the	  form	  of	  deportation	  or	  euphemistically	  disguised	  as	  ‘voluntary	  return’.	  	  	  The	  ordering	  of	  exclusion	  within	  the	  political	  community	  serves	  to	  render	  some	  bodies	  as	  abject,	  and	   therefore	   available	   for	   rescue	   and/or	   punish	   regimes	   that	   coagulate	   security	   and	  humanitarian	  imperatives.	  These	  abject	  bodies	  are	  written	  as	  risky,	  dangerous	  others,	  who	  pose	  an	   existential	   threat	   to	   the	   political	   community.	   As	   such,	   these	   others	   are	  made	   the	   targets	   of	  securitisation	  measures.	  Securitisation	  entails	  securitised	  speech	  acts,	  media	  representations	  and	  political	  spectacle,	  along	  with	  bureaucratic	  and	  administrative	  forms	  of	  policing,	  and	  ultimately	  a	  fundamental	  reordering	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  migrant	  and	  the	  citizen-­‐subject.	  Within	  a	  security	  discourse	  that	  is	  increasingly	  infused	  with	  humanitarian	  concerns,	  the	  state	  is	  at	  once	  the	  authoritarian	   sovereign	   that	   can	   act	   with	   impunity	   and	   the	   modern	   sovereign	   that	   rescues,	  protects	  and	  honours	  rights.	  	  	  Human	  security	  regimes	  rely	  upon	  visual	  regimes	  that	  serve	  to	  both	  expose	  and	  erase	  migrants	  and	  cast	  a	  relationship	  between	  migrants	  and	  spectator-­‐citizen-­‐subjects.	  Migrant	  bodies	  are	  made	  visible	  and	  invisible	  at	  different	  moments	  (and	  in	  different	  ways	  for	  different	  bodies)	  through	  the	  production	  of	  a	  spectacle	  that	  serves	  to	  support	  an	  ongoing	  process	  of	  legitimation	  of	  the	  state’s	  migration	   management	   measures.	   These	   spectacles	   –	   of	   shipwrecks,	   island	   detention	   centres,	  drownings,	  riots	  –	  serve	  to	  maintain	  the	  perception	  of	  crisis	  and	  attaches	  to	  the	  migrant	  body	  a	  certain	   type	   of	   abject	   horror.	   These	   technologies	   of	   visibility	   and	   invisibility	   operate	   across	  necropolitical	  registers	  in	  that	  the	  production	  of	  trauma	  and	  disaster	  is	  fundamentally	  connected	  to	  the	  interrelated	  modalities	  of	  the	  right	  to	  save	  and	  the	  right	  to	  let	  die.	  The	  spectacle	  of	  suffering	  and	   the	   production	   of	   trauma	   are	   fundamental	   to	   the	   operation	   of	   state	   power	   and	   the	  governance	  of	  particular	  mobile	  bodies.	  	  	  The	  spectacle	  also	  plays	  a	  critical	   role	   in	   relation	   to	  migrant	  agency.	  The	  very	  act	  of	  moving,	  of	  getting	   on	   a	   ship,	   entails	   a	   dangerous	   form	   of	   subversive	   and	   bold	   autonomy.	  Willingly	   taking	  what	  may	  prove	   to	  be	  a	   lethal	   risk	   in	  boarding	  an	   ill-­‐equipped	  boat	   to	   travel	   across	   the	   seas	   is	  seen	  as	  a	  bold	  assertion	  of	  sovereignty.	  Within	  a	  Hegelian	  paradigm,	  it	  is	  in	  the	  act	  of	  knowingly	  and	  voluntarily	   risking	  death	   that	   the	  human	  being	   truly	   ‘becomes	  a	   subject’.384	  Confronting	   the	  possibility	  of	  death	  and	  living	  with	  it,	  Hegel	  argues,	   is	  the	   ‘definition	  of	  absolute	  knowledge	  and	  sovereignty:	  risking	  the	  entirety	  of	  one’s	  life’.385	  Perhaps	  it	  is	  in	  part	  this	  death-­‐defying	  agency	  –	  born	  out	  of	  desperation	  –	  which	  states	  find	  so	  threatening	  about	  mobile	  bodies	  making	  irregular	  maritime	  crossings.	  States	  therefore	  seek	  to	  contain	  migrants’	  agency	  through	  strategies	  of	  forced	  containment	   and	   forced	   mobility,	   with	   the	   threat	   of	   expulsion	   constantly	   present.	   In	   order	   to	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ensure	   migrants	   remain	   available	   for	   humanitarian	   rescue,	   they	   must	   remain	   cast	   as	   docile	  bodies.	   To	   do	   so,	   acts	   of	   resistance	   are	   re-­‐appropriated	   and	   contained	   through	  pathologisation	  scripts,	  which	  aim	   to	  depoliticise	  migrants’	  acts	  of	   resistance	  by	  rewriting	   them	  as	  pathological	  expressions	  of	  trauma.	  	  	  The	  pathology	  of	   trauma	  and	  dangerous	  agency	  attached	   to	   the	   refugee	  body	  work	   together	   to	  produce	  a	  notion	  of	   the	  abject	  body	  vulnerable	  to	   intervention	  by	  the	   interrelated	  modalities	  of	  the	  ‘right	  to	  save	  and	  the	  right	  to	  kill	  through	  which	  sovereign	  power	  operates	  over	  bare	  life’.	  386	  At	   sea	   and	   on	   island	  detention	   centres,	  we	   see	   that	   the	   biopolitical	   imperative	   to	   save	   and	   the	  necropolitical	   imperative	   to	   kill	   or	   let	   to	   die	   are	   inseparable	   and	   operate	   alternately	   or	   even	  simultaneously.	   The	   necropolitical	   terrain	   of	   the	   spaces	   between	   nations	   –	   oceans,	   islands,	  seashores,	   the	   offshore	   –	   with	   its	   creative	   geographical	   articulations,	   entwined	   expressions	   of	  securitisation	   and	   humanitarianism,	   and	   spectacular	   visual	   regimes	   is	   therefore	   critical	   to	   the	  contemporary	  management	  of	  migration.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
                                                                                                                                                     
385 Ibid. 
386 Perera, “Australia and the Insular Imagination”, 42 
78 
Works	  Cited	  	  ACBP.	  “Australian	  Customs	  and	  Border	  Protection	  Service.”	  Australian	  Customs	  and	  Border	  Protection	  Service,	  2013.	  http://www.customs.gov.au/site/operation-­‐sovereign-­‐borders.asp.	  Agamben,	  Giorgio.	  State	  of	  Exception.	  Chicago:	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press,	  2005.	  AI.	  This	  Is	  Breaking	  People:	  Human	  Rights	  Violations	  at	  Australia’s	  Asylum	  Seeker	  Processing	  Centre	  
on	  Manus	  Island,	  Papua	  New	  Guinea.	  Amnesty	  International,	  2013.	  AI.	  The	  Human	  Cost	  of	  Fortress	  Europe:	  Human	  Rights	  Violations	  Against	  Migrants	  and	  Refugees	  at	  
Europe’s	  Borders.	  S.O.S.	  Europe:	  People	  before	  Borders.	  London:	  Amnesty	  International,	  2014.	  Alexandra	  Governorate,	  “Video:	  The	  Governor	  of	  Alexandria	  welcomes	  227	  people	  who	  attempted	  an	  illegal	  migration	  and	  provides	  a	  youth	  centre	  as	  their	  place	  of	  detention”,	  2014,	  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sOe0lCXsXnM&feature=youtube_gdata_player.	  Amar,	  Paul.	  The	  Security	  Archipelago:	  Human-­‐Security	  States,	  Sexuality	  Politics,	  and	  the	  End	  of	  
Neoliberalism.	  Durham:	  Duke	  University	  Press	  Books,	  2013.	  ———.	  “Turning	  the	  Gendered	  Politics	  of	  the	  Security	  State	  Inside	  Out?”	  International	  Feminist	  
Journal	  of	  Politics	  13,	  no.	  3	  (2011):	  299–328.	  Amoore,	  Louise.	  “Biometric	  Borders:	  Governing	  Mobilities	  in	  the	  War	  on	  Terror.”	  Political	  
Geography	  25	  (2006):	  336–51.	  Anderson,	  Benedict	  Richard	  O’Gorman.	  Imagined	  Communities:	  Reflections	  on	  the	  Origin	  and	  
Spread	  of	  Nationalism.	  Verso,	  1991.	  Andrijasevic,	  R.	  “From	  Exception	  to	  Excess:	  Detention	  and	  Deportations	  across	  the	  Mediterranean	  Space.”	  In	  The	  Deportation	  Regime:	  Sovereignty,	  Space	  and	  the	  Freedom	  of	  Movement,	  edited	  by	  N	  De	  Genova	  and	  N	  Peutz,	  147–65.	  Durham,	  NC:	  Duke	  University	  Press,	  2010.	  Andrijasevic,	  Rutvica.	  “Sex	  on	  the	  Move:	  Gender,	  Subjectivity	  and	  Differential	  Inclusion.”	  
Subjectivity	  29	  (2009):	  389–406.	  Aradau,	  Claudia.	  Rethinking	  Trafficking	  in	  Women:	  Politics	  out	  of	  Security.	  New	  York:	  Palgrave	  Macmillan,	  2008.	  Baldacchino,	  G.,	  and	  D.	  Milne.	  “Exploring	  Sub-­‐National	  Island	  Jurisdictions:	  An	  Editorial	  Introduction.”	  The	  Round	  Table	  95,	  no.	  386	  (2006):	  487–502.	  Baldacchino,	  Godfrey.	  “Editorial:	  Islands	  —	  Objects	  of	  Representation.”	  Geografiska	  Annaler:	  
Series	  B,	  Human	  Geography	  87,	  no.	  4	  (December	  1,	  2005):	  247–51.	  doi:10.1111/j.0435-­‐3684.2005.00196.x.	  ———.	  “Islands	  and	  the	  Offshoring	  Possibilities	  and	  Strategies	  of	  Contemporary	  States:	  Insights	  On/for	  the	  Migration	  Phenomenon	  on	  Europe’s	  Southern	  Flank.”	  Island	  Studies	  Journal	  9,	  no.	  1	  (2014):	  57–68.	  BBC.	  “Dozens	  of	  Migrants	  Die	  in	  Italy	  Boat	  Sinking	  near	  Lampedusa.”	  BBC	  News,	  March	  10,	  2013.	  http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-­‐europe-­‐24380247.	  Berlant,	  Lauren.	  Cruel	  Optimism.	  Durham:	  Duke	  University	  Press	  Books,	  2011.	  “Best	  Beaches	  in	  the	  World	  -­‐	  Travelers’	  Choice	  Awards	  -­‐	  TripAdvisor.”	  Accessed	  November	  15,	  2014.	  http://www.tripadvisor.com/TravelersChoice-­‐Beaches-­‐g1.	  Bigo,	  Didier.	  “Detention	  of	  Foreigners,	  States	  of	  Exception,	  and	  the	  Social	  Practices	  of	  Control	  and	  the	  Banopticon.”	  In	  Borderscapes:	  Hidden	  Geographies	  and	  Politics	  at	  Territory’s	  Edge,	  edited	  by	  Prem	  Kumar	  Rajaram	  and	  Carl	  Grundy-­‐Warr,	  3–34.	  University	  of	  Minnesota	  Press,	  2007.	  Blunt,	  Alison.	  “Cultural	  Geographies	  of	  Migration:	  Mobility,	  Transnationality	  and	  Diaspora.”	  
Progress	  in	  Human	  Geography	  31,	  no.	  5	  (2007):	  684–94.	  Brown,	  Michael,	  and	  Lynn	  A	  Staeheli.	  “‘Are	  We	  There	  yet?’	  Feminist	  Political	  Geographies.”	  
Gender,	  Place	  &	  Culture:	  A	  Journal	  of	  Feminist	  Geography	  10,	  no.	  3	  (2003):	  247–55.	  Brown,	  Wendy.	  States	  of	  Injury:	  Power	  and	  Freedom	  in	  Late	  Modernity.	  Princeton,	  New	  Jersey:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  1995.	  ———.	  Walled	  States,	  Waning	  Sovereignty.	  MIT	  Press,	  2010.	  Chambers,	  Peter.	  “Shipwreck	  with	  Spectator:	  Snapshots	  of	  Border	  Security	  in	  Australia.”	  Global	  
Change,	  Peace	  and	  Security	  26,	  no.	  1	  (2014):	  97–112.	  doi:10.1080/14781158.2014.868425.	  
79 
———.	  “Society	  Has	  Been	  Defended:	  Following	  the	  Shifting	  Shape	  of	  State	  through	  Australia’s	  Christmas	  Island.”	  International	  Political	  Sociology	  5	  (2011):	  18–34.	  CITA.	  “Christmas	  Island	  History.”	  Christmas	  Island	  Tourism	  Association,	  2012.	  http://www.christmas.net.au/about/history.html.	  Conlon,	  Deirdre.	  “Waiting:	  Feminist	  Perspectives	  on	  the	  Spacings/timings	  of	  Migrant	  (im)mobility.”	  Gender,	  Place	  &	  Culture:	  A	  Journal	  of	  Feminist	  Geography	  18,	  no.	  3	  (2011):	  353–60.	  Connell,	  John.	  “Nauru:	  The	  First	  Failed	  Pacific	  State?”	  The	  Round	  Table	  95,	  no.	  383	  (January	  1,	  2006):	  47–63.	  doi:10.1080/00358530500379205.	  Dauvergne,	  Catherine.	  Making	  People	  Illegal:	  What	  Globalization	  Means	  for	  Migration	  and	  Law.	  Law	  in	  Context.	  Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2008.	  De	  Genova,	  Nicholas.	  “The	  Deportation	  Regime:	  Sovereignty,	  Space	  and	  the	  Freedom	  of	  Movement.”	  In	  The	  Deportation	  Regime:	  Sovereignty,	  Space	  and	  the	  Freedom	  of	  Movement,	  edited	  by	  Nicholas	  De	  Genova	  and	  Natalie	  Peutz,	  33–68.	  Durham,	  NC:	  Duke	  University	  Press,	  2010.	  De	  Genova,	  N,	  and	  Natalie	  Peutz.	  “Introduction.”	  In	  The	  Deportation	  Regime:	  Sovereignty,	  Space	  
and	  the	  Freedom	  of	  Movement,	  edited	  by	  Nicholas	  De	  Genova	  and	  Natalie	  Peutz,	  1–32.	  Durham,	  NC:	  Duke	  University	  Press,	  2010.	  De	  Haas,	  Hein.	  “Lampedusa:	  Only	  the	  Dead	  Can	  Stay.”	  Hein	  de	  Haas,	  August	  10,	  2013.	  http://heindehaas.blogspot.com.au/2013/10/lampedusa-­‐only-­‐dead-­‐can-­‐stay.html.	  Demos,	  T.J.	  The	  Migrant	  Image:	  The	  Art	  and	  Politics	  of	  Documentary	  during	  Global	  Crisis.	  Durham	  &	  London:	  Duke	  University	  Press,	  2013.	  Doezema,	  Jo.	  “Ouch!	  Western	  Feminists’	  ‘Wounded	  Attachment’	  to	  the	  ‘Third	  World	  Prostitute.’”	  
Feminist	  Review	  67	  (2001):	  16–38.	  Doty,	  Roxanne	  Lynn.	  “States	  of	  Exception	  on	  the	  Mexico-­‐U.S.	  Border:	  Security,	  ‘Decisions’,	  and	  Civilian	  Border	  Patrols.”	  International	  Political	  Sociology	  1	  (2007):	  113–37.	  El-­‐Behairy,	  Nouran.	  “Morsi’s	  Syria	  Speech	  Angers	  Opposition.”	  Daily	  News	  Egypt,	  2013.	  http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2013/06/16/morsis-­‐syria-­‐speech-­‐angers-­‐opposition/.	  “EU	  to	  Probe	  Spain	  over	  Rubber	  Bullets	  Fired	  at	  Migrants.”	  BBC	  News,	  February	  15,	  2014.	  http://www.bbc.com/news/world-­‐europe-­‐26201013.	  Evans,	  Becky.	  “Lampedusa	  Migrant	  Boat	  Tragedy	  Death	  Toll	  Reaches	  211	  as	  More	  Bodies	  Are	  Recovered	  from	  the	  Sunken	  Vessel	  That	  Was	  Headed	  for	  Italy.”	  The	  Daily	  Mail.	  August	  10,	  2013.	  http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-­‐2448753/Lampedusa-­‐migrant-­‐boat-­‐tragedy-­‐death-­‐toll-­‐reaches-­‐211-­‐bodies-­‐recovered.html.	  Fassin,	  Didier.	  “Policing	  Borders,	  Producing	  Boundaries.	  The	  Governmentality	  of	  Immigration	  in	  Dark	  Times.”	  Annual	  Review	  of	  Anthropology	  40	  (2011):	  213–26.	  ———.	  “The	  Biopolitics	  of	  Otherness:	  Undocumented	  Foreigners	  and	  Racial	  Discrimination	  in	  French	  Public	  Debate.”	  Anthropology	  Today	  17,	  no.	  1	  (2001):	  3–7.	  Ferguson,	  James,	  and	  Akhil	  Gupta.	  “Spatializing	  States:	  Toward	  an	  Ethnography	  of	  Neoliberal	  Governmentality.”	  American	  Ethnologist	  29,	  no.	  4	  (2002):	  981–1002.	  Forbes,	  Vivian	  Louis,	  and	  Ee	  Tiang	  Heng.	  “Christmas	  Island:	  Remote	  No	  More.”	  In	  Australia’s	  Arc	  of	  
Instability:	  The	  Political	  and	  Cultural	  Dynamics	  of	  Regional	  Security,	  edited	  by	  Dennis	  Rumley,	  Vivian	  Louis	  Forbes,	  and	  Christopher	  Griffin.	  Springer	  Science	  &	  Business	  Media,	  2006.	  Foucault,	  Michel.	  “Of	  Other	  Spaces:	  Utopias	  and	  Hetrotopias.”	  Translated	  by	  Jay	  Miskowiec.	  
Architecture/Mouvement/Continuite,	  October	  1984.	  ———.	  “Society	  Must	  Be	  Defended”:	  Lectures	  at	  the	  Collège	  de	  France,	  1975-­‐1976.	  Translated	  by	  David	  Macey.	  Reprint	  edition.	  New	  York:	  Picador,	  2003.	  Free	  Syria	  2011,	  “Tawfiq	  Okasha	  Threatens	  to	  Kill	  the	  Syrian	  Refugees	  and	  Burn	  Down	  Their	  Houses	  in	  Egypt”,	  2013,	  Tawfiq	  Okasha,	  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=U01y6baHvm4&feature=youtube_gdata_player.	  Frontex.	  “Irregular	  Arrivals	  Were	  at	  Record	  High	  in	  the	  Third	  Quarter	  of	  2013.”	  Frontex,	  2014.	  http://frontex.europa.eu/news/irregular-­‐arrivals-­‐were-­‐at-­‐record-­‐high-­‐in-­‐the-­‐third-­‐quarter-­‐of-­‐2013-­‐qZCQJR.	  Grange,	  Mariette.	  Smoke	  Screens:	  Is	  There	  a	  Correlation	  between	  Migration	  Euphemisms	  and	  the	  
Language	  of	  Detention.	  Working	  Paper.	  Global	  Detention	  Project	  Working	  Paper.	  Geneva,	  Switzerland:	  Global	  Detention	  Project,	  2013.	  
80 
Grewcock,	  Michael.	  Border	  Crimes:	  Australia’s	  War	  on	  Illicit	  Migrants.	  Sydney,	  N.S.W:	  Federation	  Pr,	  2010.	  Gulhane,	  Joel.	  “Syrian	  Refugees	  in	  Post-­‐Morsi	  Egypt.”	  Daily	  News	  Egypt,	  March	  9,	  2013.	  http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2013/09/03/syrian-­‐refugees-­‐in-­‐post-­‐morsi-­‐egypt/.	  Harding,	  Luke.	  “Tiny	  Nauru	  Struts	  World	  Stage	  by	  Recognising	  Breakaway	  Republics.”	  The	  
Guardian,	  December	  14,	  2009,	  sec.	  World	  news.	  http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/dec/14/nauro-­‐recognises-­‐abkhazia-­‐south-­‐ossetia.	  Heller,	  Charles,	  and	  Lorenzo	  Pezzani.	  Liquid	  Traces	  -­‐	  The	  Left-­‐to-­‐Die	  Boat	  Case.	  Forensic	  Architecture.	  London:	  Centre	  for	  Research	  Architecture,	  2014.	  vimeo.com/89790770.	  Heller-­‐Roazen,	  Daniel.	  The	  Enemy	  of	  All:	  Piracy	  and	  the	  Law	  of	  Nations.	  New	  York :	  Cambridge,	  Mass:	  Zone	  Books,	  2009.	  Hyndman,	  Jennifer,	  and	  Alison	  Mountz.	  “Another	  Brick	  in	  the	  Wall?	  Neo-­‐Refoulement	  and	  the	  Externalization	  of	  Asylum	  by	  Australia	  and	  Europe.”	  Government	  and	  Opposition	  43,	  no.	  2	  (2008):	  249–69.	  Hyndman,	  J,	  and	  W	  Giles.	  “Waiting	  for	  What?	  The	  Feminisation	  of	  Asylum	  in	  Protracted	  Situations.”	  Gender,	  Place	  &	  Culture:	  A	  Journal	  of	  Feminist	  Geography	  18,	  no.	  3	  (2011):	  361–79.	  “IOM	  Releases	  New	  Data	  on	  Migrant	  Fatalities	  Worldwide:	  Almost	  40,000	  Since	  2000	  -­‐	  International	  Organization	  for	  Migration.”	  Accessed	  September	  30,	  2014.	  http://www.iom.int/cms/render/live/en/sites/iom/home/news-­‐and-­‐views/news-­‐releases/news-­‐listing/iom-­‐releases-­‐new-­‐data-­‐on-­‐migrant.html.	  Johnston,	  Alan.	  “Italy	  Boat	  Sinking:	  Hundreds	  Feared	  Dead	  off	  Lampedusa.”	  BBC,	  March	  10,	  2013.	  http://www.bbc.com/news/world-­‐europe-­‐24380247.	  Kassam,	  Ashifa.	  “African	  Migrants	  Look	  down	  on	  White-­‐Clad	  Golfers	  in	  Viral	  Photo.”	  The	  Guardian,	  November	  23,	  2014.	  http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/23/-­‐sp-­‐african-­‐migrants-­‐look-­‐down-­‐on-­‐white-­‐clad-­‐golfers-­‐in-­‐viral-­‐photo.	  Katz,	  Cindi.	  “On	  the	  Grounds	  of	  Globalization:	  A	  Topography	  for	  Feminist	  Political	  Engagement.”	  
Signs,	  Globalization	  and	  Gender,	  26,	  no.	  4	  (2001):	  1213–34.	  “King	  Visits	  Disputed	  Spanish	  Cities	  in	  Africa	  -­‐	  The	  New	  York	  Times.”	  Accessed	  November	  16,	  2014.	  http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/05/world/europe/05iht-­‐05spain.8196158.html.	  Kofman,	  Eleonore.	  “Feminist	  Political	  Geographies.”	  In	  A	  Companion	  to	  Feminist	  Geography,	  edited	  by	  Lise	  Nelson	  and	  Joni	  Seager,	  519–33.	  Blackwell	  Publishing	  Ltd,	  2005.	  http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/9780470996898.ch34/summary.	  Loyd,	  Jenna	  M.,	  and	  Alison	  Mountz.	  “Managing	  Migration,	  Scaling	  Sovereignty	  on	  Islands.”	  Island	  
Studies	  Journal	  9,	  no.	  1	  (2014):	  23–42.	  MacLellan,	  Nic.	  “What	  Has	  Australia	  Done	  to	  Nauru?”	  Overland	  Literary	  Journal,	  no.	  212	  (2013).	  https://overland.org.au/previous-­‐issues/issue-­‐212/feature-­‐nic-­‐maclellan/.	  
ManusRiot	  Insider:	  “It”s	  Designed	  as	  an	  Experiment	  in	  the	  Active	  Creation	  of	  Horror’.	  Dateline,	  2014.	  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WrnqrXSNBtc&feature=youtube_gdata_player.	  Mbembe,	  Achille.	  “Necropolitics.”	  Public	  Culture	  15,	  no.	  1	  (2003):	  11–40.	  ———.	  On	  the	  Postcolony.	  Berkeley:	  University	  of	  California	  Press,	  2001.	  McNevin,	  Anne.	  “Border	  Policing	  and	  Sovereign	  Terrain:	  The	  Spatial	  Framing	  of	  Unwanted	  Migration	  in	  Melbourne	  and	  Australia.”	  Globalizations	  7,	  no.	  3	  (2010):	  407–19.	  ———.	  Contesting	  Citizenship:	  Irregular	  Migrants	  and	  New	  Frontiers	  of	  the	  Political.	  New	  York:	  Columbia	  University	  Press,	  2011.	  Mitchell,	  K.	  “Geographies	  of	  Identity:	  The	  New	  Exceptionalism.”	  Progress	  in	  Human	  Geography	  30,	  no.	  1	  (2006):	  95–106.	  Morrison,	  Scott.	  “Manus	  Island	  Incident,	  Operation	  Sovereign	  Borders,	  Joint	  Review,”	  February	  21,	  2014.	  http://www.minister.immi.gov.au/media/sm/2014/sm212027.htm.	  Mountz,	  Alison.	  “Where	  Asylum-­‐Seekers	  Wait:	  Feminist	  Counter-­‐Topographies	  of	  Sites	  between	  States.”	  Gender,	  Place	  &	  Culture:	  A	  Journal	  of	  Feminist	  Geography	  18,	  no.	  3	  (2011):	  381–99.	  ———.	  “The	  Enforcement	  Archipelago:	  Detention,	  Haunting	  and	  Asylum	  on	  Islands,”	  Political	  
Geography	  30	  (2011):	  118–28.	  Mountz,	  Alison,	  Kate	  Coddington,	  R.	  Tina	  Catania,	  and	  Jenna	  M.	  Loyd.	  “Conceptualizing	  Detention:	  Mobility,	  Containment,	  Bordering	  and	  Exclusion.”	  Progress	  in	  Human	  Geography	  37,	  no.	  4	  (2012):	  522–41.	  
81 
ONTV,	  “Brotherhood	  members	  and	  Syrians	  are	  dancing	  Syrian	  dabka	  in	  Raba’a	  Al-­‐Adawya	  sit-­‐in”,	  2013,	  Youseff	  Al-­‐Husseiny	  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DozUkV3CqJw&feature=youtube_gdata_player.	  Papadopoulos,	  Dimitris,	  Niamh	  Stephenson,	  and	  Vassilis	  Tsianos.	  Escape	  Routes:	  Control	  and	  
Subversion	  in	  the	  21st	  Century.	  London;	  Ann	  Arbor,	  MI:	  Pluto	  Press,	  2008.	  “Paradise	  Well	  and	  Truly	  Lost.”	  The	  Economist,	  December	  20,	  2001.	  http://www.economist.com/node/884045.	  Peckham,	  Robert	  Shannan.	  “The	  Uncertain	  State	  of	  Islands:	  National	  Identity	  and	  the	  Discourse	  of	  Islands	  in	  Nineteenth-­‐Century	  Britain	  and	  Greece.”	  Journal	  of	  Historical	  Geography,	  no.	  4	  (2003):	  499–515.	  doi:10.1006/jhge.2002.0407.	  Perera,	  Suvendrini.	  Australia	  and	  the	  Insular	  Imagination:	  Beaches,	  Borders,	  Boats,	  and	  Bodies.	  New	  York:	  Palgrave	  Macmillan,	  2009.	  ———.	  “‘They	  Give	  Evidence’:	  Bodies,	  Borders	  and	  the	  Disappeared.”	  Social	  Identities	  12,	  no.	  6	  (2006):	  637–56.	  ———.	  “Torturous	  Dialogues:	  Geographies	  of	  Trauma	  and	  Spaces	  of	  Exception.”	  Continuum:	  
Journal	  of	  Media	  &	  Cultural	  Studies	  24,	  no.	  1	  (2010):	  31–45.	  Perkowski,	  Nina.	  “No	  Accident:	  Why	  Have	  19,142	  Died	  at	  Europe’s	  Frontiers?”	  Common	  Dreams,	  July	  10,	  2013.	  http://www.commondreams.org/view/2013/10/07.	  Pianigiani,	  Gaia.	  “Scores	  of	  Migrants	  Dead	  After	  Boat	  Sinnks	  Off	  Sicily.”	  The	  New	  York	  Times.	  March	  10,	  2013.	  http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/04/world/europe/scores-­‐die-­‐in-­‐shipwreck-­‐off-­‐sicily.html?_r=0.	  Pickering,	  Sharon.	  “Floating	  Carceral	  Spaces:	  Border	  Enforcement	  and	  Gender	  on	  the	  High	  Seas.”	  
Punishment	  and	  Society	  16,	  no.	  2	  (2014):	  187–205.	  PM.	  “Morrison	  Calls	  Asylum	  Policy	  ‘Operation	  Sovereign	  Murders.’”	  Sunshine	  Coast	  Daily,	  March	  1,	  2014.	  http://www.sunshinecoastdaily.com.au/news/morrison-­‐calls-­‐asylum-­‐policy-­‐operation-­‐sovereign-­‐m/2185411/.	  Pugliese,	  Joseph.	  “Technologies	  of	  Extraterritorialisation,	  Statist	  Visuality	  and	  Irregular	  Migrants	  and	  Refugees.”	  Griffith	  Law	  Review,	  Statist	  Visualities,	  22,	  no.	  3	  (2013):	  571–97.	  ———.	  “Crisis Heterotopias and Border Zones of the Dead.” Continuum: Journal of Media & 
Cultural Studies 23, no. 5 (2009): 663–79.	  ———.	  “The	  Tutelary	  Architecture	  of	  Immigration	  Detention	  Prisons	  and	  the	  Spectacle	  of	  ‘Necessary	  Suffering.’”	  Architectural	  Theory	  Review	  13,	  no.	  2	  (2008):	  206–21.	  Rajaram,	  Prem	  Kumar.	  “‘Making	  Place’:	  The	  ‘Pacific	  Solution’	  and	  Australian	  Emplacement	  in	  the	  Pacific	  and	  on	  Refugee	  Bodies.”	  Singapore	  Journal	  of	  Tropical	  Geography	  24,	  no.	  3	  (November	  1,	  2003):	  290–306.	  doi:10.1111/1467-­‐9493.00160.	  Retort.	  Afflicted	  Powers:	  Capital	  and	  Spectacle	  in	  a	  New	  Age	  of	  War.	  Verso,	  2005.	  Rough	  Guide.	  “Rough	  Guides	  -­‐	  Melilla,”	  2012.	  http://www.roughguides.com/destinations/africa/morocco/mediterranean-­‐coast-­‐rif/melilla/.	  Salter,	  Mark	  B.	  “We	  Are	  All	  Exiles:	  Implications	  of	  the	  Border	  as	  a	  State	  of	  Exception.”	  In	  
Contemporary	  Insecurities	  and	  the	  Politics	  of	  Exception,	  1–15.	  Turin,	  Italy,	  2007.	  Schmitt,	  Carl.	  Political	  Theology:	  Four	  Chapters	  on	  the	  Concept	  of	  Sovereignty.	  Translated	  by	  George	  Schwab.	  Chicago:	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press,	  2005.	  Schwab,	  George.	  “Introduction.”	  In	  Political	  Theology,	  by	  Carl	  Schmitt.	  Cambridge:	  MIT	  Press,	  1985.	  Scott,	  James	  C.	  Seeing	  Like	  a	  State:	  How	  Certain	  Schemes	  to	  Improve	  the	  Human	  Condition	  Have	  
Failed.	  Yale	  University	  Press,	  1998.	  Silvey,	  Rachel.	  “Power,	  Difference	  and	  Mobility:	  Feminist	  Advances	  in	  Migration	  Studies.”	  Progress	  
in	  Human	  Geography	  28,	  no.	  4	  (2004):	  1–17.	  Soguk,	  Nevzat.	  “Border’s	  Capture:	  Insurrectional	  Politics,	  Border-­‐Crossing	  Humans,	  and	  the	  New	  Political.”	  In	  Borderscapes:	  Hidden	  Geographies	  and	  Politics	  at	  Territory’s	  Edge,	  edited	  by	  Prem	  Kumar	  Rajaram	  and	  Carl	  Grundy-­‐Warr.	  University	  of	  Minnesota	  Press,	  2007.	  Triandafyllidou,	  Anna.	  “Multi-­‐Levelling	  and	  Externalizing	  Migration	  and	  Asylum:	  Lessons	  from	  the	  Southern	  European	  Islands.”	  Island	  Studies	  Journal	  9,	  no.	  1	  (2014):	  7–22.	  UNHCR.	  “UNHCR	  Syria	  Regional	  Refugee	  Response.”	  UNHCR	  Syria	  Regional	  Refugee	  Response,	  2014.	  http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/country.php?id=8.	  Weber,	  Leanne.	  “The	  Shifting	  Frontiers	  of	  Migration	  Control.”	  In	  Borders,	  Mobility	  and	  
Technologies	  of	  Control,	  21–43.	  Springer,	  2006.	  
82 
Wilson,	  Dean,	  and	  Leanne	  Weber.	  “Surveillance,	  Risk	  and	  Preemption	  on	  the	  Australian	  Border.”	  
Surveillance	  and	  Society	  5,	  no.	  2	  (2008):	  121–41.	  Ziarek,	  Ewa	  Plonowska.	  “Bare	  Life	  on	  Strike:	  Notes	  on	  the	  Biopolitics	  of	  Race	  and	  Gender.”	  South	  
Atlantic	  Quarterly	  107,	  no.	  1	  (2008):	  89–105.	  
 
